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Abstract 
For 30 years, federal courts have certified questions of state law to the Utah Supreme 
Court. This thesis examines the history and utility of the process and recommends changes to the 
process in the federal district court and in the Utah Supreme Court.  
The current focus of federal judges in certifying questions is on utility for the case before 
the court. But certification of questions from a federal court to a state court is an expression of 
federalism—a humble acknowledgment by a federal authority which is often regarded as 
supreme that the state is the proper and best authority to declare its own law. Certification of 
questions is a rare instance of direct communication between state and federal courts, and a 
chance for both systems to cooperate in resolution of a single case, in their respective roles.  
Certification of legal questions from federal courts to state courts has emerged in the last 
75 years. Similar purposes were accomplished previously in American law by very cumbersome 
procedures, and antecedents existed in English law. From Florida’s adoption of the first statutory 
certification procedure in 1945 through a 1960 U.S. Supreme Court endorsement of certification 
and promulgation of the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, all states except North 
Carolina have adopted a certification procedure.  
The Utah procedure and practice began in 1975 with a rule later found to violate the Utah 
Constitution. But in 1984, a constitutional authorization paved the way for a valid process which 
has been used regularly, and most frequently in the last three years since a justice of the Utah 
Supreme Court became a district judge in the District of Utah.  
Thirty years of experience with certification in Utah federal and state courts is thoroughly 
examined in this thesis. Case histories and court practices demonstrate the usefulness of 
certification in Utah. But the thesis also suggests changes to Utah certification, by adoption of a 
new rule in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah; by changes to the applicable Utah 
Rule of Appellate Procedure; and by changed practices of judges and lawyers. This thesis can 
serve as the basis for reflection, discussion and improvement between participants in the process 
of certification. 
This thesis also suggests other areas of study for the future, some related to Utah’s 
experience and other more general topics. 
Utah’s foundation for certification of questions from the federal court to the Utah 
Supreme Court has been laid. And now the process can be refined and improved for the future. 
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Overview of the Certification Process 
This section of the thesis serves as an introduction for those unfamiliar with the process 
of certification—delivering questions to a state appellate court by a court of another 
jurisdiction. Those familiar with the process may skip this section. This section introduces some 
terminology peculiar to certification. 
The law of the state having the greatest relationship to the parties’ dispute usually must be 
applied to resolve the dispute. Even if a case is filed in the court of another state or in a federal 
court, the law of the state having the greatest relationship generally must be applied. So, courts 
of one state (or a federal court) may attempt themselves to determine the applicable law by 
research, if precedent exists, or by prediction if there is no precedent, or the courts may certify a 
legal question to a court in the state of the governing law. 
This thesis only discusses certification of legal questions to the Utah Supreme Court by 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the District Court for the District of Utah, and the 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah. The certification process has many stages as outlined 
in these charts: 
Federal Court with Lawsuit or Appeal 
Legal question arises, dependent on Utah state law 
Suggestion to certify is made by the court (“sua sponte”) or by a motion from a party 
Court determines to certify, by an order granting the motion or by advising the parties in an order or 
hearing 
Attorneys and the judge draft facts and question to send to Utah Supreme Court 
Judge signs and sends “certification order” to Utah Supreme Court with documents from court record 
Utah Supreme Court 
Court receives certification order 
Court issues an order accepting or rejecting the question certified and requests documents from 
federal court record 
Court sets briefing schedule, receives briefs and holds argument (all these steps may be 
modified) 
After argument, court confers and assigns opinion to a justice (another justice may write a 
separate opinion) 
Justices issue opinion(s) answering questions (majority opinion controls) 
Opinion(s) sent to federal court 
Federal Court with Lawsuit or Appeal 
Federal court applies answer of Utah Supreme Court 
1 
Introduction 
Certification is a unique opportunity for state and federal courts to directly interact, 
though in a heavily formalized manner. When a federal court certifies a question to a state court, 
the parties’ dispute is partially shared between two independent judicial systems. Other 
circumstances in which a dispute is shared between the courts of two different sovereign 
jurisdictions are very rare. 
In certification, contrary to usual supremacy of federal over state systems, state courts set 
the procedures federal courts must follow. And a state court always has discretion to refuse, 
receive, and even reformulate the question from the federal court. In certifying a question to a 
state court, a federal court acknowledges the sovereignty of the state and the presumed expertise 
and right of a state court to interpret state law. Certification is a unique feature of American 
federalism. 
Certification from federal courts to state appellate courts is also an unusual process for 
the state appellate court. Certification interactions are different than the exchanges between 
courts of a single system, which are usually between a superior court and an inferior court. In 
those instances, the superior court instructs, rejects, or approves the actions of the inferior court. 
In certification, the responding court has a role delimited by the questioning court.  
Certification interaction, where a responding court receives a narrow, certified question, 
is similar to the role of an appellate court focused on a subset of issues raised in a trial court. But 
certification, on a partially developed record, is very different than an appeal from a fully tried 
case. In certification, the certifying court assesses the determinative nature of a question of state 
law, formulates facts on which the state court will make a decision, and prepares a certification 
order—before trial on the merits. Certification nearly places a state court in the position of 
answering a hypothetical question, which is generally disfavored by courts. 
Utah was an early adopter of certification. The Utah Supreme Court adopted a rule 
permitting certification in 1975. But in 1981, after the roster of justices on the court had entirely 
changed, the rule was found unconstitutional. Fortunately, other issues with the Judicial Article 
in Utah’s Constitution resulted in a revision of that Article in 1984. The revision included 
authorization for the Utah Supreme Court to respond to certified questions. A new statute and 
court rule followed in 1986.  
Since that time, Utah’s 30 years of experience with certification has created a rich 
database of over 130 cases. We can examine the benefits and detriments of certification in 
specific cases.1 
                                                 
1 The reader is cautioned by a note appearing in a scholarly article over twenty years ago, relating the responses of 
two judges to a survey on the issue of certification: “As to the value of this survey, two of the more interesting 
comments provided by the respondents were: ‘This is a truly tedious subject about which I have not given three 
minutes of thought in the last 22 years!’; and ‘This is a very interesting issue – AJS is to be complimented on 
addressing it.’” Jona Goldschmidt, Certification of Questions of Law: Federalism in Practice, 2 n.1, American 
Judicature Society (1995). 
2 
But certification is more than case-specific. Certification has institutional significance 
that has not been emphasized as federal courts have considered certification to the Utah Supreme 
Court. Certification recognizes the primary role of the Utah Supreme Court as the interpreter of 
Utah law. While a federal court is empowered to interpret the law of any state or foreign 
jurisdiction, certification expresses federalism, and recognizes the superior role of the Utah 
Supreme Court in setting Utah precedent. 
The unique nature of certification calls for careful consideration of its benefits, processes 
and detriments, which this thesis undertakes. The practices of the Utah Supreme Court, the 
various judges of the Utah federal district court and bankruptcy court, 2 and the panels of the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals are reviewed. This thesis examines: 
• the types of cases and issues that have used certification;  
• the best stages of proceedings to seek certification;  
• the federal judges who most often suggest certification and grant motions to 
certify;  
• the principles which have guided lawyers and judges as questions are formulated 
for certification and included in certification orders;  
• the sua sponte use of certification of questions by the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in 13 cases, where nine of the answers have resulted in reversal of a trial 
court decision; 
• the processes followed in the federal courts which certify questions to the Utah 
Supreme Court;  
• the factors considered by the federal courts in granting certification, including 
outdated factors still cited in certification decisions; 
• the role of Jill Parrish, former Utah Supreme Court justice and now federal district 
judge in changing the use of certification by the district court; 
• the criteria which appear to have been used for the decision of the Utah Supreme 
Court to accept, reject, or reformulate certified questions; and 
• the impact of certification on the case at issue, including delay from the 
certification process and the role of certification in resolving the case. 
If judges so choose, the data and analysis in this thesis may serve as a basis for direct 
non-case related communication about certification between the state and federal courts.  
This thesis recommends changes in the Utah certification process. A new local rule is 
proposed for the federal district court. Changes are recommended to the 30-year-old Utah Rule 
of Appellate Procedure on certification. These changes will better balance case specific and inter-
governmental considerations. The rule proposals may be considered by the rules committees of 
the respective courts. 
  
                                                 
2 The term “trial court” is sometimes used to include the federal district court and bankruptcy court in the District of 
Utah. 
3 
Legal Context 
The United States of America is unique in having dual sovereignties, with fifty state legal 
and court systems and a single federal system which overlaps the fifty states geographically and, 
in many instances, jurisdictionally. Federal courts may consider disputes arising under state law, 
and some federal disputes, such as tax matters, depend on application of state law. A state or 
federal court in one state may decide a case under the law of another state.  
The web of interrelated systems requires courts whose regular work is with the law of the 
sponsoring government to occasionally apply the law of a different sovereign. Conflict of law 
rules determine how these courts select the law to apply. “Federal courts [after Erie R.R. Co. v 
Tompkins3] must, when a state law question is posed within the context of a federal case, apply 
state substantive law as the rule of decision.”4  
After a court determines that the law of the state in which it sits should not apply, the 
court proceeds into less familiar legal territory. A state or federal court in which a case is pending 
is not engaged full-time in application of the law of another state; is not an integral and 
constitutional part of that state’s legal system; is not as familiar with the culture and policies of 
the other state; and, possibly most importantly, does not have the constitutional role as final 
arbiter of that state’s law. The court in which the case is pending is, however, required to locate 
authority and interpret it, or in some instances it may certify legal questions to a court of the 
jurisdiction where the law originates.  
The Development of Certification in the United States 
Legal Precedent and Alternatives 
The idea of certifying questions from one judicial system to another is not an American 
invention:  
The British Law Ascertainment Act of 1859 permitted a court in one part of the 
British Commonwealth to remit a case for an opinion on a question of law to a 
court in another part of the Commonwealth. The Foreign Law Ascertainment Act 
of 1861 allowed questions of law to be certified between British courts and courts 
of foreign countries, provided that each country had signed a convention 
governing such procedure.5 
                                                 
3 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
4 William G. Bassler and Michael Potenza, Certification Granted: The Practical and Jurisprudential Reasons Why 
New Jersey Should Adopt a Certification Procedure, 29 Seton Hall L. Rev. 491, 491 (1998-1999). 
5 Ira P. Robbins, The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act: A Proposal for Reform, 18 J. Legis. 127, 132 
(1992). 
 
4 
These enactments were made long after the dissolution of ties between England and the 
American colonies, so they were not part of the common law adopted in the colonies. But they 
may have influenced the adoption of certification processes in the United States.  
There was a federal statute of long standing which allows federal courts of appeal to 
certify questions of law to the U.S. Supreme Court.6 This procedure is no longer in use because 
the Supreme Court has limited its caseload.7 That could be an analog to certification from courts 
of states or federal courts to the courts of states. 
 Before certification procedures were in place, American federal courts would take 
alternative approaches when decisive questions of state law were presented on which the federal 
court was unwilling to opine. The federal court could stay its proceedings and direct parties to 
file a declaratory judgment action in a state court, if the state accepted such actions.8 Or a federal 
court could simply abstain from proceeding with the case, leaving the parties to re-file in another 
court—or lack a remedy. Abstention was disfavored: “Abdication of the obligation to decide 
cases can be justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order 
to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly serve an important countervailing 
interest.”9 Those interests were generally confined to comity and where a “federal constitutional 
issue . . . might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state court determination of 
pertinent state law.”10 
 And declaratory actions were sometimes rejected. In United Services Life Insurance 
Company v. Delaney11 the Fifth Circuit instructed the parties to “initiate a proceeding in a Texas 
court seeking a declaratory judgment about of the meaning of the pertinent clauses of the 
respective insurance contracts, with a review of such judgment by a court of last resort of the 
State of Texas.”12 The parties did file the declaratory action, but were told by the Texas trial court 
(which was affirmed by the Texas Supreme Court) that the declaratory case could not be heard 
due to “a constitutional lack of power.”13 “[T]he rendition of advisory opinions by courts is 
unauthorized by our constitution . . . .”14 
                                                 
6 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (2006); see also Amanda L. Tyler, Setting the Supreme Court's Agenda: Is There a Place for 
Certification?, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1310 (2010). 
7 Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 
Colum. L. Rev. 1643, 1712 (2000). 
8 Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30 (1959).  
9 Allegheny Cty. v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188–89 (1959). 
10 Id. at 189. 
11 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1964). 
12 Id. at 485. 
13 United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855, 863 (Tex. 1965). 
14 Id. at 864. 
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Florida First In Certification—and U.S. Supreme Court Commentary 
 Florida was the first state to adopt a procedure to accept questions certified from federal 
courts. The 1945 Florida statute was followed by an implementing rule in 1961.15 Before the rule 
was adopted, the U.S. Supreme Court instructed the Fifth Circuit to use the statutory process,16 
and spoke in glowing terms about the procedure: 
The Florida Legislature, with rare foresight, has dealt with the problem of 
authoritatively determining unresolved state law involved in federal litigation by a 
statute which permits a federal court to certify such a doubtful question of state 
law to the Supreme Court of Florida for its decision. Even without such a 
facilitating statute we have frequently deemed it appropriate, where a federal 
constitutional question might be mooted thereby, to secure an authoritative state 
court's determination of an unresolved question of its local law.17 
The Supreme Court directed that the Fifth Circuit, on remand, use the procedure,18 and the 
Supreme Court used the procedure itself in later Florida cases decided in 1963.19 These 
endorsements were cited as motivation the formulation of the Uniform Certification of Questions 
of Law Act (1967) (“Uniform Act (1967)”).20   
                                                 
15 Bassler, supra n.4, at 494 n.13. 
16 The Supreme Court noted that the promulgation of rules was not “a jurisdictional requirement for the 
entertainment by the Florida Supreme Court of a certificate” from a federal court. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 
U.S. 207, 212 (1960). 
17 Id. (citations omitted). When the Fifth Circuit invoked the process on remand, the procedure was upheld against a 
challenged in the Florida Supreme Court. Goldschmidt, supra n.1, at 94 n.233 (citing Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 
133 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1961), rev’d, 319 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1963), rev’d, 377 U.S. 180 (1964). The Fifth Circuit refused 
to follow the Florida Supreme Court’s answer to the substantive question, but was in turn reversed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  
18 See Clay, 363 U.S. at 213 (Black, J., dissent). 
19 Dresner v. Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136 (1963); Aldrich v. Aldrich. 375 U.S. 249 (1963). 
20 “The Florida provision has also been used by the Supreme Court of the United States, Dresner v. City of 
Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136 (1963) question answered 164 So.2d 208 (1964), and Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 75, 249 
(1963), questions answered 163 So.2d 276 (1964).” Uniform Act (1967) at Prefatory Note. 
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Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act 
Dissatisfaction with abstention and the positive attention to the Florida example led to the 
Uniform Act (1967). 21 Even before the Uniform Act was promulgated, three other states 
followed Florida’s lead with legislation of their own.22 
“Prior to formulation of the Uniform Act [(1967)] . . . scholarly work had been done in 
the area, primarily by Allan Vestal, then Professor of Law at the University of Iowa and one of 
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws [which] formed the basis for many of the policies 
ultimately realized in the U.L.A [Uniform Laws Annotated].”23 A uniform law was needed 
because “[u]niformity would make probable the greater use of certification. If attorneys and 
judges are faced not with an unfamiliar act, but rather with a carbon of the act of their own states, 
they will be more willing to use the device.”24 The Uniform Act (1967) was “patterned in large 
measure on Florida Appellate Rule 4.61.”25 
The Uniform Act (1967) was quite simple. It was drafted as a model legislative 
enactment, unlike the 1995 revision which also contemplated enactment as a court rule. The 
Uniform Act (1967) specified: 
That a designated court could answer questions from specified courts that were 
“questions of law of this state which may be determinative of the cause then pending in 
the certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no 
controlling precedent in the decisions of the [specified appellate courts] of this state”;26 
That the process could initiate on motion or sua sponte (on the court’s own suggestion);27 
The contents of a certification order—a statement of relevant facts and “the questions of 
law to be answered”;28 
                                                 
21 Uniform Act (1967); 12 U.L.A. 86 (1996). The Tarlton Law Library at the University of Texas has two boxes of 
“materials related to drafting the Uniform Certification of Question of Law Act.” 
https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/taro/utlaw/00040/law-00040p30.html (last visited January 27, 2018). 
22 Ira P. Robbins, The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act: A Proposal for Reform, 18 J. Legis. 127, 133 
n.44 (1992). The states were Hawaii, Maine, and Washington. 
23 Id. at 131. 
24 Uniform Act (1967) at Prefatory Note n.1. 
25 Id. at Prefatory Note n.2. 
26 Id. § 1. 
27 Id. § 2. 
28 Id. § 3. 
 
7 
The form of an order and the method of transmitting it and a sufficient record to the 
receiving court;29 
For an equal allocation of costs between the parties;30 
That the receiving court rules regarding briefs and argument would apply to certification 
proceedings;31 
For transmittal of the state court opinion to the certifying court and the parties;32 
That specified courts of the enacting state could certify to other courts, on similar 
grounds,33 using the process of the receiving state;34 and 
Severability,35 construction,36 title,37 and effective date.38 
After 25 years of experience with the Uniform Act (1967), Professor Ira Robbins 
proposed a new act to remedy issues which had arisen in the states which had enacted the earlier 
uniform act.39 They had often enacted variants of the Uniform Act (1967) which in his view 
were ill advised. His proposals included: 
Restricting the power to answer questions to the highest state court, to avoid inefficiency 
of a state appeal;40 
Ensuring that all federal courts and the highest court in a state may certify;41 
                                                 
29 Id. § 4. 
30 Id. § 5. 
31 Id. § 6. 
32 Id. § 7. 
33 Id. § 8. 
34 Id. § 9. 
35 Id. § 10. 
36 Id. § 11. 
37 Id. § 12. 
38 Id. § 13. 
39 Robbins, supra n.5; see also Ira P. Robbins, Interstate Certification of Questions of Law: A Valuable Process in 
Need of Reform, 76 Judicature 125 (1992). 
40 Robbins, supra n.5, at 177-78. 
41 Id. at 178. 
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Providing reciprocity, so that a court which may receive questions may also certify 
questions;42 
Allowing certification of questions which “may be determinative” rather than requiring 
that the question “must be determinative”;43 
Allowing certification of questions when “no controlling” precedent exists, rather than 
the “no clear controlling” standard;44 
Allowing initiation of certification sua sponte or on motion;45  
Encouraging preferential treatment of certification cases, by requiring the responding 
court to act “as soon as practicable . . .”;46 and 
Clarifying who generates the statement of facts in the certification order, by specifying 
that the parties may propose facts, but that the court has final responsibility.47  
Comparing Robbins’ recommendations to the Uniform Act (1967) shows that only the last two 
features in the above list were new. His intention was therefore principally to unify existing 
versions of the Uniform Act (1967) by calling attention to the problems with the variants which 
had been adopted. His recommendations were influential.48  
The Uniform Act (1967) was revised in 1995. Beyond Robbins article, a deep study by 
the American Judicature Society was also influential in the Uniform Certification of Questions of 
Law Act (1995) (“Uniform Act (1995)”). A survey of “all federal judges on the U.S. district 
courts and circuit courts of appeals and all state supreme court justices”49 along with a 
compilation of all rules and statutes governing certification was “presented to a group of U.S. 
district and circuit judges and state supreme court justices who, in December 1994, attended a 
National Workshop on Certification of Questions of Law . . . .”50 The workshop resulted in 
several recommendations: 
                                                 
42 Id. at 179. 
43 Id. at 179-80.  
44 Id. at 180. 
45 Id. at 181. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act (1995) (“Uniform Act (1995)”); 12 U.L.A. 71 (1995). 
49 Goldschmidt, supra n.1, at 1. 
50 Id. at 2. 
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Whether a litigant was a plaintiff who initiated a federal case or a defendant who 
removed a state case should have no bearing on the certification process;51 
State courts should establish standards and criteria for accepting questions, including the 
Oregon standard “that the answer ‘would have the potential of resolving at least one 
claim’ in the litigation”;52 
The priority of treatment and time limits of a certified case should be determined on a 
case-by-case basis;53 
A certifying court should be free to communicate with an accepting court;54 
Reformulation of questions should be permitted;55 
Certifying courts should not have discretion to reject answers to certifying questions;56 
and 
Answers to certified questions should be binding precedent.57 
The National Conference of Commissioners On Uniform State Laws released the 1995 
revision in the fall of that year. According to Jonas Goldschmidt, the principal changes in the 
Uniform Act (1995) are:  
(1) the Act now allows for certification to and from tribal courts, and·Canadian and 
Mexican courts, including the highest or intermediate appellate courts;  
(2) it provides that certification is only appropriate where no controlling answer to the 
question is provided by a constitutional provision, statute, or appellate decision;  
(3) it provides that a certified question may be reformulated by the answering court;  
(4) it requires that the certification be accompanied by an agreed statement of facts, or, if 
one cannot be agreed upon, by a statement of facts determined by the court; and, most 
notably,  
(5) the Act now contains a provision stating that the receiving court “shall notify the 
certifying court of acceptance or rejection of the question; and, in accordance with 
                                                 
51 Id. at 75. 
52 Id. at 76. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 77. 
57 Id. 
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notions of comity and fairness, it shall respond to an accepted certified question as soon 
as practicable.”58 
As a result of the discussion leading up to and the publication of the Uniform Act (1995) 
and continued advocacy for certification, almost all states and the District of Columbia, Puerto 
Rico,59 the Northern Mariana Islands and Guam provide for certification.60 North Carolina is the 
only state without a certification procedure.61 
Debate on Value of Certification 
Despite the rapid spread and current prevalence of certification procedures, debate about 
the practice persisted. Proponents argued the superiority of certification over the former practice 
of abstention, under which the court uncertain about the law of a state would stay or dismiss its 
proceedings, and leave the parties to find the answer to state law from a court of that state. 
Abstention left parties without resolution of their dispute in the court where the case was 
originally filed and pushed them to a state trial court declaratory judgment proceeding that could 
lead to an appeal. The delay and expense were not minimal. 
Principles of comity are cited in favor of certification,62 along with the wisdom of 
deferring interpretation of state law to the highest court in a state. If state supreme courts are 
regarded in practice as the final arbiter of state law issues, inconsistencies between state and 
federal decisions are reduced.63 One federal judge has referred to the relief from “guesswork” 
that certification affords.64 Certification can also be said to dampen forum shopping. A 
prospective litigant has no incentive to seek an alternative federal interpretation of state law if 
the federal court policy is that that a state law issue will be certified to a state court. And 
certification has the benefit of bringing a discrete legal issue to the state supreme court before the 
                                                 
58 Id. at 102. 
59 Eric Eisenberg, A Divine Comity: Certification (at Last) in North Carolina, 58 Duke L.J. 69, 71 (2008); Sharika 
Robinson, Right, but for the Wrong Reasons: How A Certified Question to the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
Could Have Alleviated Conflicting Views and Brought Clarity to North Carolina State Law, 34 N.C. Cent. L. Rev. 
230 (2012). 
60 Gregory L. Acquaviva, The Certification of Unsettled Questions of State Law to State High Courts: The Third 
Circuit's Experience,115 Penn St. L. Rev. 377, 384-85, and 385 n.59 (2010-2011). 
61 “North Carolina is the only state in the Fourth Circuit without such a mechanism.” Stahle v. CTS Corp., 817 F.3d 
96, 113 (4th Cir. 2016) (Thacker, Circuit Judge, concurring); “North Carolina is the sole state in the union that does 
not permit a federal court to certify questions of state law to the high state court for resolution.” United States v. 
Kelly, 917 F. Supp. 2d 553, 560 (W.D.N.C. 2013). 
62 M. Bryan Schneider, “But Answer Came There None”: The Michigan Supreme Court and the Certified Question 
of State Law, 41 Wayne L. Rev. 273, 301 (1994-1995); Brian Mattis, Certification of Questions of State Law: An 
Impractical Tool in the Hands of the Federal Courts, 23 U. Miami L. Rev. 717, 724-25 (1968-1969). 
63 Schneider, supra n.62, at 299-301; Mattis, supra n.62, at 724. 
64 George v. Haslam, 112 F. Supp. 3d 700, 715 (M.D. Tenn. 2015) (quoting Renteria–Villegas v. Metro. Gov't of 
Nashville & Davidson Cty., 2011 WL 4048523, at *12 (M.D. Tenn. September 12, 2011). 
 
11 
expense of trial is incurred. In this respect, filing a case in federal court has an advantage over 
filing in state court.  
But these benefits are not universally acknowledged to outweigh the time and expense 
that certification proceedings cause. There is no question that certification takes time, while the 
question is formulated, the order drafted and entered, and the state court process ensues.65 A 
1983 study by the Federal Judicial Center found that the median delay is approximately six 
months.66 But if the legal question were not certified to the state court, it would have been 
briefed, argued and decided in the federal court, possibly in that same time frame and with 
similar expense.  
Some have argued that federal judges are just as able to determine state law issues as 
their state court colleagues, sometimes with more staff resources, and that there are benefits from 
“cross-pollination” when two judicial systems look at legal questions.67 Whether that outweighs 
comity is a matter of opinion. But this comparison of relative competency, usually by a 
competitive federal court, fails to recognize the value of decisions of state law made by the court 
constitutionally entrusted with the duty to decide those issues. It fails, usually from an outside 
perspective, to recognize the benefit of decisions by a court integrated into a system of state law, 
by judges who have experience in that state’s legal system and better understand the policy and 
values of the state.  
In some instances, answers from a state supreme court have been ignored or rejected by 
the certifying federal court, causing some to object that the state court is giving advisory 
opinions.68 In other instances, the federal case resolves while the certification issue is still 
pending or without regard to the answer, because other decisive issues arise after certification. 
Because certification can occur early in a federal case, the question can be regarded as 
abstract.69 Formulation of an issue too early can consume a great deal of time and may, as 
discovery and motions develop, prove to be an inaccurate forecast. Piecemeal litigation is 
generally disfavored.70 The American common law system discourages interlocutory appeals, but 
certification is just that—the federal court presents an issue to an appellate state court, before 
trial has taken place. 
                                                 
65 Mattis, supra n.62, at 725-27 (1969). 
66 Bassler, supra n.4, at 511; Schneider, supra n.62, at 296. 
67 Bassler, supra n.4, at 516-20. 
68 Id. at 520-25; John B. Corr and Ira P. Robbins, Interjurisdictional Certification and Choice of Law, Vand. L. Rev. 
411, 419-20 (1988); Mattis, supra n.62, at 734. 
69 Bassler, supra n.4, at 525; Schneider, supra n.62, at 294-95; Corr & Robbins, supra n.68, at 422. 
70 Mattis, supra n.62, at 727-28. 
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Early in the American certification experience, some expressed fear of overloading state 
dockets.71 But no jurisdiction reports this as a problem,72 though some state courts reject a much 
higher percentage of certified questions than other courts.73  
Some practitioners express that certification may misshape issues in a case. Some feel 
that judges attempt to avoid federal constitutional issues by finding a state law issue that might 
vitiate the constitutional claim. This could allow the federal judge to defer action, dodge a hard 
issue, and defer truly deserved relief from constitutional violations.  
But certification has strong advocates. The U.S. Supreme Court, as noted above, praised 
the process in Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Limited. And it has further said certification “does, of 
course, in the long run save time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial 
federalism.”74 
Judge Guido Calabresi of the Second Circuit penned a stirring opinion (in dissent) that 
“federal courts in general, and this circuit in particular, have tended to be far too reluctant to 
certify questions to the state courts.”75 His fundamental premise was that “[r]eluctance to certify 
is wrong because it leads to precisely the kind of forum shopping that Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins 
was intended to prevent.”76 The majority opinion in the case relied on authority from 
intermediate New York courts which would “prevent the state’s highest court from reaching the 
issue . . . .”77 [I]n the absence of certification, the party that is favored by the lower court 
decisions will almost invariably seek federal jurisdiction”78 to avoid contrary binding state 
precedent. And similar result would occur when an old state decision is contrary to emerging 
authority in other states.79 The party favored by the outdated case law will avoid state court. 
Thus, he concluded “When federal courts, in effect, prevent state courts from deciding unsettled 
                                                 
71 Bassler, supra n.4, at 511, 514.  
72 Schneider, supra n.62, at 297-98. 
73 Id. at 315-17. The 27 certification orders over a 20-year period reported in the article would not seem to be a 
burden. But the Michigan Supreme Court answered only eight. 
74 Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974). 
75 McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 157 (2d Cir. 1997) (Calabresi, J., dissenting). Judge Calabresi cited Martin 
Flumenbaum and Brad S. Karp, Certification of Unsettled Law Issues, N.Y.L.J., January 29, 1992, at 3 (“noting that 
the procedure for certification to the New York Court of Appeals ‘has been used only sparingly by the Second 
Circuit,’ which in 1992 had certified only five issues over the preceding six-year period.”). 
76 McCarthy, 119 F.3d at 157 (citations omitted). 
77 Id. at 158. 
78 Id. at 157-58. 
79 Id. at 158 n.1. 
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issues of state law, they violate fundamental principles of federalism and comity.”80 Those courts 
“end up ‘mak[ing] important state policy, in contravention of basic federalism principles.’ ”81 
He rejected the argument that federal courts use certification to shift unwanted burdens to 
state courts:  
[I]t is well known that state court judges have expressed both publicly and 
privately their desire for certification and their irritation with the fact that federal 
courts often decide interesting and important questions rather than certifying them 
to the courts that should be deciding them. More importantly, a state court that 
feels overburdened, or that for any other reason does not wish to decide the 
certified question, is always free to refuse to answer it.82 
 Judge Calabresi gave the example of cases deciding ownership of stolen property in 
which the statute of limitations was used as a defense to a claim for recovery. The issue of 
reasonable diligence in attempting to recover the property was presented. The Second Circuit 
“elected not to certify this question of New York law to the New York Court of Appeals”83 and 
found that reasonable diligence was necessary to recovery of property. Judge Calabresi recounts 
what happened when that same issue later arose in another case in state court: 
Three years later, the New York Court of Appeals was presented with precisely 
the same issue [as the Second Circuit], and held that the statute of limitations does 
not require a showing of reasonable diligence. See Solomon R. Guggenheim 
Found. v. Lubell, 77 N.Y.2d 311, 567 N.Y.S.2d 623, 626-27, 569 N.E.2d 426, 
429-30 (1991). The [New York] Court of Appeals remarked, somewhat acidly: 
Although the [Second Circuit] acknowledged that the question posed by 
the case was an open one, it declined to certify it to this Court, stating that 
it did not think that it “[would] recur with sufficient frequency to warrant 
use of the certification procedure.” Actually, the issue has recurred several 
times in the three years since DeWeerth was decided, including the case 
now before us. We have reexamined the relevant New York case law and 
we conclude that the Second Circuit should not have imposed a duty of 
reasonable diligence on the owners of stolen art work for purposes of the 
Statute of Limitations.84 
After the state court opinion Guggenheim made New York law clear, the claimant in the wrongly 
decided Second Circuit case attempted to re-open her claim.85 But it was too late. So the stolen 
                                                 
80 Id. at 158. 
81 Id. (quoting Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 70 F.3d 291, 302 (3d Cir. 1995) (Becker, J., dissenting)). 
82 Id. at 160. 
83 Id. at 159. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
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painting that should have been her painting was not hers because the Second Circuit failed to 
certify a question of state law. 
 Judge Calabresi persuasively argues that state courts should make significant state law 
decisions. The court considering certification still must consider whether the existing state cases 
are sufficiently clear. But if there is a serious question of state law, the issue should be certified. 
Development of Utah’s Certification Process 
Just as the Uniform Act (1967) was being promulgated, a Utah case illustrated the 
conundrum presented by Utah’s lack of a certification procedure. In Black v. United States., 
District Judge Sherman Christensen considered “whether in Utah a husband can maintain an 
action for loss of consortium by reason of negligent injury of his wife by a third person.”86 Judge 
Christensen traced Utah law from territorial times and concluded that where “the state Supreme 
Court has not had occasion to pass upon the particular question, it still is my duty to ascertain the 
best I can from all available sources what the local law is and apply it.”87 Not finding a clear 
statement that a right to loss of consortium existed in Utah, Judge Christensen declined to 
recognize the claims stated and struck them: 
Unless and until the Utah State Legislature or the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah expressly charts the course, it would be presumptuous under the 
circumstances for the federal court to initiate and foster such a new and, in my 
judgment, retrogressive and confusing system for the state.88 
Judge Christensen was thus compelled to deny the plaintiff’s claim. If a certification process had 
existed, the Utah Supreme Court could have authoritatively rejected—or possibly recognized—
the plaintiff’s claim.  
 On appeal after trial, different issues were raised which also depended upon state law—
and were also without precedent. 
To determine the answer to each of these issues it is necessary to apply the 
substantive law of Utah as found in the statutory and case law of that state. 
Counsel for Philco and plaintiff each state that no precedent of any kind exists 
under the Utah law that serves as a persuasive guideline. . . . 
[W]e consider it unnecessary and certainly undesirable to advance a foreguess as 
to how the Utah Supreme Court would decide the issues were they presented to 
that high court.89 
                                                 
86 263 F.Supp. 470, 471 (D. Utah 1967). 
87 Id. at 472-73. 
88 Id. at 480. 
89 Black v. United States, 421 F.2d 255, 258 (10th Cir. 1970). 
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If certification had existed in Utah, the Utah Supreme Court could have spoken on these 
issues. 
1975 Certification Rule 
 Utah adopted a Certification Rule on April 17, 1975 (“1975 Certification Rule”).90 While 
based in part on the Uniform Act (1967), it appears to be most closely modeled on Colorado Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 21.1 (“Colorado Rule”).  
 The 1975 Certification Rule reads: 
(a) Power to Answer. The Supreme Court may answer questions of law certified to it by 
the Supreme Court of the United States, a Court of Appeals of the United States, or a 
United States District Court, when requested by the certifying court, if there is involved 
in any proceeding before it questions of law of this state which may be determinative of 
the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying 
court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court. 
(b) Method of Invoking. This rule may be invoked by an order of any of the courts 
referred to in section (a) upon said court's own motion. 
(c) Contents of Certification Order. A certification order shall set forth: 
(1) The question of law to be answered; and 
(2) A statement of all facts relevant to the questions certified and showing fully 
the nature of the controversy in which the questions arose. 
(d) Preparation of Certification Order. The certification order shall be prepared by the 
certifying court, signed by the judge presiding at the hearing, and forwarded to the 
Supreme Court by the clerk of the certifying court under its official seal. The Supreme 
Court may require the original or copies of all or of any portion of the record before the 
certifying court to be filed under the certification order, if, in the opinion of the Supreme 
Court, the record or portion thereof may be necessary in answering the questions. 
(e) Costs of Certification. Fees and costs shall be the same as in civil appeals docketed 
before the Supreme Court and shall be equally divided between the parties unless 
otherwise ordered by the certifying court in its order of certification. 
(f) Briefs and Arguments. Upon the agreement of the Supreme Court to answer the 
questions certified to it, notice shall be given to all parties. The plaintiff in the trial court, 
or the appealing party in the appellate court shall file his opening brief within thirty days 
from the date of receipt of the notice, and the opposing parties shall file an answer brief 
within thirty days from service upon him of copies of the opening brief. A reply brief may 
be filed within twenty days of the service of the answer brief. Briefs shall be in the 
manner and form of briefs as provided in this Court. 
(g) Opinion. The written opinion of the Supreme Court stating the law governing the 
questions certified shall be sent by the clerk under the seal of the Supreme Court to the 
Certifying court and to the parties. 
                                                 
90 Holden v. NL Indus., Inc., 629 P.2d 428, 429 (Utah 1981). Unfortunately, no records of the adoption of the 1975 
Certification Rule could be located at the Utah Supreme Court or in the Utah State Law Library.  
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Comparison with Colorado Rule of Appellate Procedure 21.1  
The only variations between the Colorado Rule and the 1975 Certification Rule are: 
a. elimination by Utah of the United States Court of Claims as a potentially 
certifying court; 
b. elimination by Utah of the possible initiation of certification by motion of the 
parties, even though that feature was included in the Uniform Act (1967). (The 
1975 Certification Rule only permitted sua sponte certification.); and 
c. minor technical changes, such as changes in briefing times, and reference to Utah 
rules regarding argument rather than referring to the Colorado argument rule.91 
Comparison with Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act (1967) 
 The 1975 Certification Rule92 varies in more significant ways from the Uniform Act 
(1967). The 1975 Certification Rule: 
a. omits references93 to many potential certifying courts: “the United States Court of 
International Trade, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, the United 
States Claims Court, the United States Court of Military Appeals, the United 
States Tax Court, [or the highest appellate court or the intermediate appellate 
court of any other state] . . . .”; 
b. requires the certification order to set forth the “question of law to be answered” 
rather than referring to “questions of law”;94 
c. has a more complete description of the briefing process;95 
d. omits the procedures and the power to certify to the courts of other states;96 and 
e. omits provisions on severability,97 construction,98 short title99 and effective 
date.100 
 
                                                 
91 The 1975 Certification Rule has other minor puzzling variations from the Colorado Rule, such as subtitle (f)’s 
reference to “Arguments” rather than “argument,” though that subsection in both rules and in the Uniform Act 
(1967) has no text about oral argument, and capitalization of “Certifying” when referring to the originating court 
in (g)—but not in other parts of the rule. 
92 The 1975 Certification Rule and the Colorado Rule have the same variations from the Uniform Act (1967). 
93 Compare 1975 Certification Rule at (a) with Uniform Act (1967) § 1. 
94 Compare 1975 Certification Rule at (c)(1) with Uniform Act (1967) § 3(1). 
95 1975 Certification Rule at (f). 
96 Uniform Act (1967) §§ 8-9. 
97 Id. § 10. 
98 Id. § 11. 
99 Id. § 12. 
100 Id. § 13. 
 
17 
Holden v. NL Industries Invalidates the 1975 Certification Rule 
In 1981, the Utah Supreme Court struck down the 1975 Certification Rule as 
unconstitutional in Holden v. NL Industries.101 After an adverse ruling from the trial court, 
plaintiff’s counsel asked for and was granted certification of two questions. The Supreme Court’s 
acceptance was expressly tentative, because the “defendant . . . filed a motion in opposition to 
acceptance of certification.”102 After briefly recounting the status of certification procedures 
nationally and reciting the 1975 Certification Rule, Justice Dallin Oaks searched for a 
jurisdictional basis on which the Utah Supreme Court might accept questions certified from 
federal courts. First, he looked to the Utah Constitution Judicial Article:103 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, 
certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus. Each of the justices shall 
have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, to any part of the State, upon petition 
by or on behalf of any person held in actual custody, and may make such writs 
returnable before himself or the Supreme Court or before any district court or 
judge thereof in the State. In other cases the Supreme Court shall have appellate 
jurisdiction only, and power to issue writs necessary and proper for the exercise of 
that jurisdiction. 
He concluded “This section grants no ‘original jurisdiction’ to answer certified questions since 
certification does not involve one of the writs to which this Court’s original jurisdiction is 
limited.”104 A comparison with Colorado’s Constitution was important to his decision. The 
Colorado Constitution granted jurisdiction to the Colorado Supreme Court “to issue writs . . . and 
such other original and remedial writs as may be provided by rule of court with authority to hear 
and determine the same.”105 Citation of the Colorado Constitution made sense because Utah’s 
1975 Certification Rule appears to have been derived from the Colorado rule. 
 Justice Oaks then looked to the constitutional reference to appellate jurisdiction as 
providing authority to answer certified questions. This possibility was rejected because of one 
word: 
Article VIII, Section 4 . . . provides: “In other cases the Supreme Court shall have 
appellate jurisdiction only . . . .” The comparable provision in most state 
constitutions omits the word only. In the absence of that negative, the 
constitutional conferral of appellate jurisdiction would be susceptible to the 
                                                 
101 629 P.2d 428; see also Bassler, supra n.4, at 934; Goldschmidt, supra n.1, at 95. 
102 Holden, 629 P.2d at 429. 
103 Utah Const. art. VII, § 4. 
104 Holden, 629 P.2d at 430. 
105 Id. (citing Colo. Const. art. VI, § 3). 
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construction that the court's jurisdiction could be enlarged by an exercise of 
legislative or judicial power, by law or by court rule.106  
He compared the Utah result with a decision of the Washington Supreme Court,107 under a 
constitution omitting the word “only” and generously providing ‘“appellate jurisdiction in all 
actions and proceedings . . . .”108 “Since this provision contained no limitation similar to that in 
the Utah Constitution, the Washington Legislature was free to define its court’s jurisdiction to 
include the functions specified in the [Washington] certification legislation.”109 And he also 
contrasted the favorable findings of constitutionality in Florida and Alabama.110 
 Finally, Justice Oaks examined whether “appellate jurisdiction only” might include 
responding to questions from a federal trial court. He found that it did not, because appellate 
jurisdiction applies to inferior courts, not to courts of other jurisdictions. 
“Appellate jurisdiction” obviously connotes review of the action of an inferior 
court. “Inferior court” has been appropriately defined as “any court subordinate to 
the chief appellate tribunal in the particular judicial system.” Federal courts are 
not “inferior courts” to this Court. Consequently, this Court's answer to a certified 
question in a case that originated in or is to be adjudicated in a federal court is not 
an exercise of “appellate jurisdiction” within the meaning of the Utah 
Constitution.111 
 So the Utah Supreme Court withdrew its own 1975 Certification Rule as unconstitutional 
and dismissed Holden’s request for certification, but with a salute to the idea of certification: 
The procedure devised to permit federal courts to certify questions of state law for 
state courts to answer is a commendable effort to further the interest of justice 
through cooperative efforts by state and federal courts. If our constitutional 
powers permitted us to be involved in that kind of cooperative effort, and if other 
legal questions unnecessary to the disposition of this case could be resolved, we 
would have no hesitancy. But under the current language of our constitution, we 
must conclude that this Court has no jurisdiction to provide federal courts the 
requested ruling on state law.112 
                                                 
106 Id. 
107 In re Elliott, 446 P.2d 347 (Wash. 1968). 
108 Holden, 629 P.2d at 430. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 431 (citing Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 133 So.2d at 742) (construing Fla. Const. art. V, §§ 3-4; Ala. Const. art. VI, 
§ 140 (Amend. No. 328)). 
111 Holden, 629 P.2d at 431. 
112 Id. at 431-32. 
 
19 
How could a court unanimously strike down a rule it adopted only six years earlier? The 
composition of the Utah Supreme Court changed completely between 1975 and 1981.113 None of 
the justices present in 1975 were still present in 1981. The members of the Holden court were not 
personally committed to the 1975 Certification Rule.  
Utah’s constitutional quandary is notable because Holden is the only case to find a 
certification procedure unconstitutional.114 While Arkansas’s Constitution had similar 
restrictions,115 the Arkansas Constitution was amended116 in 2000 to grant “[o]riginal jurisdiction 
to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United States, which may be exercised 
pursuant to Supreme Court rule.”117 Thus, Utah stands alone as adopting a certification 
procedure, invalidating it, and—after a constitutional amendment—readopting certification. 
1984 Judicial Article of Utah Constitution 
The Utah Constitution judicial article was amended in 1984 and one part of the 
amendment permitted certification.118 But the amendment was not caused by Holden. The 
revision of Article VIII was precipitated by a dispute between the courts and legislature over 
judicial nomination and appointment processes. The result was “a complete rewrite of the 
judicial article of the Utah Constitution that finally settled [that] dispute and several other long-
standing issues with a set of wide-ranging compromises that brought all interested parties to the 
table.”119 
 The new version of Article VIII, Section 3 expressly confers jurisdiction to answer 
questions from federal courts: 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United States. The 
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be 
exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all writs and orders necessary 
for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction or the complete determination 
of any cause. 
                                                 
113 In 1975, Justices J. Allen Crockett, F. Henri Henriod, E. R. Callister, R. L. Tuckett, and A. H. Ellett were on the 
Utah Supreme Court. In 1981, the Utah Supreme Court consisted of Richard J. Maughan, Gordon R. Hall, I. Daniel 
Stewart, Richard C. Howe, and Dallin H. Oaks. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Justices_of_the_Utah_Supreme_Court (last visited January 12, 2018). 
114 Goldschmidt, supra n.1, at 95. 
115 Id. at 96. 
116 Coby W. Logan, Certifying Questions to the Arkansas Supreme Court: A Practical Means for Federal Courts in 
Clarifying Arkansas State Law, 30 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 85, 87 (2007). 
117 Ark. Const. amend. LXXX, § 2. 
118 Goldschmidt, supra n.1, at 95 n.244. 
119 In re Young, 976 P.2d 581, 587 (Utah 1999) (citing Utah Const. Rev. Comm'n Rep., 15-16 (January 1984)). 
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The Utah Supreme Court is now empowered “to answer questions of state law certified by a 
court of the United States.”120 Thus “[a]ny court of the United States”121 may certify a question 
to the Utah Supreme Court, but other state courts may not. And the Utah Court of Appeals may 
not receive certified questions.122  
Effectuating the Constitutional Revision 
Utah Code Provision 
 Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102, which defines Utah Supreme Court jurisdiction, states in 
subsection (1) that “The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law 
certified by a court of the United States.” This is a verbatim mirror of the Utah Constitution 
provision, which fortunately prevents any separation of powers issue arising from a conflict 
between the constitutional powers of the court and the legislative enactment.123  
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 41 
 Following approval of the 1984 Constitutional Amendment, Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 41 was adopted.124 Rule 41provides: 
RULE 41. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW BY UNITED STATES 
COURTS 
(a) Authorization to answer questions of law. The Utah Supreme Court may 
answer a question of Utah law certified to it by a court of the United States when 
requested to do so by such certifying court acting in accordance with the 
provisions of this rule if the state of the law of Utah applicable to a proceeding 
before the certifying court is uncertain. 
(b) Procedure to invoke. Any court of the United States may invoke this rule by 
entering an order of certification as described in this rule. When invoking this 
rule, the certifying court may act either sua sponte or upon a motion by any party. 
(c) Certification order. 
(c)(1) A certification order shall be directed to the Utah Supreme Court 
and shall state: 
                                                 
120 Utah Const. art. VIII, § 3. 
121 Utah R. App. P. 41(b). 
122 The amendment also expanded writ power to “all extraordinary writs” from “writs of mandamus, certiorari, 
prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus.” Utah Const. art. VII, § 3. Notably, legislative control was limited to 
appellate jurisdiction. 
123 In re Young, 976 P.2d 581. 
124 Unfortunately, no records of adoption of Utah R. App. 41 could be located in the Utah Supreme Court or Utah 
State Law Library. The year of adoption is not clear. It was likely adopted in 1986 after the massive revision of the 
Utah Judicial Code was enacted, following the 1984 Constitutional Revision. H.B. 100, Judicial Article 
Implementation, Utah Session Laws 1986 Ch. 47, was passed February 26, 1986. That was the first statutory 
recognition of the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court “to answer questions of state law certified by a court of 
the United States.” Utah Code Ann § 78-2-2 (1986). 
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(c)(1)(A) the question of law to be answered; 
(c)(1)(B) that the question certified is a controlling issue of law in 
a proceeding pending before the certifying court; and 
(c)(1)(C) that there appears to be no controlling Utah law. 
(c)(2) The order shall also set forth all facts which are relevant to the 
determination of the question certified and which show the nature of the 
controversy, the context in which the question arose, and the procedural 
steps by which the question was framed. 
(c)(3) The certifying court may also include in the order any additional 
reasons for its entry of the certification order that are not otherwise 
apparent. 
(d) Form of certification order; submission of record. A certification order shall be 
signed by the judge presiding over the proceeding giving rise to the certification 
order and forwarded to the Utah Supreme Court by the clerk of the certifying 
court under its official seal. The Supreme Court may require that all or any 
portion of the record before the certifying court be filed with the Supreme Court if 
the record or a portion thereof may be necessary in determining whether to accept 
the certified question or in answering that question. A copy of the record certified 
by the clerk of the certifying court to conform to the original may be substituted 
for the original as the record. 
(e) Acceptance or rejection of certification. Upon filing of the certification order 
and accompanying papers with the clerk, the Supreme Court shall promptly enter 
an order either accepting or rejecting the question certified to it, and the clerk 
shall serve copies of the order upon the certifying court and all parties identified 
in the certification order. If the Supreme Court accepts the question, the Court will 
set out in the order of acceptance (1) the specific question or questions accepted, 
(2) the deadline for notifying the Supreme Court as to those portions of the record 
which shall be copied and filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, and (3) 
information as to when the briefing schedule will be established. 
(f) Briefing; oral argument. The form of briefs and proceedings on oral argument 
will be governed by these rules except as such rules may be modified by the 
Supreme Court to accommodate the differences between the appeal process and 
the determination of a certified question. The clerk of the Supreme Court will 
provide written notice to the parties as to the schedule for the filing of briefs and 
content requirements, as well as the schedule and procedures for oral argument. 
(g) Appearance of counsel pro hac vice. Upon acceptance by the Supreme Court 
of the question of law presented by the certification order, counsel for the parties 
not licensed to practice law in the state of Utah may appear pro hac vice upon 
motion filed pursuant to the Code of Judicial Administration. 
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The procedure of Utah R. App. P. 41 differs from the 1975 Certification Rule in many 
respects. The new rule: 
allows certification by any “court of the United States,”125 rather than enumerating 
potential certifying federal courts;126 
refers to a certified “question of law,” 127 rather than “questions of law”;128  
permits certification when “the law of Utah is . . . uncertain,”129 and that “there appears to 
be no controlling Utah law,”130 rather than referring to certification when “there is no 
controlling precedent”;131  
requires that the question be a controlling issue of law, and that the order state the 
same,132 while the 1975 Certification Rule permitted certification of a question “which 
may be determinative”;133  
permits certification orders “upon a motion by a party,” in addition to the sua sponte 
certification permitted in the 1975 Certification Rule;134 
requires that the certification order include all facts “which are relevant to the 
determination of the question certified,”135 rather than those relevant to the “questions 
certified”;136 
requires the certification order to specify “the context in which the questions arose, and 
the procedural steps by which the question was framed”;137 
                                                 
125 Utah R. App. P. 41(a). 
126 1975 Certification Rule at (a). 
127 Utah R. App. P. 41(a), (c)(1). 
128 1975 Certification Rule at (a). 
129 Utah R. App. P. 41(a). 
130 Id. at 41(c)(1)(C). 
131 1975 Certification Rule at (a). 
132 Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(1)(B). 
133 1975 Certification Rule at (a). 
134 Utah R. App. P. 41(b), compare with 1975 Certification Rule at (b). 
135 Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(2). 
136 1975 Certification Rule at (c)(1)(2). 
137 Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(2). 
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permits the certification order to include “any additional reasons for . . . entry of the 
certification order that are not otherwise apparent”;138 
refers to the Supreme Court’s determination “whether to accept the certified question,”139 
and has a new subsection (e) regarding the acceptance process and an order of acceptance 
(which was not treated in the 1975 Certification Rule, and which implies questions may 
be rejected); 
has a new provision regarding pro hac vice admission of counsel;140  
permits flexibility in briefing and argument, providing that the normal rules and 
timeframes “may be modified by the Supreme Court to accommodate the differences 
between the appeal process and determination of a certified question”;141 and 
has technical refinements, such as including the state name in places as a descriptor of the 
“Utah” Supreme Court,142 referring generally to other rules of the court regarding 
briefing and oral argument (and actually mentioning oral argument), and providing for 
certification of a copy of the certifying court’s record.143 
Comparison with Uniform Act (1995) 
 Utah Rule 41 varies from the Uniform Act (1995)144 in several respects, which is to be 
expected as Rule 41 preceded the Uniform Act (1995) by a decade:  
The Utah Rule does not permit the Utah Supreme Court (or the Utah Court of Appeals) to 
certify a question to another court;145 
The Utah Rule does not permit courts of states, tribes, or Mexican courts to certify 
questions;146 
                                                 
138 Id. at 41(c)(2). 
139 Id. at 41(d). 
140 Id. at 41(g). 
141 Id. at 41(f). 
142 Id. at 41(a), (c)(1), (d). 
143 Id. at 41(c)(2). 
144 While the Uniform Act (1995) was promulgated nearly a decade after Utah R. App. 41, it is the most recent 
uniform law on the subject of certification, so it is the most universal standard for comparison of Utah and national 
practice. 
145 Uniform Act (1995) § 2. 
146 Id. § 3. 
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The Uniform Act (1995) allows certifying to obtain an answer that “may be determinative 
of an issue,”147 while the Utah Rule requires a certified issue to be “controlling”148 which 
may mean it must control the federal litigation, not merely an issue in it;149 
While the Utah Rule requires that there be “no controlling Utah Law”150 and that “the 
state of the law of Utah applicable to a proceeding before the certifying court [be] 
uncertain”151on the certified issue, the Uniform Act (1995) specifies sources of law which 
might be regarded as controlling—“no controlling appellate decision, constitutional 
provision, or statute of this State”;152 
Rule 41 specifies that certification may be raised in the federal court “either sua sponte or 
upon a motion by any party”;153 
The Uniform Act (1995) expressly permits the receiving court to “reformulate a question 
of law certified to it”154 and also requires the certification order to expressly state that the 
receiving court may reformulate the question,155 while the Utah Rule has no such 
provision;156 
The Uniform Act (1995) requires the certification order to contain “the names and 
addresses of counsel of record and parties appearing without counsel”;157 
The Uniform Act (1995) contemplates that parties will have an opportunity to “agree 
upon a statement of facts”158 in the certification order; 
                                                 
147 Id. § 3. 
148 Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(1)(B). 
149 Some jurisdictions adopt the Uniform Act (1995) with a requirement that the issue be determinative of the 
“cause” or their courts interpret their enactment in that manner. See Eric C. Surette, Construction and Application of 
Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 69 A.L.R. 6th 415, §§ 27-28 (2011). 
150 Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(1)(C). 
151 Id. at 41(a). 
152 Uniform Act (1995) § 3. 
153 Utah R. App. P. 41(b). 
154 Uniform Act (1995) § 4. 
155 Id. § 6(a)(3). 
156 The Utah Supreme Court has determined it has this authority. In re W. Side Prop. Assocs., 13 P.3d 168 (Utah 
2000). 
157 Uniform Act (1995) § 6(a)(4). 
158 Id. § 6(b). 
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Rule 41 requires a certification order to set forth “the procedural steps by which the 
question was framed”;159 
The Uniform Act (1995) requires that the accepting court “in accordance with notions of 
comity and fairness, respond to an accepted certified question as soon as practicable”;160 
Rule 41 allows the Supreme Court to specify a briefing schedule,161 and applies standard 
appellate rules to briefs and argument, unless “modified by the Supreme Court to 
accommodate the differences between the appeal process and the determination of a 
certified question,162 while the Uniform Act (1995) suggests application of “the rules and 
statutes governing briefs, arguments, and other appellate procedures”;163  
The Uniform Act (1995) specifies that the responding court “shall state in a written 
opinion the law answering the certified question and send a copy of the opinion to the 
certifying court, counsel of record, and parties appearing without counsel”;164 
The Uniform Act (1995) specifies that “[f]ees and costs are the same as in [civil appeals] 
docketed before the [Supreme Court] of this State and must be equally divided between 
the parties unless otherwise ordered by the certifying court”;165  
Rule 41 provides for appearance of counsel pro hac vice in certification proceedings, 
which is apparently not permitted in other proceedings before the Utah Supreme Court;166 
and 
The Uniform Act (1995) has technical sections on severability,167 construction,168 and 
citation title.169 
 Both Rule 41 and the Uniform Act (1995) require the certification order to state the 
question of law to be answered,170 facts relevant to the controversy and the nature of the 
                                                 
159 Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(2). 
160 Uniform Act (1995) § 7. 
161 Utah R. App. P.  41(e)(3). 
162 Id. at 41(f). 
163 Uniform Act (1995) § 8. 
164 Id. § 9. 
165 Id. § 10. 
166 Utah R. App. P. 41(g). 
167 Uniform Act (1995) § 12. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. § 13. 
170 Id. § 6(a)(1); Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(1)(A). 
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controversy,171 and contain requirements for delivery of the certification order and record to the 
receiving court.172   
Comparison with Utah’s Interlocutory Appeal Rule 
 The Utah Rule can also be compared to Utah’s rule on interlocutory appeals from lower 
courts.173 Certification comes before a federal court adjudication, while interlocutory appeals are 
taken from an entered order in litigation underway in an inferior court. In interlocutory appeals, 
the lower court assures the Utah appellate court that enough record exists to adjudicate the 
question. A certified question is more hypothetical and posed in advance of a decision. 
Receipt of certified questions and interlocutory appeals is discretionary with the appellate 
court. The appellate court controls its review of these matters, and can exercise unrestrained 
discretion in accepting or rejecting them. 
Both processes require the receiving appellate court consider similar issues: 
Interlocutory Appeals Certification of Questions 
The issue presented174 
A concise analysis of the statutes, rules 
or cases believed to be determinative 
of the issue stated175 
The question of law to be answered176 
A concise statement of facts material to 
a consideration of the issue presented 
and the order sought to be reviewed177 
All facts which are relevant to the 
determination of the question 
certified178 
The terms and circumstances of the 
case but without unnecessary detail179 
The nature of the controversy, the 
context in which the question arose, 
                                                 
171 Uniform Act (1995) § 6(a)(2); Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(2). 
172 Uniform Act (1995) § 5; Utah R. App. P. 41(d). 
173 Utah R. App. P. 5. 
174 Id. at 5(c)(1)(B). 
175 Id. at 5(c)(1)(C). 
176 Id. at 41(c)(1)(A). 
177Id. at 5(c)(1)(A). 
178 Id. at 41(c)(2). 
179 Id. at 5(c)(1)(B). 
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Interlocutory Appeals Certification of Questions 
and the procedural steps by which the 
question was framed180 
A statement of the reasons why an 
immediate interlocutory appeal should 
be permitted181 
The reason why the appeal may 
materially advance the termination of 
the litigation182 
That the question certified is a 
controlling issue of law in a 
proceeding pending before the 
certifying court183 
 
Each process requires consideration of unique factors. A party petitioning for 
interlocutory appeal must demonstrate “that the issue was preserved in the trial court,”184 and 
“state the applicable standard of appellate review and cite supporting authority.”185 Those factors 
have no corollary in certification. The federal court certifies that the question relates to a “live” 
issue, to which the answer is required to make a dispositive decision. And the federal court has 
not made a substantive decision, so no standard of review applies. But the Utah Supreme Court 
has full discretion with regard to the certifying order—the question(s) may be accepted, 
reformulated, or rejected.  
Certification requires that “[t]he state of the law of Utah applicable to a proceeding 
before the certifying court is uncertain”186 and “there appears to be no controlling Utah law.”187 
Because a question presented on interlocutory appeal is often mixed law and fact, that process 
does not require isolation of a unique, undecided legal issue. 
Initiation of the interlocutory and certification processes is different because of the 
method in which they arise. Utah certification may be initiated by the federal court sua sponte188 
and is then ordered by the court,189 but interlocutory appeals require a party petition.190 Because 
                                                 
180 Id. at 41(c)(2). 
181 Id. at 5(c)(1)(C). 
182 Id. at 5(c)(1)(D). 
183 Id. at 41(c)(1)(B). 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 5(c)(1)(B). 
186 Id. at 41(a). 
187 Id. at 41(c)(1)(C). 
188 Id. at 41(b). 
189 Id. at 41(a). 
190 Id. at 5(a). 
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of its decision-making responsibility, the federal court controls the certification process, while 
parties have the burden of going forward in interlocutory appeals.  
Comparing factors relevant in interlocutory appeal and certification informs some 
recommendations for procedural improvements at the end of this thesis. 
Cases Bridging the Certification Processes 
 Stubbs v. United States191 bridged the time between the 1975 Certification Rule and the 
certification procedure enabled by the 1984 constitutional revision. Stubbs’ first appeal, taken in 
1979, was from Stubbs’ suit against the federal government to quiet title and partition property. 
The case was largely decided on federal law. 
The second appeal involving Stubbs, decided in 1985, was from a separate case the 
government was compelled to file against Stubbs because he “apparently persisted in asserting 
rights to the property . . . .”192 This appeal presented many state law issues. As to one, the circuit 
court stated “[t]he United States has suggested that we might certify this question [about effect of 
a deed] to the Supreme Court of Utah for its definitive answer.”193 But the Tenth Circuit declined 
to certify because the issue was subordinate to another decisive issue, on which the law and facts 
were clear. “We do not do so because we are satisfied that even if we have erroneously 
interpreted Utah law on this issue, the stipulated facts sufficiently establish that the United States 
had acquired good title by adverse possession by 1955.”194 Apparently, the Tenth Circuit felt that 
the passage of the constitutional revision in 1984 was sufficient to enable certification even 
though the statute and rule had not yet been enacted. 
Worthen v. Kennecott Corp.195 originated before certification was available and ended 
after it was available. District Judge David Winder received a motion for certification196 but 
“[t]he trial court denied such a motion because, at the time of trial, no such procedure was 
available under Utah law.”197 Judge Winder was the trial judge in Holden v. NL Industries.198 
Undeterred, “Appellant . . . urged [the Tenth Circuit] to certify the question concerning the dual 
capacity doctrine to the Utah Supreme Court.”199 Apparently, this request was made at argument. 
Examining Utah law, Circuit Judge McKay (who is from Utah) wrote that “[t]he combination of 
                                                 
191 620 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1980). 
192 United States v. Stubbs, 776 F.2d 1472, 1473 (10th Cir. 1985). 
193 Id. at 1475. 
194 Id. 
195 780 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1985). 
196 The motion is not listed on the case docket, but it may have been embedded in the summary judgment motion 
papers filed in 1984 and 1985, or in the motion to amend or alter the decision filed in February 1985. 
197 Worthen, 780 F.2d at 860. 
198 629 P.2d 428. 
199 Worthen, 780 F.2d at 860. 
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the clarity of the issue and the amount of time which has transpired since this matter was first 
raised leads us to conclude that this is not a case appropriate for the necessarily duplicative 
efforts of referring the case to the Utah Supreme Court.”200 Judge McKay clarified that he was 
not generally disposed against certification but that timeliness was a significant consideration. 
“We do not mean thereby to imply that we are hostile to suggestions of certification of state law 
to the appropriate state courts. Ordinarily, such suggestions are best raised on appeal by motion 
before the case has been fully submitted and argued.”201  
Early Certification Cases Under the New Rule 
According to currently available records, District Judge Bruce Jenkins was the first 
federal judge to certify a question to the Utah Supreme Court under Rule 41, adopted after the 
constitutional revision. In late 1989, he certified a question to the Utah Supreme Court. The 
Court accepted the question but the parties settled the case in late 1991, before an answer was 
received. 
The first full use of the new certification process was in 1990-91 in Grundberg v. Upjohn 
Co. District Judge Thomas Greene at the federal court faced a case202 with multiple causes of 
action arising out of a daughter’s shooting of her mother while the daughter was under the 
influence of Halcion. One cause of action alleged strict liability, and Judge Greene certified the 
question “whether Utah adopts the ‘unavoidably unsafe products’ exception to strict products 
liability as set forth in comment k to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) 
(“comment k”).” His certification order was issued December 19, 1990; the Utah Supreme Court 
accepted the question January 8, 1991; and the opinion issued only four months later on May 14, 
1991.203 The pace is even more remarkable as the decision was 3-2, with two separate dissenting 
opinions.204 The majority “characterize[ed] all FDA-approved prescription medications as 
‘unavoidably unsafe,’” thus “expanding the literal interpretation of comment k.”205 Following 
the Utah Supreme Court’s decision, the parties briefed its impact on the case, and settled it in 
August 1991.206  
Over a year before he certified the question in Grundberg, Judge Greene received a 
motion to certify in Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc.207 His order certifying the question did not 
                                                 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 Grundberg, 2:89-cv-00274-JTG. When referring to cases in the District of Utah, the local case citation will be 
used and where possible, will be linked to the case docket. 
203 Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991). 
204 Id. at 99-100. 
205 Id. at 90. 
206 Order Dismissing Case, Grundberg, 2:89-cv-00274-JTG, docket no. 695, filed August 12, 1991. 
207 Motion to Amend Judgment or in the Alternative for Certification, Hansen, 2:88-cv-00708-JTG, docket no. 95, 
filed December 29, 1989. 
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issue for nearly a year, 208 just six weeks before his certification order in Grundberg. The opinion 
from the Supreme Court did not come for another 16 months.209 The majority opinion was 
shorter than Grundberg’s and the two concurrences were less than three lines. But Hansen took 
two and a half years in the certification process, compared to Grundberg where the process only 
took five months. Hansen did answer three questions, but stayed inside the parameters of the 
Restatement and prior Utah precedent.  
Grundberg and Hansen are contrasts in speed and complexity. Oddly, speed was 
inversely proportional to the complexity of the Utah Supreme Court opinion. These early cases 
illustrate that delay may – or may not—result from certification and that the delay cannot be 
predicted accurately by complexity of issues or by the identity of the presiding federal judge. 
Statistical Overview 
Before examining groups of cases, a statistical overview provides perspective. As far as 
could be determined, as of February 28, 2018, 134 Tenth Circuit, Utah federal district court and 
Utah bankruptcy court cases have considered certification or—in cases before 1971210—the need 
for it. Of those cases,211 about half did not certify a question to the Utah Supreme Court. And 
about half of the cases did certify a question. In one case,212 the district judge is currently 
considering a motion to certify.  
Certification by the Tenth Circuit - Summary Statistics 
In 13 of the cases that did certify a question, the certification occurred in the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals,213 rather than in the district or bankruptcy court. The district judges 
from whom those appeals were taken are: 
                                                 
208 Order of Certification, Hansen, 2:88-cv-00708-JTG, docket no. 150, filed November 2, 1990. 
209 Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 830 P.2d 236 (Utah 1992). 
210 Black v. United States, C138-66 (D. Utah). 
211 The thesis does not consider cases certified to the Utah Supreme Court from courts other than the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Utah, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Nor does it consider cases in those courts which considered certification of questions to the courts of states other 
than Utah. 
212 Roberts v. CR England, 2:12-cv-00302-RJS-BCW. 
213 United States v. Badger, 818 F.3d 563 (10th Cir. 2016); Hogan v. UTOPIA, 635 Fed. App’x 509 (10th Cir. 2015); 
Haik v. Salt Lake City Corp., 567 Fed. App’x 621 (10th Cir. 2014) (2:12-cv-00997-TS in the district court); Krehbiel 
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 387 Fed. App’x 827 (10th Cir. 2010); Century Indem. v. Hanover Ins., 417 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 
2005); Morgan v. McCotter, 365 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 2004); Boyd v. Jones, 85 Fed. App’x 77 (10th Cir. 2003) (denied 
because a recent Utah Supreme Court opinion addressed the issue, resulting in reversal of the trial court decision); 
Johnson v. Life Inv’rs Ins. Co. of Am., 216 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir. 2000); Hale v. Danny's Constr. Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 
389 (10th Cir. 2000); Bragg v. Buck, 1997 WL 474520 (10th Cir. 1997) (case reversed on a different issue, making 
certification unnecessary); Adams v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Canada, 133 F.3d 932 (10th Cir. 1997); Lyman v. San 
Juan Cty., 588 Fed. App’x 764 (10th Cir. 1994) (certification was sought on appeal by a different party, of a different 
issue than was sought in a motion to certify in the district court); Anaconda Minerals Co. v. Stoller Chem. Co., 990 
F.2d 1175, 1178 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating “We remain convinced that the Utah Supreme Court would construe the 
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Trial court judge 
Certified 
by Circuit 
years on 
bench214 
District Judge Dee Benson 3 26 
District Judge Paul Cassell 1 5 ½ 
District Judge Thomas Greene 1 25 
District Judge Bruce Jenkins 2 31 
District Judge Dale Kimball 3 20 
District Judge Ted Stewart 1 18 
District Judge Clark Waddoups 2 9 
TOTAL 13  
 
 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has also considered motions for certification to the 
Utah Supreme Court. The Tenth Circuit:  
• has never (18 instances) certified a question to the Utah Supreme Court on motion of 
a party made for the first time on appeal;215 and 
• has never (7 instances) reversed a district court judge’s decision not to certify a 
question to the Utah Supreme Court.216 
The Tenth Circuit practice demonstrates the importance of timely motions for certification in the 
district court and that there is no second chance at the appellate court. The substantial number of 
sua sponte certifications suggests that certification is not raised often enough in the district court. 
In nine of the cases in which questions were certified sua sponte, the answer resulted in reversal 
                                                 
pollution exclusion as we did in Hartford [Accident & Indem. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 962 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 
1992)].”); Wright v. Deland, 986 F.2d 1432 (10th Cir 1993); Littlefield v. Mobil Expl. & Producing, N. Am., Inc., 131 
F.3d 152 (10th Cir. 1992); Harline v. Gladwell, 950 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1991); Jorgensen v. Larsen, 930 F.2d 922 
(10th Cir. 1991); Worthen, 780 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1985). 
214 Years starting in 1986, when certification was first available. 
215 Garza v. Burnett, 547 Fed. App’x 908 (10th Cir. 2013); Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints v. Horne, 698 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 2012); In re Reinhart, 505 Fed. App’x 761 (10th Cir. 2012); In re Reinhart, 
477 Fed. App’x 510 (10th Cir. 2012); Whitney v. Div. of Juvenile Justice Servs., 468 Fed. App’x 871 (10th Cir. 
2012); McArthur v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 467 Fed. App’x 792 (10th Cir. 2012); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co v. Unigard 
Ins. Co., 458 Fed. App’x 705 (10th Cir. 2012); Mecham v. Frazier, 295 Fed. App’x 267 (10th Cir. 2008); Tabor v. 
Metal Ware Corp., 251 Fed. App’x 577 (10th Cir. 2007); Olseth v. Larson, 236 Fed. App’x 443 (10th Cir. 2007); 
Robert J. DeBry & Assocs., P.C. v. Quest Dex, Inc., 190 Fed. App'x 685 (10th Cir. 2006); Richardson v. Navistar 
Int’l Transp. Corp., 231 F.3d 740 (10th Cir. 2000); Hirpa v. IHC Hosp., Inc., 141 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 1998). 
216 Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. AMSCO Windows, 593 Fed App’x 802 (10th Cir. 2014); Haik, 567 Fed. App’x 621 (this 
case was 2:13-cv-01051-TS in the district court); Rawlings v. Gilt Edge Flour Mills, 378 Fed. Appx. 859 (10th Cir. 
2010); Soc’y of Lloyd's v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 2005); Snyder v. Cache Cty., 18 Fed. App’x 693 (10th 
Cir. 2001); Copier v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 1998). In one other case, the district court did 
not resolve a certification motion before the appeal, and the Tenth Circuit denied the motion to certify. Anderson v. 
Toomey, 324 Fed. App’x 711 (10th Cir. 2009). 
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of the district court’s opinion.217 But in four instances, the Supreme Court’s answer did not 
change the ruling below.218 The Tenth Circuit’s track record for judging the need to certify is 
impressive—in two thirds of the cases it certifies, the answer results in a reversal of the district 
court. The Tenth Circuit certified questions to the Utah Supreme Court most frequently in in 
2005-07 (three certification orders) and 2009-12 (seven certification orders).  
Certification in the District and Bankruptcy Courts - Summary Statistics 
When certification is sought by motion in the trial court, the rate of success is about 30%. 
The rate of success varies widely by judge. District Judge Dee Benson has granted the most 
motions for certification. 
Trial court judge motions granted 
per cent 
granted 
years on 
bench219 
District Judge Aldon Anderson 2 1 50% 10 
District Judge Dee Benson 9 6 66% 26 
District Judge Tena Campbell 10 1 10% 22 
District Judge Paul Cassell 1 1 100% 5 ½ 
District Judge Thomas Greene 9 5 56% 25 
District Judge Bruce Jenkins 9 1 11% 31 
District Judge Dale Kimball 11 3 27% 20 
District Judge David Nuffer 2 0 0% 14 
District Judge Jill Parrish 1 0 0% 2 ½  
District Judge David Sam 3 1 33% 31 
District Judge Robert Shelby220 2 0 0% 5 
District Judge Ted Stewart 4 0 0% 18 
District Judge Clark Waddoups 4 1 25% 9 
District Judge David Winder221 2 2 100% 23 
Magistrate Judge Paul Warner 1 0 0% 11 
Magistrate Judge Evelyn Furse 1 1 100% 5 ½  
Bankr. Judge Judith Boulden 1 1 100% 24 
TOTAL 72 24 33%  
 
                                                 
217 Garza, 547 Fed. App’x 908; Horne, 698 F.3d 1295; In re Reinhart, 505 Fed. App’x 761; Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 458 
Fed. App’x 705; Mecham, 295 Fed. App’x 267; Tabor, 251 Fed. App’x 577; Olseth, 236 Fed. App’x 443; 
Richardson, 231 F.3d 740; Hirpa, 141 F.3d 1184. 
218 In re Reinhart, 477 Fed. App’x 510; Whitney, 468 Fed. App’x 871; McArthur, 467 Fed. App’x 792; Robert J. 
DeBry & Assocs., P.C., 190 Fed. App’x 685. 
219 Years starting in 1986, when certification was first available. 
220 One motion is pending decision. Roberts, 2:12-cv-00302-RJS-BCW. 
221 One case in which Judge Winder granted certification was Holden v. NL Industries, 629 P.2d 428, which resulted 
in overturning the 1975 Certification Rule. 
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As might be expected, when the judge is the one who thinks of certification, certification 
is far more likely to happen. But certification is not guaranteed, even then. Trial court judges 
have sua sponte raised certification five times and later decided not to certify. 
Trial court judge 
raised sua 
sponte  
certification 
occurred 
per cent 
certified 
years on 
bench222 
District Judge Dee Benson 5 4 80% 26 
District Judge Tena Campbell 5 5 100% 22 
District Judge Paul Cassell 2 2 100% 5 ½ 
District Judge Thomas Greene 1 1 100% 25 
District Judge Bruce Jenkins 3 2 67% 31 
District Judge Dale Kimball 0 0 0% 20 
District Judge David Nuffer 1 1 100% 14 
District Judge Jill Parrish 8 7 75% 2 ½  
District Judge David Sam 1 0 0% 31 
District Judge Robert Shelby 1 1 100% 5 
District Judge Ted Stewart 2 2 100% 18 
District Judge Clark Waddoups 0 0 0% 9 
District Judges Waddoups/Shelby/Nuffer 1 1 100%  
Magistrate Judge Brook Wells 1 1 100% 14 
Magistrate Judge Evelyn Furse 1 1 100% 5 ½ 
Bankruptcy Judge Kevin Anderson 2 2 100% 2 
Bankr. Judges Glen Clark / Bill Thurman 1 1 100%  
Bankruptcy Judge Kimball Mosier 1 1 100% 9 
TOTAL 36 32 88%  
 
Trial court judges have made 50% more certifications sua sponte than on motion. On the 
average, on motion or sua sponte about 2 cases per year in the trial court have certified questions 
since 1986. But in 2016 and 2017, 11 cases have certified questions. 
Sua sponte certification seems to arise at a hearing on a dispositive motion, when the 
judge recognizes that a controlling issue is an issue of state law. Motions to certify which are 
granted also arise in the context of dispositive motions. The motions to certify are more often 
granted if made in the briefing, with an admission that existing case law is unclear. But the 
motions are denied if made at the hearing on the motion; after the movant has stated the law is 
clear in briefing; or after the trial court judge has ruled or indicated an inclination. 
Pro se parties fare poorly in attempts to certify, as did certification requests after an 
adverse ruling. A pro se party has never had an issue certified in the Utah federal district court, 
                                                 
222 Years starting in 1986, when certification was first available. 
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though six have tried.223 Certification requests after an adverse ruling have succeeded only one 
out of nine times.224  
While well over 60 federal cases issued certification orders, only 47 opinions from the 
Utah Supreme Court answer certified questions. In three cases, the request was rejected.225 No 
explanation was given in the rejection orders.226 Nine cases settled while the certified question 
was pending in the Utah Supreme Court.227 Six cases with certified questions are currently 
pending in the Utah Supreme Court.228  
It is clear from the records that 14 of the Utah Supreme Court answers to certified 
questions were case-dispositive,229 by causing the case to settle or clarifying grounds for entry of 
judgment soon after the certified question was answered. And other cases were likely aided by 
answers but the cases had other issues that required additional motions or trial. 
Certification of Questions of Utah Law from Federal Courts 
 Utah trial level federal courts, including district judges, bankruptcy judges and magistrate 
judges have certified questions to the Utah Supreme Court. And the Tenth Circuit has also 
certified questions. This section will examine the processes, standards and case patterns in these 
courts. The processes in these courts to generate the certification orders are not identical.  
Federal Court Certification Processes 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has a rule on certification of questions of state law, 
adopted in 1999.230 Very brief, it treats only five subjects: 
                                                 
223 See infra p. 45. 
224 See infra pp. 44-45. 
225 Novell v. Handiman, 2:01-cv-00173-TS; Kennard v. Leavitt, 2:01-cv-00171-DB; Stoker v. Salt Lake Cty., 2:90-cv-
248-BSJ. 
226 In Kennard, 2:01-cv-00171-DB, the trial court record reflects that the Utah Supreme Court had two matters 
pending that likely involved similar issues. 
227 See infra pp. 60-61. 
228 Mitchell v. Roberts, 2:16-cv-00843-EJF; HealthBanc Int’l, LLC v. Synergy Worldwide, Inc., 2:16-cv-00135-JNP-
PMW; GeoMetWatch v. Hall, 1:14-cv-00060-JNP-PMW; CR England v Swift, 2:14-cv-781-DB; In re Hendry, 2:14-
bk-27398-KA; Katterman v. Salt Lake Cty., 2:13-cv-01122-EJF. 
229 See infra pp. 61-63. 
230 Certification of Questions of State Law  
(A) Certification; Abatement. When state law permits, this court may: 
(1) certify a question arising under state law to that state's highest court according to that court's 
rules; and 
(2) abate the case in this court to await the state court's decision of the certified question. 
(B) Motion. The court may certify on its own or on a party's motion. 
(C) Time to File. A motion to certify should be filed at the same time as, but separately from, the moving 
party's brief on the merits. 
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• authorization of certification and abatement of an appeal; 
• certification may be raised by a party or by the court; 
• any motion should be filed with, but separate from, a brief;  
• any response should be filed with the other party’s next brief or, if the motion was 
filed with a reply brief, 14 days after the reply brief; and  
• the motion will be considered by the argument panel, at argument. 
While the rule provides guidance, it has never been invoked successfully by a party seeking 
certification.  
In contrast, the Utah federal district and bankruptcy courts have no defined procedures 
for promulgating certification orders. Because many judges sit on these courts and they always 
make individual decisions, there is no uniform practice in these courts. As was seen in the 
statistical summary, many successful certifications begin with the judge’s suggestion. In those 
instances, parties are often directed to meet and confer, or submit proposed certification orders. 
Sometimes a sua sponte certification may occur without party input.  
Other successful certification processes begin with a motion. The motion process 
includes briefing which may concur in the idea of certification and propose versions of the facts 
and questions for an eventual order. Or a party may oppose another party’s motion to certify, 
asserting the law is clear.  
Certainly, the better orders are those in which parties and the judge participate in 
formulation. The Utah Supreme Court advised this course: “In formulating the wording of the 
questions to be certified, a few federal courts ask counsel for both sides to provide assistance. 
However, most courts prepare the questions themselves without input from counsel which has, at 
times, led to the wrong questions being asked.”231 
Federal Court Considerations for Certifying Questions of Utah Law 
Because certification is discretionary,232 there is precedent for the decision to certify and 
for the decision not to certify. A discretionary decision may only be overturned if it is “an 
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment.”233 On the background of 
such discretion, the courts feel free to use broad language supporting their decision on a 
certification motion. And these broad statements of law permitting certification or refusal 
                                                 
(D) Response; Time to File. A response may be filed at the same time as the answer or reply brief or within 
14 days after the motion is served. 
(E) When Considered. A motion to certify is ordinarily referred to the panel of judges assigned to decide 
the appeal on the merits and is considered at the same time as the arguments on the merits. 
10th Cir. R. 27.2. 
231 In re W. Side Prop. Assocs., 13 P.3d at 170. 
232 Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 843 F.2d 406, 407 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing Lehman Bros., 416 U.S. at 391). 
233 FDIC v. Oldenburg, 34 F.3d 1529, 1555 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 
36 
buttress future courts looking to support their discretionary, nearly irreversible decisions. Some 
of the arguments made and authorities cited cannot, however, survive critical examination. 
Arguments and Authorities Against Certification 
One argument against a federal plaintiff’s motion to certify is that forum selection at 
filing means that the filer trusts the forum to answer all legal questions presented, even if the 
forum is federal and the question is one of state law. In rejecting a request to certify, the Tenth 
Circuit stated: “One who chooses to litigate his state action in the federal forum must ordinarily 
accept the federal court's reasonable interpretation of extant state law rather than seeking 
extensions via the certification process.”234 The quotation implies that certification is an 
extension of the case schedule in federal court and assumes, contrary to usual thinking, that 
plaintiffs favor delay. Usually, plaintiffs are anxious to conclude their claims—but they want the 
claim decided on accurate, authoritative interpretations of state law. And a plaintiff’s selection of 
a forum may involve many factors beyond selection an interpreter of law.235  
The Tenth Circuit has often, when rejecting a request to certify, reflected attitudes from 
the era when certification was emerging and less proven. In that era of more dominant federal 
control, federal courts assumed they were as well or better equipped to decide questions of state 
law. In one instance, about six years after Utah’s certification process was implemented, the 
Tenth Circuit expressed full confidence in its ability to predict Utah law: 
 
The Utah Supreme Court has not yet considered the meaning of “sudden and 
accidental” in the context of the pollution exclusion [in an insurance policy]. In 
such a case of first impression, our responsibility is to give the clause the 
interpretation we believe the Utah court would. We are informed by decisions of 
                                                 
234 Littlefield, 131 F.3d 152, n.5 (citing Reynolds v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 989 F.2d. 465, 472 (11th Cir. 1993); 
Croteau v. Olin Corp., 884 F.2d. 45, 46 (1st Cir. 1989); Armijo, 843 F.2d at 407). 
235 A corollary is that a plaintiff who is involuntarily in federal court after removal from state court is not entitled to 
certification. The Tenth Circuit rejected that absolute rule:  
[W]e are unable to discern when a federal district court, under plaintiff-appellant's argument, 
would ever be able to deny certification in a Utah case that had been removed if there were any 
possible argument that there is uncertainty on the Utah law. Any plaintiff seeking redress under 
Utah law whose case was subsequently removed to federal court would be able to raise the same 
argument Ms. Copier has, and if the district court could not rule out even the slightest degree of 
uncertainty in the law of the state, it could never deny certification. Such a rule would be clearly 
wrong. 
Copier, 138 F.3d at 839. 
Of the six cases removed to Utah federal district court in which certification was sought, certification was 
granted in three. Carson v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 2:09-cv-00663-DB; Whitney v. Div. of Juvenile Justice Servs., 
2:09-cv-00030-DAK (certification granted; answer dispositive); Anderson v. Toomey, 2:07-cv-00673-TS; Jensen v. 
State of Utah, 2:05-cv-00739-TS; Clark v. United States, 2:98-cv-00304-DB (certification granted; answer 
dispositive); Soter's Inc., v. Deseret Fed., 2:89-cv-00979-DB (certification granted; answer dispositive). 
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the Utah appellate courts and by precedent of federal courts in this and other 
circuits.236 
That case then decided the issue using cases from the First, Second and Sixth Circuits, the State 
of New York, and the Utah Court of Appeals. The Tenth Circuit did not consider the possibility 
of certification to the Utah Supreme Court for an authoritative answer. 
The Tenth Circuit has also said “[c]ertification is not to be routinely invoked whenever a 
federal court is presented with an unsettled question of state law.”237 One oft-cited reason for the 
federal court to proceed to answer a state law question was stated in the 1943 U.S. Supreme 
Court opinion in Meredith v. City of Winter Haven.238 “[I]t has from the first been deemed to be 
the duty of the federal courts, if their jurisdiction is properly invoked, to decide questions of state 
law whenever necessary to the rendition of a judgment.”239 That statement was made, however, 
long before certification procedures were in place, and in a case in which the Court of Appeals 
had directed the trial court to dismiss without prejudice so that the plaintiff could refile in state 
court.240 The U.S. Supreme Court directed that the judgment of the district court, deciding the 
issue, be reinstated.241 Meredith was decided when the only alternatives for a federal court 
considering an issue of state law were to decide the issue or abstain. Meredith could not consider 
certification. Certification, where a forum is maintained, is very different than abstention, where 
the federal court denies its services. In an era when certification is available in all states but one, 
Meredith’s statement about the duties of trial courts should not be cited. 
As recently as 2005, in Society of Lloyd’s v. Reinhart the Tenth Circuit stated that 
“[w]hile certification is appropriate ‘where the legal question at issue is novel and the applicable 
state law is unsettled,’ it is never compelled.”242 For that last phrase, the Lloyd’s opinion cited 
Lehman Bros. v. Schein243 which is a pro-certification opinion that  
• does not use the word “compelled,” but states that even where certification is 
available, it is never “obligatory”; 
                                                 
236 Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 962 F.2d at, 1487-88. 
237 Armijo, 843 F.2d at 407 (citing L. Cohen & Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, 629 F.Supp. 1419, 1425 (D. Conn. 1986)). 
238 320 U.S. 228 (1943). Despite its age, this precedent continues to be used. L. Cohen & Co., cited above, relied on 
it and cited other pre-1960’s case law such as R.R. Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Burford v. 
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); and Cty. of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959). 
239 Meredith, 320 U.S. at 234; see also Copier, 138 F.3d at 839; Memorandum Decision and Order, Self v. 
Teleperformance Grp. USA, 2:08-cv-00395-PMW, docket no. 126, filed February 4, 2009; Order on Motions to 
Dismiss, Jensen, 2:05-cv-00739-TS, docket no. 52, filed June 16, 2006, 2006 WL 1702585, at *21 (D. Utah June 16, 
2006). 
240 Meredith, 320 U.S. at 230. 
241 Id. at 238. 
242 402 F.3d at 1001 (citations omitted). 
243 416 U.S. at 390-91. 
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• led off that paragraph with a sentence and footnote clarifying that certification was 
only available in nine states at the time of the opinion;244 
• noted that certification “does, of course, in the long run save time, energy, and 
resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism”; and  
• remanded so the lower court could consider certification. 
Lloyd’s and Lehman also cited Meredith v. Winter Haven, decided in the abstention era. As stated 
above, that case law is of little value now that certification is readily available. Reliance on 
Lehman Bros. as speaking against certification is flawed. 
The Tenth Circuit has also cited a Florida case for the proposition that certification “is to 
be utilized with restraint and distinction.”245 For several reasons, this citation in Ormsbee 
Development Company v. Grace is misleading.  
The careless citation of the case is revealed by Ormsbee’s use of the word “distinction.” 
That word does not appear in the Florida opinion. Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp. actually 
stated: “We use much judgment, restraint and discretion in certifying.”246 The erroneous use of 
the word “distinction” has been perpetuated by its use in Ormsbee.247 But it has also been 
corrected. In spite of Ormsbee’s misquotation, District Judge Bruce Jenkins cited Ormsbee using 
the correct word from Shevin: “While the decision to certify is discretionary and certification 
should be used with restraint . . . .”248  
More important than the use of the wrong word, Shevin is actually not a case to use 
against certification. The case should be seen in its perspective as coming from Florida, the first 
state with a certification process. Further, the quotation should be placed in context of the 
opinion’s general endorsement of the certification process:  
[O]nly the Florida Supreme Court can decide this state law question in a manner 
that is, by definition, correct. Thus the defendants' strong urging that the issue be 
certified to that Court has considerable force. Both the United States Supreme 
Court and this Court have lauded the certification process, not only because it 
produces definitive answers but also because it ‘helps build a cooperative judicial 
federalism’. However, as has been noted by Chief Judge Brown, one of the 
strongest advocates of the process, certification should never be automatic or 
                                                 
244 Forty-nine states now have certification rules. Eisenberg, supra n.59. 
245 Ormsbee Dev. Co. v. Grace, 668 F.2d 1140, 1149 (10th Cir. 1982) (citing Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 
526 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 829 (1976)).  
246 526 F.2d at 274 (emphasis added). 
247 Reynolds v. United States, CIV.A. 98-B-1003, 2000 WL 134550, at *1 (D. Colo. January 21, 2000); L. Cohen & 
Co., 629 F.Supp. at 1424. 
248 Cyprus Plateau Mining Corp. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 972 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (D. Utah 1997) (citing 
Ormsbee Dev. Co., 668 F.2d at 1149). 
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unthinking. ‘We use much judgment, restraint and discretion in certifying. We do 
not abdicate.’249  
[W]e decline to certify the state law question in this case to the Florida Supreme 
Court. In taking this action, we intend to cast no doubt on the general efficacy of 
the certification process. And we certainly recognize the supremacy of the Florida 
Supreme Court as interpreter of state law . . . .250 
And the case had many reasons certification was not used. The plaintiff was the Attorney 
General of the State of Florida: 
We have before us the Attorney General, elected by the people of Florida, whose 
opinions on questions involving the duties of various state officials are persuasive, 
though certainly not binding, in Florida courts. He has brought this action in what 
he has determined to be the public interest and has proceeded for two years 
without apparent opposition from the Florida Legislature or the state 
governmental entities he purports to represent. To impede the progress of this 
action through the certification process itself seems to us to involve some 
disregard of the state governmental processes that comity principles require us to 
respect.251 
There were also strong practical reasons not to certify in Shevin. Shevin was an “antitrust 
action against seventeen major oil companies” which the trial court dismissed, directing the 
parties to proceed with a declaratory action in state court before the federal court would hear 
their antitrust claims.252 The Shevin appeal was presented after the case had been pending two 
years and stated only federal claims.253   
 And there was abundant state precedent on the question presented: 
[T]he narrow issue of the Florida Attorney General’s standing to bring this action 
does not seem to us an extremely close one. And we come to this conclusion with 
the aid of a long line of Florida decisions . . . as well as the body of common law 
dealing with the powers of attorneys general. This clearly is not a case in which 
we are required to ‘guess’ state law from one or two questionable precedents.254 
 Shevin’s circumstances, praise of the certification process, comparison with available 
alternatives, and broad language in favor of certification in its careful—not casual—analysis 
                                                 
249 Florida ex rel. Shevin, 526 F.2d at 274 (quoting Barnes v. Atl. & Pac. Life Ins. Co., 514 F.2d 704, 705 n.4 (5th 
Cir. 1975)) (citations omitted). 
250 Id. at 276. 
251 Id. at 275. 
252 Id. at 267. 
253 Id. at 275. 
254 Id. 
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makes citation of Shevin against certification improper. And returning to Ormsbee, the Tenth 
Circuit case citing Shevin, certification was never really viable. In Orsmbee, the court said 
“certification . . . is not appropriate when, as here, the issue certified would not be determinative 
of the issues before us on appeal.”255 So, Orsmbee should not be cited against certification. 
Criteria for Certification 
Two opinions from the Utah district court have stated certification is appropriate “when 
the case concerns a matter of vital public concern, where the issue will likely recur in other 
cases, where resolution of the question to be certified is outcome determinative of the case, and 
where the state supreme court has yet to have an opportunity to illuminate a clear path on the 
issue.”256 District Judge Dale Kimball’s language was cited by District Judge Jill Parrish, but she 
added an additional point, extending beyond his last criterion: “And the United States Supreme 
Court has instructed that federal district courts may avail themselves of state certification 
procedures when facing ‘[n]ovel, unsettled questions of state law.’”257  
Judges Kimball and Parrish list five instances when certification is appropriate: 
1. when the case concerns a matter of vital public concern; 
2. where the issue will likely recur in other cases; 
3. where resolution of the question to be certified is outcome determinative of the 
case; 
4. where the state supreme court has yet to have an opportunity to illuminate a clear 
path on the issue; and 
5. when facing “[n]ovel, unsettled questions of state law.” 258 
In an extensive footnote, when considering certification sua sponte, Judge Bruce Jenkins 
cited language from a Tenth Circuit opinion259 which correlates with the last three criteria used 
by Judges Kimball and Parrish. The Circuit opinion used language from the Uniform Act (1995). 
When the Circuit opinion borrowed the standards of the Uniform Act (1995) in setting standards 
for the certifying court, the state law became federal precedent: 
The Tenth Circuit has determined that certification is appropriate where it appears 
that the question to be certified may be determinative of the action now pending 
                                                 
255 Orsmbee Dev. Co.,668 F.2d at 1149. 
256 Memorandum Decision and Order Certifying Question to Utah Supreme Court, Carranza v. Mountainlands 
Health Clinic, 2:07-cv-00291-DAK, docket no. 31, filed May 14, 2009, 2009 WL 1392839, at *4 (D. Utah May 14, 
2009) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pate, 275 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Memorandum 
Decision and Order, Burningham v. Wright Med. Grp., Inc., 2:17-cv-00092-JNP-PMW, docket no. 48, filed January 
23, 2018, 2018 WL 542708, at *3 (D. Utah January 23, 2018). 
257 Memorandum Decision and Order, Burningham, 2:17-cv-00092-JNP-PMW, docket no. 48, filed January 23, 
2018, 2018 WL 542708, at *3 (D. Utah January 23, 2018) (citing Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 
43, 77 (1997)). 
258 Id. 
259 Swink v. Sunwest Bank (In re Fingado), 955 F.2d 31 (10th Cir. 1992). 
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before the federal court and where there is no controlling authority on the 
question from the state's highest court or its intermediate appellate court.260 
The Uniform Act (1995) criteria are also the likely foundation of the last three criteria in the 
Kimball-Parrish list above. 
 District Judge Jenkins also added that certification is appropriate “where the question has 
not been addressed by the state courts with ‘sufficient clarity.’ ”261 Thus, even if a question had 
been addressed by the state court, but without precision, certification could be used as an 
opportunity for state law to be made more understandable. 
 The criteria established illustrate the major purposes of certification—some of which are 
in conflict when the practical impact of certification is considered.  One consideration is case 
specific—the issue certified must be case determinative. But other case specific considerations 
such as time and expense may push against certification. And other considerations are systemic.  
The existence of a novel question of law, unsettled by state authority, likely to bear in other 
cases, requires the court and parties to look beyond their current case. This is an opportunity for 
counsel and the court to look at the larger purposes of the judicial system and the respective roles 
of federal and state courts. Comity and federalism are much larger than any current case and 
future cases. So, those factors external to the case may drive a case to bear a burden for the 
benefit of others. The parties are most likely to emphasize the case specific factors, unless one of 
them is a recurrent litigant or a governmental entity. Therefore, the court must require the parties 
to address factors external to the case and may need to develop those factors itself if the parties 
do not adequately address them. 
Motion to Certify Denied 
As stated earlier, in about half of cases in which certification is considered, no question is 
certified. There are several common reasons. 
No State Law Question. Of course, certification is not needed if the state law question is 
not decisive. Framing the issues in the case can make certification irrelevant. In SEC v. Merrill 
Scott Limited,262 District Judge Tena Campbell rejected an attempt to “certify a question of Utah 
property and trust law to the Utah Supreme Court regarding a trust beneficiary's ability to control 
property held in trust.”263 At the hearing, she stated “This is not a state law question. This is a 
question of securities transactions, the antifraud provisions.”264 In her later order denying 
certification she added: “The Tenth Circuit has made clear that certification is appropriate only 
                                                 
260 Cyprus Plateau Mining Corp., 972 F.Supp. at 1383 (citing Swink, 955 F.2d at 33), compare with Uniform Act 
(1995) § 2. 
261 Cyprus Plateau Mining Corp., 972 F. Supp. at 1383 (citing Delaney v. Cade, 986 F.2d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1993)). 
262 2:02-cv-00039-TC. 
263 Order at 3, Merrill Scott Ltd., 2:02-cv-00039-TC, docket no. 970, filed May 2, 2007. 
264 March 8, 2007 Hrg. Tr. at 64, Merrill Scott Ltd., 2:02-cv-00039-TC, docket no. 949, filed March 22, 2007. 
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where novel or unsettled issues of state law exist. . . . This case turns on the application of federal 
law . . . .”265 
 Utah Law is Clear. In Evans v. State of Utah,266 same-sex couple plaintiffs alleged 
deprivation of their property and liberty interests resulting from the State of Utah's failure to 
recognize same-sex marriages solemnized in the time between issuance of an order in the District 
Court validating such marriages and a stay of that order entered by the U.S. Supreme Court.267 
Defendants filed two motions to certify issues to the Utah Supreme Court. District Judge Dale 
Kimball denied the motions: “Because Utah law is clear and not ultimately controlling of the 
case before this court, the court concludes that there is no basis for certifying the state law 
questions to the Utah Supreme Court.”268  
No Unusual Difficulty in Deciding. In Society of Lloyd's v. Reinhart,269 certification was 
not used sua sponte by the Tenth Circuit because the issue was not hard to resolve:  
While no Utah court has rendered a decision on the precise issue in question, our 
analysis above establishes that there is no unusual difficulty in deciding the state 
law question or a likelihood that Lloyd's theory of liability would be adopted by 
the Utah courts. Thus, given the above conclusions, certification is 
unnecessary.270 
Failure to Disclose Known Authority. While a lack of candor with the court may not 
doom a certification motion, it certainly played a role in Self v. Teleperformance Group USA.271  
Magistrate Judge Paul Warner noted that the decisive issue on which certification was sought had 
been ruled on by another judge in the district recently, and that counsel clearly knew of the 
decision because counsel was also engaged in that other case: 
Two weeks after Judge Stewart’s October 1, 2008 decision was rendered in Sweat, 
Plaintiffs’ counsel filed the motion to certify in this case but, for whatever reason, 
failed to mention Judge Stewart’s ruling in Sweat. It is not lost on the court that 
Plaintiffs’ counsel did not believe it was necessary to request certification of the 
above-referenced issue until after Judge Stewart ruled against the plaintiffs on the 
same issue in Sweat.272 
                                                 
265 Order at 3, Merrill Scott Ltd., 2:02-cv-00039-TC, docket no. 970, filed May 2, 2007. 
266 2:14-cv-00055-DAK. 
267 Memorandum Decision and Order, Evans, 2:14-cv-00055-DAK, docket no. 45, filed May 19, 2014. 
268 Id. at 34. 
269 402 F.3d 982. 
270 Id. at 1002. 
271 2:08-cv-00395-PMW. 
272 Memorandum Decision and Order at 4, Self, 2:08-cv-00395-PMW, docket no. 126, filed February 4, 2009. 
 
43 
Timing of Motion, After Party Asserts Law is Clear. A party seeking certification 
should at the latest raise it when a dispositive motion raises the issue. In American National 
Property v. McNeely,273 District Judge Dale Kimball pointed out the danger in waiting too long. 
The motion was made three days before a hearing and denied a day after the hearing. 
The court considers Defendant’s present motion to be untimely. A party cannot 
assert that Utah law is clear on an issue and then seek redress from another court 
when it receives an unfavorable ruling. At this stage of the litigation, if Defendant 
disagrees with the court’s analysis, his recourse is to file an appeal to the Tenth 
Circuit. Defendant can ask the Tenth Circuit to certify the issue prior to its 
analysis of the issue. Prior to this court’s analysis of the issue, Defendant’s only 
position was that the issue was clear and that the court should certify the question 
only if the court thought it was unclear or disagreed with Defendant. [The Court’s 
d]isagreement with a party’s position does not make the issue unclear.274   
When a motion suggests the issue, certification should be raised. Stating that the law is clear will 
work against a party later seeking certification, who must necessarily claim the law is not settled. 
Motion Made After Adverse Decision. A motion is clearly untimely after an adverse 
decision. Perhaps the untimeliest motion was made in another case District Judge Dale Kimball 
handled. In Utah Division of Forestry v. United States,275 the motion was made in 2004, three 
years after a summary judgment ruling.  
In 1.800. Vending v. Wyland,276 the motion was not as late, and District Judge Clark 
Waddoups explained why a motion to certify is too late when made after an adverse ruling: 
Surprisingly, Defendants believed the court had sufficient guidance to rule in 
Defendants’ favor on the motion for summary judgment and sought certification 
only after the court rejected its argument. If such a procedure were to be allowed, 
it would in effect allow a party to make a motion, argue the merits, and then after 
losing on an issue, use certification as an interlocutory appeal from an interim 
decision by a federal court to the Utah Supreme Court.277 
                                                 
273 1:16-cv-00007-DAK. 
274 Memorandum Decision and Oder Denying Motion to Certify Question to Utah Supreme Court, McNeely, 1:16-
cv-00007-DAK, docket no. 32, filed November 22, 2016. 
275 2:97-cv-00927-DAK. 
276 1:14-cv-00121-CW. 
277 Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion to Certify a Question at 3, Wyland, 1:14-cv-00121-CW, 
docket no. 94, filed January 11, 2017. 
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In six other cases a motion to certify was made after an adverse ruling and denied,278 but in one 
case a district judge granted a motion to certify after an adverse ruling was made against the 
movant.279 
The Tenth Circuit has stated: “We generally will not certify questions to a state supreme 
court when the requesting party seeks certification only after having received an adverse decision 
from the district court.”280  
 Prematurity. Sometimes the determinative issues have not emerged, making certification 
at an early stage unwise. In Spurlino v. Holcim, District Judge Jill Parrish denied a motion to 
certify for that reason: “While the court agrees that certification of the question may eventually 
be appropriate, it would be premature to do so now. . . . At this early stage of the proceeding, 
Plaintiff has not developed a factual record showing it would benefit [from the issue of law].”281 
Pro Se Movants. Pro se parties also fare poorly when asking for certification.282 In 
Edwards v. Utah Board of Pardons,283 a pro se habeas petitioner sought post-conviction relief 
from a state criminal sentence and almost a year after the District Court dismissed his petition for 
failure to exhaust state remedies,284 the petitioner filed a motion for certification.285 The motion 
did not propose a question to certify—it only requested the clerk certify and transmit all records 
to the Utah Supreme Court. That motion was found moot286 after the petitioner’s appeal. The 
Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal as untimely because the appeal was filed five months after the 
District Court dismissed his petition.287  
                                                 
278 Allen v. Bamboo HR, 2:16-cv-00905-RJS; First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Nw. Title Ins. Agency, 2:15-cv-00229-DN; 
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 No Stated Reason. Sometimes, no reason for 
denial is given. Because the decision is entirely 
discretionary, even a brief denial will suffice. In 
Whiteman v. Friel,288 District Judge Tena Campbell 
denied the motion by endorsement. 289 
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. In Haik 
v. Salt Lake County Board of Health290 the District Court and Tenth Circuit denied motions to 
certify because the federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 
Remarkable Cases 
 For several reasons, cases involving certification may be remarkable. Certification creates 
a unique interplay between two sovereigns. By the nature of the process, the issues certified are 
significant. In these first 30 years of the Utah experience, some cases have procedural features 
worth examining. The personalities of judges involved may impress themselves on the various 
orders and opinions. Lawyer and party strategies make each case unique. This section of the 
thesis will examine some cases that deserve attention beyond their contribution to the pattern of 
cases in which certification was considered and used. 
Reformulation: In the first case291 which reformulated a certified question, the Utah 
Supreme Court reviewed the history of certification generally and in Utah. “The practice of 
certifying questions of state law to a state supreme court is a fairly recent device that arose from 
the judge-made doctrine of abstention, whereby a federal court would abstain until the state court 
had resolved the state questions.”292 The opinion noted U.S. Supreme Court approval of 
certification and the constitutional infirmities in Utah’s 1975 Certification Rule. Then, the 
opinion explained why the need for reformulation arises (lack of lawyer participation in 
formulation);293 how the need is accommodated by the federal court (by an express statement 
that “the particular phrasing of the question should not restrict the state court from reformulating 
the question as it sees fit”);294 the power of the receiving court to reformulate a question;295 and 
why the Utah Supreme Court found it necessary to reformulate the question.296 The opinion did 
not note the lack of an express reformulation provision in Utah’s Rule 41. 
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That case is also interesting because it was a 3-2 decision, with the dissent boldly stating 
it “would advise the bankruptcy court to employ the guidelines set out in this dissenting 
opinion.”297 The bankruptcy court followed the position of the majority.298 
An unfinished order: A 
mechanical problem required two 
certification orders in Gardner v. 
Galetka,299 The first certification order300 
was unfinished—omitting the certified 
question—and rejected for not containing 
the federal court’s statement of the 
question submitted.301 The corrected order 
containing the questions was submitted after briefing four months later. 302 
 Public policy exceptions to at-will employment:  Among the high-profile cases which 
have turned on certified questions is Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.303 Utah is an at-will 
employment state, but a wrongful termination suit may be maintained if a termination violates 
public policy. The plaintiff-employees responded to shoplifting incidents where the shoplifters 
were armed. They did not follow Wal-Mart policy to withdraw but instead pinned the shoplifters 
and confiscated the weapons. They were then terminated. The question whether this stated a 
violation of the Utah policy of self-defense was certified sua sponte and answered. The Utah 
Supreme court held that self-defense resulting in termination may give rise to a wrongful 
termination claim and is an exception to the rule of at-will employment, but limited the exception 
to circumstances where an employee reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend 
against an imminent threat of serious bodily harm and the employee has no opportunity to 
withdraw.304 
Ammons v. La-Z-Boy, Inc.305 is another at-will employment case in which certification 
was important. In response to the question about another public policy exception to at-will 
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employment, the Utah Supreme Court held306 that retaliatory discharge for seeking workers’ 
compensation violates public policy, so that a wrongful discharge claim is recognized as an 
exception to the general rule of at-will employment. But the court declined to recognize causes 
of action for harassment or discrimination307 or for retaliatory discharge for an opposing 
employer’s treatment of fellow employees who applied for workers’ compensation benefits.308 
 Certification reviews state court proceedings:  Some certification cases illustrate the 
interplay between state and federal courts, even beyond the certification process. Richardson v. 
Navistar International Transportation Corp.309 was a federal case brought against different 
defendants following a state case arising out of the same automobile accident. The question was 
the effect of the state case on the federal case. Plaintiffs brought a negligence action in Utah state 
court against various parties involved in an accident but did not include Navistar International 
Transportation Corp. (“Navistar”) or Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. (“Toyota”). In a bifurcated 
proceeding, the state court jury returned a special verdict allocating 100% of fault among the 
named defendants. The parties to that suit settled before the damages stage of the trial, and the 
state trial court entered a judgment of dismissal with prejudice.  
Plaintiffs then filed an action against Navistar and Toyota in federal district court 
asserting negligence and strict product liability claims. Defendants raised the defense of 
collateral estoppel and moved to dismiss the suit based on the state jury’s allocation of 100% of 
the fault in the prior state court proceeding. The district court granted Navistar and Toyota’s 
motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed. 
The Tenth Circuit then certified a question310 to the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah 
Supreme Court held that because “the parties reached a settlement before the state court entered 
a judgment allocating fault pursuant to the Liability Reform Act . . . the jury's verdict on 
allocation had no binding or preclusive effect on any party or court.” The Tenth Circuit then held 
that the federal action was not barred by collateral estoppel, and the law of the case doctrine 
applied after the Utah Supreme Court opinion to preclude a federal court from considering 
whether Utah’s comparative negligence law required allocation of all fault in one action.311 The 
District Court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the 
parties stipulated to dismissal, presumably in settlement.312 
Soter’s Inc., v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association,313 is another federal case 
showing the inter-relations of state and federal courts. The case was tried to a jury in state 
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court.314 Post-trial motions raised issues with the meaning of the jury’s answers to interrogatories 
on issues of waiver. But before the motions could be resolved, the defendant was put into a 
federal receivership.315 The receiver then removed the action to federal court. District Judge 
Bruce Jenkins certified seven questions on the Utah law of waiver.316 The Supreme Court 
decided that the state court jury was improperly instructed, which effectively required a new 
trial. But because the Supreme Court was hearing certified questions rather than an appeal, the 
Supreme Court did not even suggest a new trial. That procedural decision was for the federal 
judge, who then re-tried the case in federal court.317 On request of a federal court, the Utah 
Supreme Court decided that a state trial court had misapplied Utah law. 
In a third case, the Utah Supreme Court was asked to determine the effect of one of its 
own orders. In Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Wisan,318 the Tenth 
Circuit asked the Utah Supreme Court whether its dismissal of an application for an 
extraordinary writ due to laches was a final decision on the merits so that res judicata applied to 
bar similar claims in a federal civil suit. The district court “attempted to discern the Utah 
Supreme Court's likely approach.”319 But the Tenth Circuit, on appeal, decided to certify the 
question to the Utah Supreme Court, noting that “[c]ertification by this court in no way implies 
an abuse of discretion by the district court in failing to certify, but only indicates our independent 
judgment on the question.”320 The Utah Supreme Court determined that its decision on the writ 
had preclusive effect,321 so the Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s decision and 
remanded.322 Following the Tenth Circuit's directive, the district court dismissed the action on res 
judicata grounds.323 
Tenth Circuit Recommends Certification: McArthur v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.,324 
like Fundamentalist Church, is a case in which the Tenth Circuit certified a question decided by 
the district judge. The Circuit stated its view of the need to certify a little differently than it had 
stated it in Fundamentalist Church: 
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Needless to say, the outcome of this proceeding turns upon important state law 
questions of public policy, statutory interpretation, and insurance contract 
construction which we believe the Supreme Court of Utah should have the 
opportunity to address in the first instance. Therefore, we conclude certification of 
the above questions would further the interests of comity and federalism by giving 
the Supreme Court of Utah an opportunity to answer the questions should it elect 
to do so under Utah R.App. P. 41(e).325 
The Utah Supreme Court agreed with the trial judge and the Tenth Circuit affirmed in a very 
brief opinion.326 
Multiple attempts at certification: Iverson v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company327 
tells counsel seeking certification to keep trying. District Judge Dee Benson refused to certify a 
question about automobile insurance, stating “[i]n light of Utah statutory language, as well as 
cases from this and other jurisdictions, there is enough guidance for this Court to make a 
determination without the need to certify.”328 But after a chambers conference four months 
later,329 and another chambers conference two months after that,330 he certified a differently 
stated question.331 From the first motion332 to the order certifying, nine months elapsed. 
Quick certification: Tight cooperation between the federal district court and the Utah 
Supreme Court was demonstrated in Utah Republican Party v. Herbert.333 The case, filed on 
January 15, 2016, challenged election procedures modified by the Utah State Legislature in 
2015. Four days after the case was filed, the district court ordered the parties to meet, confer and 
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submit questions to certify.334 Ten days later, the plaintiff and defendant filed a joint motion to 
certify.335 A certification order issued six days later.336 
The next day, the Utah Democratic Party moved to intervene and moved to certify 
another question. Six days later, after accelerated briefing, a second certification order issued 
with two questions.337  
The Utah Supreme Court’s opinion issued April 8, 2016.338 It declined to answer the third 
question, stating that it was “based on ambiguous statements of intent by different 
representatives of the Republican Party.”339 “[R]elief, premised on hypothetical future facts, is 
inappropriate in this procedural setting.”340 “[T]here is no controversy ripe for resolution . . . 
.”341 
The certification process, from the suggestion of the need on January 19, 2016, to the 
opinion of the Utah Supreme Court on April 8th, took less than three months.  
Construing a clear statute under the rule against absurdity: In Garfield County v. 
United States,342 the Utah Supreme Court construed a clear statute contrary to its language to 
avoid an absurd result. The case was one of dozens brought by Utah counties to declare rights of 
way across federal land. Litigants in multiple cases had raised as a defense Utah Code § 78B–2–
201(1), which imposes a seven-year time period for the state to bring an action for title to 
property. The federal courts questioned whether this statute and its predecessor were statutes of 
limitations or statutes of repose. Three district judges joined in a sua sponte certification order, 
formulated with input from the parties. The Utah Supreme Court accepted the question: 
We hold that the plain language of both versions of the statute reveals them to be 
statutes of repose. . . . Because of the absurdity that results from applying section 
201 and its predecessor as statutes of repose in this context, we construe these 
statutes as statutes of limitations with respect to R.S. 2477 right of way claims.  
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The Utah Supreme Court found that the plain language of the statute, applied in a dispute with 
the federal government, created the absurd result of terminating causes of action before they 
existed.  
We hold that the plain language of both versions of the statute reveals them to be 
statutes of repose. The application of this interpretation to the State's R.S. 2477 
rights of way leads to the result that the State effectively and inevitably lost title 
to any such rights of way after seven years without any opportunity to prevent 
such loss. This result—the automatic expiration of the State's title to R.S. 2477 
rights of way—is absurd . . . .343 
The opinion has a strong dissent by two Utah Court of Appeals judges who sat on the case. Judge 
Fred Voros, the author, summarized: 
[T]he claimed absurd result—that Utah would enjoy rights of way granted by the 
United States without a judicial remedy for quieting title to them against the 
United States—was the prevailing law nationwide for 106 years, from the passage 
of the Mining Act in 1866 until the passage of the Quiet Title Act in 1972.  
For this reason, I believe the majority opinion represents the most expansive 
application of the absurdity doctrine in American law. I am unaware of the 
absurdity doctrine ever being employed, in Utah or elsewhere, to reject as absurd 
not a proposed rule of law, but a long-existing rule of law—in this case, a rule of 
law governing all American states and territories for over a century. If that rule of 
law in fact mandated absurd results, surely in 106 years some court somewhere 
would have noticed. Yet no party cites, nor am I able to discover, any court 
questioning the rationality of the rule of law that we today declare absurd.344 
In Garfield County, the Utah Supreme Court was of divided views, as it had been in In re West 
Side Property Associates.345 But in Garfield County, the dissent did not “advise the [federal] 
court to employ the guidelines set out in this dissenting opinion.”346 
Significant Legal Issues 
Answers to certified questions have clarified many significant aspects of Utah law. The 
unique questions presented by certification have enhanced Utah law, by authoritative 
declarations from the Utah Supreme Court. 
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In Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc.,347 District Judge Thomas Greene, with input from 
counsel, certified three questions.348 These questions arose out of Mrs. Hansen’s presence while 
four other plaintiffs, including her son, received electric shocks in the waters behind a Sea-Ray 
boat at Lake Powell. The Utah Supreme Court summarized the threshold issue: “Plaintiffs ask us 
to expand the zone of danger rule [for negligent infliction of emotional injury] found in the 
Restatement to include recovery for persons who are not actually within the zone of danger but 
who reasonably and subjectively believe they are in danger.”349 The Court answered in the 
negative: “We decline to extend recovery to those outside the zone of danger even though they 
may reasonably fear for their own safety and even though they may witness injury to a close 
relative.”350 
In Burkholz v. Joyce,351 a victim of years of alleged sexual abuse sued her abuser. The 
case was filed before enactment of a Utah statute of limitation specific to child abuse claims 
which provided additional time to assert these claims. The plaintiff also alleged tolling by 
minority, mental disability, and the discovery rule.352 On these difficult facts, the Utah Supreme 
Court determined the statute of limitations barred the claims: “In making this decision we in no 
way mean to discount the trauma Burkholz has suffered. However, . . . we find ourselves 
constrained by the policy underlying the statute of limitations and principles underlying the 
discovery rule's narrow exception to the statute of limitations and conclude that under these 
circumstances, no other result is tenable.”353 
Carranza v. Mountainlands Health Clinic,354 raised the issue of existence of a claim for 
wrongful death of an unborn child. The Utah Supreme Court determined—with a two-justice 
majority, a two justice concurrence in the result, and a one justice dissent—that such a claim 
does exist.355 From acceptance of the difficult question to issuance of its multi-part opinion, the 
Utah Supreme Court required 28 months. 
In Miller v. United States,356 John and Joan Miller filed a suit in federal court to recover 
for injuries in an auto accident. The defendant was an employee of the United States Air Force 
who had been drinking liquor at the Noncommissioned Officers Club at Hill Air Force Base. The 
Millers’ complaint included a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) alleging that 
Mr. Valle had been negligently and carelessly served alcohol at the club in violation of the Utah 
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Dramshop Act and that the federal government, as the dramshop, was liable for the Millers’ 
injuries. District Judge Tena Campbell’s certification order357 cited Utah cases holding that the 
strict liability Utah Dramshop Act is an exclusive remedy, eliminating a state law claim for 
negligence which is an essential predicate to an FTCA claim. Judge Campbell’s order also cited a 
Seventh Circuit case358 holding that even if a state dramshop act eliminated a state court claim 
for negligence, the negligence claim should survive for the limited purpose of supporting an 
FTCA claim. In essence, the Seventh Circuit (without certifying the question to the Illinois 
Supreme Court) declared a narrow exception to the exclusive remedy of the Illinois dramshop act 
for purposes of the FTCA. 
In response to the questions in Miller, the Utah Supreme Court held359 that Utah's 
Dramshop Act was a strict liability statute, and that “Utah does not recognize a common law 
cause of action in negligence for the sale of alcohol to persons who cause injury to third parties 
while under the influence of alcohol.”360 A separate opinion concurred in the result but dissented, 
because the majority’s opinion went beyond the question certified.361 
Certifications by Article I Judges 
 In several cases, judges appointed under Article I of the U.S. Constitution have issued 
certification orders when they are responsible to decide controlling issues. This occurs when a 
bankruptcy judge is conducting an adversary proceeding or when a magistrate judge handles a 
civil case on consent of the parties. 
Cases certified by bankruptcy judges include In re West Side Properties,362 from 
Bankruptcy Judge Judith Boulden; In re Kunz363 and In re Rockwell364 jointly certified by 
Bankruptcy Judges Glen Clark and William Thurman; In re Simmons365 certified by Bankruptcy 
Judge Kimball Mosier; and In re Hendry366 and In re Kiley367 certified by Bankruptcy Judge 
Kevin Anderson. 
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Cases certified by Magistrate Judges include National Indemnity et al v. United States 
Sports Specialty368 certified by Magistrate Judge Brooke Wells while the case was pending 
consent and Katterman v. Salt Lake County369 and Mitchell v. Roberts370 certified by Magistrate 
Judge Evelyn Furse. Magistrate Judge Paul Warner considered but rejected certification in Self v. 
Teleperformance Group USA.371 
The Role of Justice and Judge Parrish 
Of all judges and justices involved in certification from the federal courts to the Utah 
Supreme Court, save perhaps Justice Dallin Oaks who wrote the opinion invalidating the 1975 
Certification Rule, Jill Parrish has the most prominent role. She served as a justice of the Utah 
Supreme Court from 2003 to 2015 and in that capacity wrote six opinions on questions certified 
from federal courts. Serving as a district judge in the District of Utah since August 2015, she has 
already certified more questions to the Utah Supreme Court than any other federal judge. She is 
the only person who has served in a judicial capacity on both sides of the certification process. 
Opinions on Utah Supreme Court 
In Smith v. United States she wrote the opinion372 responding to questions certified by 
District Judge Dee Benson.373 The issue was whether a legislative cap on noneconomic damages 
in medical malpractice cases applied in cases of wrongful death and, if so whether the limitation 
was valid under the Utah Constitution’s prohibition of such damage caps in wrongful death 
cases. Justice Parrish’s unanimous opinion declared the cap unconstitutional in such cases. This 
is the only opinion Justice Parrish wrote in response to questions certified from a trial court 
judge. 
 Justice Parrish responded374 to the Tenth Circuit’s certification375 in In re Reinhart about 
the effect of Utah garnishment exemptions in bankruptcy. The district court had affirmed a 
decision of the bankruptcy court finding the Utah statutory exemption created a bankruptcy 
exemption,376 but on further appeal, the Tenth Circuit certified questions. Justice Parrish held 
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that the garnishment exemption did not, by its terms, create a bankruptcy exemption. Then, the 
Tenth Circuit remanded to the district court to remand to the bankruptcy court.377 
 Justice Parrish’s opinion was the second she had written in In re Reinhart. Her first was 
written a year earlier.378 The earlier opinion was also in response to a Tenth Circuit 
certification.379 The issue on this appeal was an exemption of a retirement plan. Following the 
answer of the Utah Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the exemption on the principal but 
not on the earnings, reversing the trial court in part.380 
 In Whitney v. Division of Juvenile Justice Services381 Justice Parrish again wrote in 
response to certification from the Tenth Circuit.382 While the possibility of certification was 
raised in the district court, the nine-line motion had only cursory argument.383 The response to 
the certified question confirmed the correctness of the district court decision, so the Tenth Circuit 
affirmed.384 
Justice Parrish also wrote for the court in Ohio Casualty Insurance Company v. Unigard 
Insurance Company385 in response to a question from the Tenth Circuit.386 No question of 
certification arose in the District Court on the issue of allocation of defense costs between 
insurers, but the Utah Supreme Court answered the question of first impression supporting the 
Tenth Circuit reversal of the District Court.387 
 Justice Parrish responded to questions certified by the Tenth Circuit in Mecham v. 
Frazier.388 Justice Parrish held that immunity protected the state officers from suit, requiring the 
Tenth Circuit to reverse the district judge’s denial of immunity on the state law claims.389 
Because a separate opinion of the Tenth Circuit had already reversed the district judge’s denial of 
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qualified immunity on the federal claims,390 the federal case was then dismissed by the federal 
district court. 
 Five of the six opinions written by Justice Parrish were in response to questions from the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Of those, four resulted in trial court reversals. During her tenure 
on the Utah Supreme Court, the Court issued twenty-seven opinions in response to certified 
questions, eleven of which were certified from the Tenth Circuit. This background may in part 
explain her readiness, as a district judge, to certify questions. She raises the possibility sua sponte 
more than she faces it on motions—having received only one motion to certify in her cases. And 
she denied that motion. 
Questions Certified as District Court Judge 
Judge Parrish first faced certification as a district court judge in Spurlino v. Holcim391 
Judge Parrish denied a motion to certify questions about the Utah Uniform Unfair Practices Act. 
She stated: 
While the court agrees that certification of the question may eventually be 
appropriate, it would be premature to do so now. . . . Plaintiff has not developed a 
factual record showing it would benefit from the [competitive injury] inference, if 
such an inference is indeed permissible under Utah law. Additionally, Defendants 
argue they have defenses that will defeat Plaintiff’s claims even if the . . . 
inference applies.392 
At almost the same time, in Dircks v. Travelers Indemnity Company of America,393 Judge 
Parrish suggested that claims for declaratory relief regarding underinsured motorist coverage 
required interpretation of the Utah statute, making certification advisable.394 The parties provided 
input and a certification order issued with a single question.395 The question was answered396 and 
judgment was entered for the plaintiff.397 
                                                 
390 Mecham v. Frazier, 500 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir. 2007). 
391 2:14-cv-00461-JNP. 
392 Order Denying Without Prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion for Certification of Questions of Law to the Utah Supreme 
Court, Spurlino, 2:14-cv-00461-JNP, docket no. 73 at 2, filed January 27, 2016. 
393 2:14-cv-00118-JNP-DBP. 
394 Order Staying Case, Dircks, 2:14-cv-00118-JNP-DBP, docket no. 38, filed December 17, 2015.  
395 Order Certifying Questions to the Utah Supreme Court, Dircks, 2:14-cv-00118-JNP-DBP, docket no. 41, filed 
January 29, 2016. 
396 Dircks v. Traverlers Indem. Co. of Am., 2017 WL 4675471 (Utah 2017). 
397 Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Defendant’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Dircks, 2:14-cv-00118-JNP-DBP, docket no. 50, filed December 1, 2017; Judgment, Dircks, 2:14-cv-
00118-JNP-DBP, docket no. 51, filed December 1, 2017. 
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Two questions regarding Utah insurance laws were certified in Lancer Insurance Co. v. 
Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines,398 after Judge Parrish obtained input from the parties. Both 
questions were answered,399 resulting in declaratory judgment against the insurer.400 
In Zimmerman v. University of Utah, simultaneous with an order on two dispositive 
motions, Judge Parrish certified three questions401 regarding Utah’s constitutional free speech 
clause and employment law. The questions were accepted, but only one was answered due to 
poor briefing by the parties.402 
Judge Parrish suggested certification of questions about a Utah statute of limitations at 
argument of a motion to dismiss in Loveridge v. Prudential Insurance Company of America.403 
The defendant-movant requested a 21-day stay and then withdrew the motion. The case settled 
shortly thereafter. 
In GeoMetWatch v. Hall,404 Judge Parrish certified three questions about governmental 
immunity to the Utah Supreme Court sua sponte405 but on the parties’ motions, substantially 
amended the questions and expanded the order.406 The questions are pending at the Utah 
Supreme Court.407 
In Flores v. Unified Police Department of Greater Salt Lake,408 Judge Parrish certified 
two governmental immunity questions,409 but revoked her order 21 days later when the case 
settled.410 
                                                 
398 Order Certifying Questions to the Utah Supreme Court, Lancer Ins. Co., 2:14-cv-00785-JNP, docket no. 58, filed 
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400 Order Denying [32] Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting [42] Motion for Summary Judgment, Lancer 
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402 Zimmerman v. Univ. of Utah, 2018 WL 523483 (Utah January 23, 2018). 
403 Minute Entry, Loveridge, 2:16-cv-00377-JNP, docket no. 18, filed August 22, 2016. 
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405 Order Certifying Questions to the Utah Supreme Court, GeoMetWatch, 1:14-cv-00060-JNP-PMW, docket no. 
475, filed March 29, 2017. 
406 Memorandum Decision and Amended Order Certifying Questions to the Utah Supreme Court, GeoMetWatch, 
1:14-cv-00060-JNP-PMW, docket no. 489, filed April 21, 2017. 
407 GeoMetWatch v. Hall, 20170264-SC. 
408 2:16-cv-00224-JNP-BCW. 
409 Amended Order Certifying Questions to the Utah Supreme Court, Flores, 2:16-cv-00224-JNP-BCW, docket no. 
19, filed April 3, 2017. 
410 Order Striking Certification of Questions to the Utah Supreme Court, Flores, 2:16-cv-00224-JNP-BCW, docket 
no. 23, filed April 24, 2017. 
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The application of the economic loss rule to fraudulent inducement claims was certified 
by Judge Parrish in HealthBanc International, LLC v. Synergy Worldwide, Inc.411 The case is 
pending at the Utah Supreme Court.412 
Recently Judge Parrish ordered “the parties to meet, confer, and submit a proposed 
statement of facts and proposed questions for certification” in Burningham v. Wright Medical 
Group.413 They did so, and she signed the certification order.414 The case is pending at the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
 The influence of Justice and Judge Parrish is unique because of her positions the Utah 
federal district court and the Utah Supreme Court. Those courts are most involved in certified 
questions of Utah law. Her inclination to raise the issue sua sponte may influence other judges to 
consider certification more often. 
Impact of Certification on Cases 
 The certification process impacts cases. While an authoritative decision on state law is 
the desired result of the process, there are other benefits. The mere filing of a motion to certify, 
or the pendency of a motion, or entry of a certification order may cause a case to settle. And as 
would be expected, the answer to a certified question may provide a basis for settlement or for 
entry of an order deciding a dispositive motion. 
Certification Motion Causes Cases to Settle 
The mere suggestion of certification may advance a case—perhaps by focusing a critical 
issue, or perhaps by creating a concern about delay. In Loveridge v. Prudential Insurance 
Company of America,415 District Judge Jill Parrish expressed the inclination to certify a question 
of applicability of a statute of limitations after hearing arguments on a motion to dismiss.416 
Defendant then requested a three-week stay of the case, withdrew the motion to dismiss and a 
few months later, the parties filed a stipulated notice of dismissal.417 
                                                 
411 Order Certifying Questions to the Utah Supreme Court, HealthBanc Int’l, LLC, 2:16-cv-00135-JNP-PMW, 
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At a final pretrial conference in Jeppson v. Thoman,418 District Judge David Sam directed 
the parties to prepare an order certifying an issue under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Instead, a motion for summary judgment was filed six weeks later, and the case settled six 
months after that. In the interim, time had been extended for any response to the motion.  
In Davis County Construction v. Davis County,419 the case settled eighteen months after 
the certification motion was filed. On the same day the motion was filed, an order from District 
Judge David Sam set an accelerated briefing schedule and gave notice of a hearing five days 
later—which was apparently never held.   
Cases Settle While Questions Pend in Utah Supreme Court 
In at least nine other instances, cases have settled while certification is pending after a 
certification order is sent to the Utah Supreme Court. The time between entry of the order and 
settlement may range from days to a year. During that time, the parties examine—and perhaps 
brief—their positions. The close look at the controlling issues which are certified, and the spectre 
of additional time and expense to complete litigation facilitates settlement. 
Flores v. Unified Police Department of Greater Salt Lake420 moved very quickly. The 
question was certified April 3, 2017, and amended April 21, 2017—and the case was 
dismissed April 24, 2017. 
Gibbs v. Unum Life Insurance Company of America421 settled a week after the 
certification order issued. 
Pace v. Swerdlow422 settled less than two months after a question was certified. 
In Westport Insurance v. Ong,423 an order of certification was followed within two weeks 
by a motion to amend it. In the course of resolution of that motion, the parties settled the 
case less than four months later.  
Haights Creek Irrigation Company v. United Technologies424 was dismissed less than 
four months after the certification order issued. 
                                                 
418 2:94-cv-00519-DS. 
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Johnson v. Riddle425 and In re Hendry426 settled six months after the certification order 
issued. 
In McCourt v. Semken,427 the Utah Supreme Court did not respond to accept or reject a 
November 1989 certification order until January 1991 and then the plaintiff voluntarily 
dismissed the case in December 1991. 
Gines v. Ingersoll-Rand Company428 settled a year after the certification order issued. 
Answer to Certified Questions Causes Cases to Settle 
In another 12 cases, the answer to the certified issues apparently assisted in settlement.  
A retaliatory termination cause of action based on reporting co-worker law violations was 
determined not to exist in the Utah Supreme Court’s answer429 to the question posed in 
Fox v. MCI Communications Corp.430  The case promptly resolved. 
In Spackman v. Board of Education of Box Elder County,431 the Utah Supreme Court’s 
determination432 that two state constitutional provisions were self-executing, thus 
validating two of the plaintiff’s causes of action, enabled a settlement. 
Egbert, v. Nissan North America433 resolved after two certification orders issued by 
District Judges Paul Cassell and Dee Benson (successively presiding in the case). Issues 
certified related to Utah tort law. The parties settled before resolution of a summary 
judgment motion filed after the opinions434 were received from the Utah Supreme Court.  
A claim for descendant’s benefits came before the district court in Burns v. Astrue.435 The 
parties stipulated to certification of whether an agreement to be a sperm donor constituted 
a record of consent to being a parent for purposes of intestacy, entitling the child to social 
                                                 
425 2:98-cv-00599-TS. 
426 2:14-bk-27398-KA. 
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security survivor’s benefits. After the Utah Supreme Court opinion436 declaring that the 
donation agreement did not constitute consent to being a parent, the parties stipulated to 
dismiss the federal case. 
In Whitney v. Division of Juvenile Justice Services437 the Tenth Circuit (in an 
interlocutory appeal) determined that a district judge’s decision denying governmental 
immunity was correct—after the Circuit received an answer from the Utah Supreme 
Court438 to the question certified from the Circuit. The case settled shortly after remand. 
In Thayer v. Washington County School District439 settlement was reached after the Utah 
supreme Court’s determined440 that governmental immunity did not bar suit for death of a 
student by a firearm used in a school play rehearsal.  
The statutory interpretations provided by the Utah Supreme Court441 to a question 
certified by two bankruptcy judges together in In re Kunz442 and In re Rockwell443 
enabled settlement by clarifying status of funds transferred between two IRA accounts. 
After the Utah Supreme Court’s opinion issued,444 both parties in Iverson v. State Farm 
Mutual Insurance Company445 moved for summary judgment, and filed settlement papers 
five months later. 
Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.446 settled after the Utah Supreme Court’s opinion447 defining 
the parameters of a public policy which could be the basis of a claim for wrongful 
termination of employment. Wal-Mart provoked the settlement by filing a motion for 
summary judgment. 
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After the opinion from the Utah Supreme Court448 in Grundberg v. Upjohn Company,449 
District Judge Thomas Greene invited the parties to brief the impact of the ruling and the 
case settled three months later. 
The role of the answer of the Utah Supreme Court450 is not as clear in Peterson v. 
Browning451 because the case settled a year and a half after the appellate opinion and 
records are not available. 
Certification Answer Dispositive for Motion in Federal Case  
In two federal district cases, the answer to the certified question was dispositive for a 
federal court motion.  
Just two days after the Utah Supreme Court’s opinion452 in Lancer Insurance Co. v. Lake 
Shore Motor Coach Lines,453 District Judge Jill Parrish granted one previously pending 
motion for summary judgment and denied the other party’s motion. 
In Clark v. United States454 the answer of the Utah Supreme Court455 spawned a motion 
to dismiss based on governmental immunity. The motion was granted six months after the 
certified question was answered. 
Certified Answer Irrelevant 
In at least one case, a certified question turned out to be irrelevant to the case outcome. In 
Waddoups v. Noorda456 the question was whether a statute barring claims for negligent 
credentialing of physicians was retroactive. But two weeks after the Utah Supreme Court 
opinion,457 the plaintiff agreed to dismiss the claim458 after determining it had no factual basis. 
                                                 
448 Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991). 
449 2:89-cv-00274-JTG. 
450 Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992). 
451 1:87-cv-00121-JTG. 
452 Lancer Ins. Co., 391 P.3d 218. 
453 2:14-cv-00785-JNP. 
454 2:98-cv-00304-DB. 
455 Clark v. United States, 998 P.2d 268 (Utah 2000). 
456 1:11-cv-00133-CW. 
457 Waddoups v. Noorda, 321 P.3d 1108 (Utah 2013). 
458 Notice of Non-Opposition to Intermountain Healthcare, Inc. dba Logan Regional Hospital’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Negligent Credentialing Claim, Waddoups, 1:11-cv-00133-CW, docket no. 233, 
filed November 14, 2013. 
 
63 
Deference for Answers to Certified Questions 
 Utah’s federal trial courts seem to have had no question about applying the answer to 
certified questions, but have not expressly considered the possibility of acting otherwise. When 
the Utah Supreme Court has responded to a certified question, the Tenth Circuit gives full 
deference; 
[T]he Utah Supreme Court issued a clear statement of the applicable law in Utah. 
Whether we would answer the question differently is immaterial. The Utah Supreme 
Court has spoken, and on this issue of state law, we are in no position to question the 
propriety of that distinguished court's decision.459 
This regard for the decision of the state court is in marked contrast to “one Ohio federal district 
court, [which] having received a divided opinion from the Ohio Supreme Court, chose to dismiss 
the disputed state law claim without prejudice, anticipating that the Court could change its mind 
in the future.”460 
Utah Supreme Court Responses to Certification Orders 
Utah Supreme Court Standards When Responding to Certified Questions 
The Utah Supreme Court has substantial control over the certification process. While its 
rule authorizes certification, the Court retains the right to “enter an order either accepting or 
rejecting the question certified to it.”461  
The Court has rejected questions at the outset, without comment.462 And it has rejected 
questions it has previously accepted, with explanatory commentary; 
While it is clear that we have original jurisdiction to answer the certified question, 
there does appear to be significant uncertainty as to whether the federal district 
court has jurisdiction over these claims. Accordingly, we revoke our acceptance of 
the certified question as improvident.463 
In that instance of revocation, the Court added some advice, even though the certification was 
revoked: 
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While we do not decide whether the federal district court has jurisdiction over the 
Plaintiff’s UADA claims, we note that Ms. Endow faces serious jurisdictional 
problems as to these claims, problems that were not brought to the attention of the 
federal district court in the Defendants' motion to dismiss. The court therefore had 
no opportunity to consider them. First, the commencement of the Plaintiff's 
federal law claims may bar the continuation of her UADA claims under the plain 
language of the Act. Further, she may have failed to exhaust her administrative 
remedies under the UADA with respect to the individual defendants. Because of 
these serious jurisdictional concerns, any opinion we issue on the certified 
question may be advisory, and we do not issue advisory opinions.464 
The Court further elaborated in a footnote to draw the line between observing, advising and 
deciding: 
We underscore that we do not decide whether the federal district court has 
jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s UADA claims. We were not presented with full 
briefing or a full record concerning these issues. For instance, while it does not 
appear that the Plaintiff filed an administrative claim against the individual 
defendants, we were only given one of the many documents relating to her 
administrative claim.465 
The federal district court eventually dismissed the UADA claims.466 
The Utah Supreme Court reformulated questions or gave partial answers to certified 
questions in three cases. In In re West Side Properties,467 one of two questions was reformulated 
(after a lengthy discussion of the certification process) because as it was submitted, “there is no 
unclear issue of state law for us to address, and therefore, the exercise of certification would be 
futile.”468  
One of three certified questions was not accepted in TruGreen Companies v. Bitton469 The 
questions certified were: 
1. Whether under Utah law a former employer is entitled to an award of lost 
profits damages, or instead an award of restitution or unjust enrichment damages, 
where a former employee has breached contractual non-competition, non-
disclosure, and employee nonsolicitation provisions? 
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2. Whether Utah law recognizes an unjust enrichment measure of damages for 
tortious interference with a competitor’s contractual and economic relations? 
3. Whether “actual damages” under Utah Code Ann. § 13-5a-103(1)(b)(i), the 
Utah Unfair Competition Act, means the plaintiff’s lost profits or an award of 
damages defined by the defendant’s revenues?470 
Without comment, the court accepted only the first two of the questions.471 
The recent opinion in Zimmerman v. University of Utah472 declined to answer two 
accepted questions and made clear that the Utah Supreme Court’s power to accept or reject did 
not end at an initial acceptance order:  
The power to elect to decide a certified question encompasses the power to 
decline to resolve it conclusively in appropriate circumstances. And on reflection 
we see reasons not to render a conclusive answer to the first two questions 
certified in this case. Because these questions are not adequately briefed by the 
parties we decline to resolve them here. Instead we answer only the third 
question, which is squarely presented and amply addressed in the parties’ 
briefs.473   
In nine paragraphs the Court discussed how the inadequacies of the briefing made answers ill-
advised.474 “The answer to these questions may yet prove crucial to the disposition of this case. 
But the parties have not given us the kind of adversary briefing that we would need to resolve 
these important issues with confidence, and we therefore decline to do so.”475 
After the hurdle of acceptance is passed, the Utah Supreme Court has defined standards 
for proceeding.  
First, the Court will not revisit facts stated in the certification order from the District 
Court. When one party “attempted to reargue the facts as found by the federal district court,” the 
Court declared that “[i]n answering a question on certification from the district court, we do not 
refind the facts; we simply answer the certified question of law.”476 This restraint is well suited to 
the role of the Utah Supreme Court as an arbiter of law and not a court of evidentiary 
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presentation. The prohibition against refinding facts prevents unnecessary distractions from the 
legal issues presented for decision, and retains respect for the role of the certifying court.  
Second, the Court has also stated that it accepts the decision of the federal court as to the 
dispositive nature of the certified question. “[T]hose courts’ conclusion that these statutes could 
be dispositive is a legal conclusion that we are not in a position to review on certification and 
must accept for purposes of answering the certified question.”477 
Third, a certified question presents a unique procedural setting for application of legal 
standards. The Court has said:  
“A certified question from the federal district court does not present us with a 
decision to affirm or reverse a lower court's decision; as such, traditional 
standards of review do not apply.” Accordingly, we merely answer the question 
presented, leaving “resolution of the parties' competing claims and 
arguments . . . up to the federal courts, which of course retain jurisdiction to 
decide [the] case.”478  
Fourth, the Court may answer a question broadly. In Egbert v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd.,479 
a party argued that an issue raised by the other party “exceeds the scope of the certified question 
and thus we should only look to the narrow question [certified].”480  
This court has noted that it “will reformulate the question if necessary regardless 
of whether the federal court has expressly stated this in the certification.” 
Therefore, even if the question were limited to the narrow reading proposed . . . , 
we would reformulate the question . . . in order for our answer of the certified 
question to clarify the disputed issue of law and to assist the federal district 
court.481 
This approach is similar to the “speaking rejection” used to advise the federal court in Endow v. 
Utah Transit Authority482 
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court does not attempt to impose its views on the certifying 
federal court.  
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[E]xcept to clarify our law, we do not pretend to possess or exercise the authority 
to dictate the preclusive effect of our decision to the courts of a separate 
sovereign. Those courts retain the independent authority to decide whether and to 
what extent to apply our law or to recognize limitations on or caveats to it.”483 
Is Certification Worth It? 
The last 30 years of certification practice have demonstrated its value, and exposed its 
weaknesses. One’s opinion on the value of certification depends on the point of view. If 
certification is examined only from the point of view of an individual case, the deficiencies in 
certification—time and expense, and uncertainty about both while the parties are in the process 
and the federal court is waiting—raise serious questions. When a systemic view is taken, 
considering certification in the American federalist structure, the value of certification is more 
apparent. But certification involves real cases, so the problems for those cases and benefits to our 
federal-state system must both be regarded. 
Costs and Benefits for the Parties 
In most cases which pass through the certification process, the parties benefit by an 
authoritative declaration of Utah law. Many cases demonstrate that the answer resolves the case 
or important issues in it. But other cases in which certification is raised also benefit.  Discussion 
of certification focuses the parties and may resolve issues. Motions to certify questions often 
resolve a case. So, the process has value to parties in a practical sense.  
But what is the value of a decision by the Utah Supreme Court compared to a decision by 
the federal court? A decision by the federal court on an issue of state law is not authoritative and 
is subject to question—and to appeal to the Tenth Circuit, if the decision is made by a trial court 
judge, and even possible certification by the Tenth Circuit—whereas a decision by the Utah 
Supreme Court terminates debate on the issue.484 So, the parties not only benefit by the answer 
but by the finality of the answer to a certified question. And there is clearly enhanced benefit to 
having a decision thought through by a team of judges rather than by one federal trial judge. 
But certification also costs the parties. Years may elapse between the suggestion of 
certification and the eventual answer from the Utah Supreme Court. Some of this delay can be 
attributable to the undefined process for certifying questions in federal court. It has taken over a 
year, in some instances, for the federal trial court to certify a question. The cost of briefing and 
argument may, due to formalities in the Utah Supreme Court briefing process, be greater than the 
same briefing and argument in the federal court, if the federal court were to decide the question. 
The time to decide an issue in the Utah Supreme Court is usually longer than the time required 
for such a decision in a federal trial court. The Utah Supreme Court treats certification as a 
standard appeal, with a time frame which may be as long as the entire complaint-to-trial process 
in federal court. The decision of the Utah Supreme Court may be slower than a federal trial court 
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decision because the Utah Supreme Court is better equipped—and accustomed—to consider 
broader issues, including state law context, implications for other areas of the law, and state 
policy, than a federal trial court might consider. Decisions also take longer in the Utah Supreme 
Court because five judges must make a decision—or decisions, in the case of concurrences and 
dissents—while in the trial court, one judge makes the decision.  
If an issue is legitimately subject to certification, efficiency for the parties dictates that 
certification occur in the trial court. Certification often terminates or narrows a case in the trial 
court, and may prevent appeals to the Tenth Circuit. A party aggrieved by a failure to certify an 
issue will harbor the hope that the Tenth Circuit will certify, and is motivated to appeal. An 
answer by the Utah Supreme Court to the trial court removes that hope and likely resolves, at 
least partially, the case, preventing a federal appeal. As is the case in most litigation, an early 
decision benefits the parties’ need for resolution. 
The parties will expend more time and perhaps more money in receiving an answer to a 
certified question from the Utah Supreme Court. But they receive an authoritative answer, from a 
system designed to render a decision, formulated through debate among the justices, that is not 
subject to appeal. The value of a Utah Supreme Court decision on an issue of state law is much 
greater than the decision of a federal trial court. The facts of a specific case will, however, dictate 
whether certification is advisable in that case, based on the benefits to the parties. 
Costs and Benefits for the Federal and State Systems 
The value of the certification process and the value of certification in a specific case must 
also consider the value of certification to the federal and state judicial systems. The Utah 
Supreme Court is the constitutionally designated authority for decisions on Utah state law. 
Federal courts are authorized and required to apply state law but they do not have the assignment 
to declare state law. State and federal authority are always debated, but the constitutional roles of 
these separate courts are respected and acknowledged by certification of questions. 
Old precedent, from a time when certification was unavailable or novel, sometimes 
referred to the abilities and resources of federal trial courts, implying that they were as well 
suited to define state law as a state appellate court. Use of this aged guidance in the present time 
when certification is readily available can appear to demonstrate a lack of humility and lack of 
respect by the federal trial court. The federal courts have limited jurisdiction and while applying 
state law is necessary for federal courts, the boundary between applying and declaring needs to 
be observed. The federal court may do its best, but get the answer wrong, with terrible 
consequences for the case before the court and for future cases.485 By assignment and 
constitutional role, the federal court cannot speak with authority on state law. 
The five justices of the Utah Supreme Court are authoritative specialists in Utah state law 
and the Utah constitution. The Utah Supreme Court is able to concentrate on the issue(s) 
certified, with more focused briefing than that which might occur in a state appeal. Undistracted 
                                                 
485 McCarthy, 119 F.3d at 160, supra, at n.82. 
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by a multitude of issues after trial, the justices are able to turn full attention to the legal issue(s), 
on a clear and simply summarized factual and procedural record.486 
Federal court recognition of the value of the answer to a certified question is a 
demonstration of comity between the courts of different sovereigns. Certification is a clear 
statement of support for the federal-state division of authority, which not only benefits the state 
but also benefits the federal system. Our branches of government need more opportunity to 
demonstrate the mutual respect that is shown by certification of questions.  
Even if a question is rejected or reformulated, the federal court which issues a 
certification order has reflected the respect due the Utah Supreme Court. If the Utah Supreme 
Court feels an issue is clear—or that a forthcoming opinion in an appeal will answer the 
question—it is able to so state in rejecting a certified question. 
Summary and Reconciliation of Costs and Benefits 
 When evaluating certification in a specific case, the parties and court must consider the 
values of the judicial system, in addition to the demands of their case. The existence of a novel 
question of law, unsettled by state authority, likely to bear in other cases, requires the court and 
parties to look beyond their current dispute. This is an opportunity for counsel and the court to 
look at the larger purposes of the judicial system and the respective roles of federal and state 
courts. Comity and federalism are much larger than any current case and future cases. So, those 
factors external to the case may drive a case to bear a burden for the benefit of others. The parties 
are, unless one of them is a recurrent litigant or a governmental entity, most likely to emphasize 
case specific factors. The court must require the parties to address factors external to the case and 
may need to develop those factors itself if the parties do not adequately address them. Focus on 
these multiple considerations is challenging but will ensure that certification is wisely employed. 
Recommendations for Improvement of the Utah Certification Process 
The process of certification to the Utah Supreme Court can be improved based on the 
experience of the last 30 years. The wide variations in the federal trial court  
• in suggesting certification by motion or sua sponte; 
• in time taken to promulgate a certification order after certification is suggested; 
and  
• in the process of generating the certification order 
can all be standardized through a local federal court rule on certification. Defining the current ad 
hoc certification process in the federal trial court would likely save time and money, and 
introduce clarity for the parties and for judges. 
The process in the Utah Supreme Court may also be clarified and accelerated. 
Improvements might include statement of a reason for rejection of a certified question, including 
                                                 
486 Burkholz, 972 P.2d at 1237, supra at n.476. 
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express reference to a case pending before the Court in which the question will likely be 
answered; reduction of timeframes for delivery of the record, briefing; and issuance of 
opinion(s); and introduction of a process for revision of deficient certification orders. 
Reducing the time to receive an answer to a certified question would be the single 
greatest benefit to the parties in a case with a certified question, and to the federal court in which 
the case is pending. 
Changes in Federal Practice  
 In contrast to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has a rule on certification of 
questions, and the more comprehensive rule of the Utah Supreme Court, certification practice in 
the District of Utah is less defined, arising ad hoc in each case.  A rule is likely the best way to 
formalize the practice, to raise awareness of the availability of certification, and to reduce sua 
sponte certification on appeal—and perhaps reduce appeals. 
Recommendation of a Local Federal Rule 
Because a federal court may certify questions to any other court capable of receiving the 
question, a local federal court rule must be broadly drawn. But such a rule will draw on the 
experience deepest experience of the court—which for the Utah federal district court is with the 
Utah Supreme Court. The Tenth Circuit has a rule on certification487 which is quite complete 
compared to the rule in the Second Circuit.488 But neither are as complete as needed for a local 
rule in the District of Utah. The text of a proposed rule follows uninterrupted with a later 
explanation of the sources and rationale for the rule components.   
DUCivR __ - __   Certification of Questions of Law 
By certification of questions of law, the district court federal court respects the role of 
other tribunals, agencies, and courts. Answers to certified questions are authoritative, 
issued by the institution entrusted with the responsibility of interpretation. The 
relationships of federal and state governments are properly respected by certification of 
questions of law to a state court. 
(a) Certification of Questions of Law 
                                                 
487 10th Cir. R. 27.2.  
488 Certification of Questions of State Law: 
(a) General Rule. If state law permits, the court may certify a question of state law to that state's 
highest court. When the court certifies a question, the court retains jurisdiction pending the state 
court's response to the certified question. 
(b) Motion or Request. A party may move to certify a question of state law by filing a separate 
motion or by including a request for certification in its brief. 
2d Cir. R. 27.2. 
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When the law or rule of another jurisdiction, agency, tribunal, or court permits, this court 
may certify a question arising under the law of that jurisdiction to the appropriate agency, 
tribunal, or court as designated and under the procedures in that law or rule, if:489  
(1) the pending litigation involves a question to be decided under the law of the 
other jurisdiction; 
(2) the answer to the question may be determinative of an issue in the pending 
litigation; and 
(3) the question is one for which an answer is not provided by a controlling 
appellate decision, constitutional provision, or statute of the other jurisdiction.490 
(b) Motion or Suggestion for Certification 
A party should move to certify the question of law at the earliest opportunity. Or the court 
may suggest certification of the question. Any motion or response to a suggestion by the 
court should discuss:  
(1) the question and its role in the case as determinative of an issue;  
(2) the relationship of that question to the case as a whole and the effect of 
certification on other procedures in the case such as discovery and motions;  
(3) available authority on the question from appellate decisions, constitutional 
provisions, or statutes of the other jurisdiction;  
(4) available guidance on the question from decisions of other sources;  
(5) the facts which are relevant to the determination of the question and which 
show the nature of the controversy and the context in which the question arises;491  
(6) the anticipated time and expense of receiving an answer to the question;  
(7) the benefits of an authoritative decision to other litigation or disputes in this or 
other courts, tribunals, or agencies;  
(8) the relationship of the issue to the policy of the other jurisdiction;  
(9) how comity and federalism will be affected by a decision to certify or not 
certify; and 
                                                 
489 Broadened from Tenth Circuit rule. 10th Cir. R. 27.2. 
490 Uniform Act (1995) § 2. 
491 Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(2). 
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(10) other matters material to the decision to certify or not to certify.  
(c) When the court suggests certification or when a motion is filed, the court shall set a 
hearing to be held within 28 days. 
(d) Any response to the motion or suggestion shall be filed within 14 days. 
(e) If, at the hearing, the court determines that a question shall be certified, the court shall 
expressly state which, if any, activities in the case shall abate pending the decision on the 
certified question. 
(f) If, at the hearing, the court determines that a question shall be certified, the parties 
shall meet, confer and within 7 days of the hearing propose an Order Certifying Question 
which shall clearly state, with adequate discussion and support: 
(1) the question of law to be answered;492 
(2) that the question certified is a controlling issue of law in the proceeding493 and 
why the answer to the question will materially advance the termination of the 
litigation; 
(3) that there appears to be no controlling Utah law;494 
(4) that the agency, tribunal, or court receiving the question may reformulate the 
question;495 
(5) all facts which are relevant to the determination of the question certified and 
which show the nature of the controversy, the context in which the question arose, 
and the procedural steps by which the question was framed; 
(5) any additional reasons for its entry of the certification order that are not 
otherwise apparent;496 
(6) a listing of the record documents which the parties believe should be sent to 
court, agency or tribunal, receiving the certified question;  
                                                 
492 Id. 41(c)(1)(A). 
493 Id. 41(c)(1)(B). 
494 Id. 41(c)(1)(C). 
495 Uniform Act (1995) § 6(a)(3). 
496 Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(3). 
 
73 
(7) the names and addresses of counsel of record and parties appearing without 
counsel;497 
(8) such other matters as may be appropriate. 
(g) This rule shall be construed broadly to permit and enable timely certification of 
questions. 
(h) The answer to the certified question shall be considered binding on that issue.498  
The following table lists the components of the proposed local rule with explanation as to 
the source and function. 
DUCivR __ - __   Certification of Questions of 
Law 
Explanation 
By certification of questions of law, the district 
court federal court respects the role of other 
tribunals, agencies, and courts. Answers to 
certified questions are authoritative, issued by the 
institution entrusted with the responsibility of 
interpretation. The relationships of federal and 
state governments are properly respected by 
certification of questions of law to a state court. 
This statement of purpose places the 
policy reasons for certification in front of 
the parties, who are more concerned about 
the practical effects on their own case. 
The rule’s provisions require the court to 
consider both. 
(a) Certification of Questions of Law 
When the law or rule of another jurisdiction, 
agency, tribunal or court permits, this court may 
certify a question arising under the law of that 
jurisdiction to the appropriate agency, tribunal or 
court as designated and under the procedures in 
that law or rule, if:   
This subparagraph is drawn from the 
Tenth Circuit rule, but broadened to 
match language in the Uniform Act 
(1995) § 1 to include all possible entities 
to which certification might be made. 
                                                 
497 Uniform Act (1995) § 6(a)(4). 
498 Burkholz, 211 F.3d 1277 (Table), at *3. 
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DUCivR __ - __   Certification of Questions of 
Law 
Explanation 
(1) the pending litigation involves a question to be 
decided under the law of the other jurisdiction; 
(2) the answer to the question may be 
determinative of an issue in the pending litigation; 
and 
(3) the question is one for which an answer is not 
provided by a controlling appellate decision, 
constitutional provision, or statute of the other 
jurisdiction. 
These subparagraphs are drawn from the 
Uniform Act (1995) § 2. 
(b) Motion or Suggestion for Certification 
A party should move to certify the question of law 
at the earliest opportunity. Or the court may 
suggest certification of the question. Any motion 
or response to a suggestion by the court should 
discuss  
(1) the question and its role in the case as 
determinative of an issue;  
(2) the relationship of that issue to the case as a 
whole and the effect of certification on other 
procedures in the case such as discovery and 
motions;  
(3) available authority on the issue from appellate 
decisions, constitutional provisions, or statutes of 
the other jurisdiction;  
(4) available guidance from decisions of other 
courts on the question;  
(5) the facts which are relevant to the 
determination of the question and which show the 
nature of the controversy and the context in which 
the question arises; 
(6) the anticipated time and expense of receiving 
an answer to the question;  
This subparagraph is drawn to meet the 
requirements of Utah R. App. P. 41.  
It adds many considerations for the 
district court which may not be as 
relevant to the entity receiving the 
certified question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subparagraph (5) includes language from 
Utah R. App. P 41(c)(2). 
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DUCivR __ - __   Certification of Questions of 
Law 
Explanation 
(7) the benefits of an authoritative decision to 
other litigation or disputes in this or other courts, 
tribunals or agencies;  
(8) the relationship of the issue to the policy of 
the other jurisdiction;  
(9) how comity and federalism will be affected by 
a decision to certify or not certify; and 
(10) other matters material to the decision to 
certify or not to certify.  
(c) When the court suggests certification or when 
a motion is filed, the court shall set a hearing to 
be held within 28 days. 
Setting a hearing at the earliest date will 
reduce time in the certification process. 
(d) Any response to the motion or suggestion shall 
be filed within 14 days. 
Defining response time for sua sponte 
suggestions of certification is new but 
otherwise this subparagraph conforms to 
DUCivR 7-1(b)(3)(B). 
(e) If, at the hearing, the court determines that a 
question shall be certified, the court shall 
expressly state which, if any, activities in the case 
shall abate pending the decision on the certified 
question. 
Requiring the court and parties to 
consider the effect of certification on the 
case schedule will cause the realities of 
that effect to be carefully considered. 
(f) If, at the hearing, the court determines that a 
question shall be certified, the parties shall meet, 
confer and within 7 days of the hearing propose 
an Order Certifying Question which shall clearly 
state, with adequate discussion and support: 
The requirement that the parties meet and 
confer takes the advice offered in In re 
West Side Property Associates499 that 
attorney input creates better certification 
orders. 
                                                 
499 13 P.3d at 170-71. 
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DUCivR __ - __   Certification of Questions of 
Law 
Explanation 
(1) the question of law to be answered; 
(2) that the question certified may be 
determinative of an issue in the proceeding and 
why the answer to the question will materially 
advance the termination of the litigation; 
(3) that there appears to be no controlling Utah 
law; 
These subparagraphs are drawn from 
Utah R. App. P 41(c)(1) but modified 
consistent with Uniform Act (1995) § 3, 
to refer to questions “determinative of an 
issue” rather than “controlling issues of 
law.” The additional requirement that the 
answer materially advance the 
termination of the litigation places the 
issue in context of the entire case. 
(4) that the agency, tribunal, or court receiving the 
question may reformulate the question; 
This subparagraph is drawn from the 
Uniform Act (1995) § (6)(a)(3). 
(5) all facts which are relevant to the 
determination of the question certified and which 
show the nature of the controversy, the context in 
which the question arose, and the procedural steps 
by which the question was framed; 
From Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(2). 
(5) any additional reasons for its entry of the 
certification order that are not otherwise apparent; 
From Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(2). 
(6) a listing of the record documents which the 
parties believe should be sent to court, agency or 
tribunal receiving the certified question;  
This subparagraph anticipates (and may 
accelerate) transmission of the record 
under Utah R. App. P. 41(d). 
(7) the names and addresses of counsel of record 
and parties appearing without counsel; and 
From Uniform Act (1995) § 6(a)(4). 
(8) such other matters as may be appropriate.  
(e) Within 28 days of the motion or suggestion, 
the court shall set a hearing or issue an Order 
Certifying Question. 
This subparagraph sets a sense of urgency 
in certification.  
(f) If an Order Certifying Question issues, the 
court shall expressly state in a separate order 
which, if any activities in the case shall abate 
pending the decision on the certified question. 
This provision requires that the status  of 
the pending case be expressly treated.  
(g) This rule shall be construed broadly to permit 
and enable timely certification of questions. 
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DUCivR __ - __   Certification of Questions of 
Law 
Explanation 
(h) The answer to the certified question shall be 
considered binding on that issue.  
Consistent with Burkholz v. Joyce,500 this 
provision encourages due regard for an 
answer to a certified question, which is 
received at personal and institutional 
costs. 
 
Changes in State Rule and Practice 
 Some potential changes in state practice and the state rule have been noted above. 
Reformulation of questions was implemented by decision in Utah,501 while the Uniform Act 
(1995) includes it in rule text.502 Rejection orders might state reasons for rejection to guide future 
practitioners, and if the reason for rejection is a pending appeal dealing with the issue, that other 
case might be identified. And time frames might be defined.  
The following table shows recommended revisions in Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 
41. The variations from the Uniform Act (1995) are noted.. 
RULE 41. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS 
OF LAW BY UNITED STATES COURTS 
Explanation 
(a) Authorization to answer questions of law. The 
Utah Supreme Court may answer a question of 
Utah law certified to it by a court of the United 
States when requested to do so by such certifying 
court acting in accordance with the provisions of 
this rule if the state of the law of Utah applicable to 
a proceeding before the certifying court is 
uncertain. 
(b) Procedure to invoke. Any court of the United 
States may invoke this rule by entering an order of 
certification as described in this rule. When 
invoking this rule, the certifying court may act 
either sua sponte or upon a motion by any party. 
The limitations of Utah Const. Art. VIII, 
Sec. 3 prohibit broadening 
subparagraphs (a) and (b) to match the 
Uniform Act (1995) § 3 to add “by [an 
appellate [the highest] court of another 
State [or of a tribe ] [or of Canada, a 
Canadian province or territory, Mexico, 
or a Mexican state] 
                                                 
500 211 F.3d 1277 (Table), at *3. 
501 In re W. Side Prop. Assocs., 13 P.3d 168. 
502 Uniform Act (1995) § 4. 
78 
RULE 41. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS 
OF LAW BY UNITED STATES COURTS 
Explanation 
(c) Certification order. 
(c)(1) A certification order shall be directed to the 
Utah Supreme Court and shall state: 
(c)(1)(A) the question of law to be answered; 
(c)(1)(B) that the question certified is a controlling 
issue of law may be determinative of an issue in a 
the proceeding pending before the certifying court 
and that the answer to the question will materially 
advance the termination of that proceeding; and 
(c)(1)(C) that there appears to be no controlling 
Utah law.; and 
Subparagraph (c) reflects the odd 
function of a certification rule in a 
receiving court, defining the order to 
issue from a certifying court. It may be 
that a conference between rules 
committees of the Utah Supreme Court 
and District of Utah can correlate 
expectations and deliveries and 
consistency of rules in each court.  
Compare the proposal for a local federal 
rule, subparagraph (d)(2), derived from 
Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(1)(B) but 
modified consistent with Uniform Act 
(1995) § 3. 
(c)(1)(C) that this Court may reformulate a question 
of law certified to it. 
From Uniform Act (1995) § 4. Adding 
this subparagraph makes clear the 
holding of In re West Side Property 
Associates.503 
(c)(2) The order shall also set forth all facts which 
are relevant to the determination of the question 
certified and which show the nature of the 
controversy, the context in which the question 
arose, and the procedural steps by which the 
question was framed including opportunities for the 
parties to meet, confer and contribute to the content 
of the certification order. 
(c)(3) The certifying court may also include in the 
order any additional reasons for its entry of the 
certification order that are not otherwise apparent. 
The new text reflects the assumption in 
Uniform Act (1995) § 6(b) that the 
parties will contribute to the 
certification order. In re West Side 
Property Associates observed that when 
“courts prepare the questions themselves 
without input from counsel . . . the 
wrong questions [may be] asked.”504 
(d) Form of certification order; submission of 
record. A certification order shall be signed by the 
judge presiding over the proceeding giving rise to 
the certification order and forwarded to the Utah 
Supreme Court by the clerk of the certifying court 
under its official seal. The Supreme Court may 
Record transmission should be 
accelerated by the new federal rule 
subparagraph (d)(6). 
                                                 
503 13 P.3d 168. 
504 Id. at 170. 
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RULE 41. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS 
OF LAW BY UNITED STATES COURTS 
Explanation 
require that all or any portion of the record before 
the certifying court be filed with the Supreme Court 
if the record or a portion thereof may be necessary 
in determining whether to accept the certified 
question or in answering that question. A copy of 
the record certified by the clerk of the certifying 
court to conform to the original may be substituted 
for the original as the record. 
(e) Acceptance, reformulation or rejection of 
certification. Upon filing of the certification order 
and accompanying papers with the clerk, the 
Supreme Court shall promptly enter an order either 
accepting, reformulating or rejecting the question 
certified to it, and the clerk shall serve copies of the 
order upon the certifying court and all parties 
identified in the certification order. If the Supreme 
Court accepts the question, the Court will set out in 
the order of acceptance (1) the specific question or 
questions accepted, (2) the deadline for notifying 
the Supreme Court as to those portions of the 
record which shall be copied and filed with the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court, and (3) information as 
to when the briefing schedule will be established. If 
the Supreme Court rejects the question, the Court 
may set out in the order of rejection any reasons for 
rejection and any pending appeal which already 
presents the certified question. 
The specific reference to reformulation 
puts parties on notice of that possibility. 
The suggestion that a rejection order 
may provide information beyond a bare 
rejection may allow parties to be 
informed as to better practice or the 
possibility that a question may be 
answered by an appellate case in 
process. A rejection order that comments 
on the basis for rejection may assist the 
federal court in reframing a deficient 
certification order.  
(f) Briefing; oral argument. The form of briefs 
and proceedings on oral argument will be governed 
by these rules except as such rules may be modified 
by the Supreme Court to accommodate the 
differences between the appeal process and the 
determination of a certified question and the 
schedule of proceeding giving rise to the 
certification order and the implications of delay on 
the proceeding. The clerk of the Supreme Court 
will provide written notice to the parties as to the 
schedule for the filing of briefs and content 
requirements, as well as the schedule and 
procedures for oral argument. In recognition of the 
narrowness of the issue(s) presented and the 
defined record, in accordance with notions of 
The new language is drawn in part from 
the proposed local federal rule (b) and 
Uniform Act (1995) § 7. 
80 
RULE 41. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS 
OF LAW BY UNITED STATES COURTS 
Explanation 
comity and fairness, the Supreme Court will 
respond to an accepted or reformulated certified 
question as soon as practicable.  
(g) Appearance of counsel pro hac vice. Upon 
acceptance by the Supreme Court of the question of 
law presented by the certification order, counsel for 
the parties not licensed to practice law in the state 
of Utah may appear pro hac vice upon motion filed 
pursuant to the Code of Judicial Administration. 
This subparagraph might be better 
placed as a separate Rule of Appellate 
Procedure. 
 
These refinements of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure may contribute to more 
clarity in the certification process. 
Conclusions 
 Certification has been successfully implemented in Utah. Though the first effort in 1975 
was unsuccessful, a constitutional amendment in 1984 made possible certification of legal 
questions to the Utah Supreme Court. The experience of the last 30 years confirms the value of 
certification. Some of the most interesting and important issues in state law are resolved in the 
answers to certified questions.505  
Certification confirms the relative roles of the state and federal courts, and helps resolve 
cases. Answers to certified questions are authoritative, issued by the court with constitutional 
responsibility to interpret state law. Those answers put to rest hopes of obtaining a different 
answer from a different federal judge at the trial or appellate level.  
The rate of certification and the rate of acceptance of certified questions by the Utah 
Supreme Court suggests the utility of the process and that relationships of the federal courts and 
the Utah Supreme Court are good. The transition of former Justice Jill Parrish to the federal 
district bench has increased the use of certification. 
 With changes, the process can be improved to reduce burdens in individual cases, by 
more clearly defining processes and time frames in the federal court and clarifying the state 
appellate rule. This thesis proposes a new rule for the federal district court, and changes to the 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure. 
                                                 
505 See Appendix listing certified questions. 
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Beyond the rule proposals, defining and reducing timeframes in the Utah Supreme Court 
would also reduce burdens on individual cases. As was demonstrated in Grundberg (5 months)506 
and Utah Republican Party (4 months),507 the certification process can be completed in a very 
short time. Not every case needs such accelerated treatment, but if a defined timeframe were 
available, the relative burden on parties would decrease, allowing more certifications to occur, 
thus recognizing more often the rightful place of the Utah Supreme Court in declaring Utah law.  
Increased awareness of the process and definition of criteria for its use will likely 
increase wise use of certification, and contribute to the achievements already made by the federal 
courts and by the Utah Supreme Court, for the benefit of citizens, litigants and counsel. 
  
                                                 
506 Supra, at 30 n.202-06. 
507 Supra, at 50-51 n.333-341. 
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Appendices 
Appendix - Recommendations for Further Study 
 In the somewhat unstudied area of certification of questions to the Utah Supreme Court, 
numerous byways for further study were encountered. Some of these were within the original 
scope of the thesis but deferred due to the time available for the thesis. 
More detailed study within the scope of the thesis 
 Several projects could be undertaken within the scope of this thesis which confines itself 
to the cases involved with certification of questions to the Utah Supreme Court.  
What were the origins of the 1975 Certification Rule? 
How do counsel and parties involved in certification evaluate the process and its effect on 
time and expense in a case? 
How do judges and justices evaluate certification processes and the substantive impact of 
certification on the case at hand and (in the Utah Supreme Court) on other appellate 
caseload? 
Would informal discussions, outside the context of any specific case, between judges of 
federal courts and justices of the Utah Supreme Court cause improvements in the 
certification process? 
Would an interactive process between the Utah Supreme Court and the federal court help 
improve the quality of certification orders and answers to certified questions? 
How do the internal procedures of the Utah Supreme Court differ for interlocutory 
appeals and answering certified questions? Are the internal standards and processes for 
evaluation, acceptance and rejection the same or different? Are the time frames for 
processing these cases similar or different? In both instances, the trial court awaits a 
decision to move forward with resolution of a pending case, as contrasted with an appeal 
in which the parties have reached decision on most issues before the Utah Supreme Court 
considers the case. 
Did the federal court in Miller v. United States properly analyze the Federal Tort Claims 
Act issue after the Utah Supreme Court ruled? When a federal tort case is dependent on 
state common law is the state court decision final as was suggested in Miller or does the 
federal court have the ability to find a limited claim present as was done in Smith v. 
Pena? 
Would a comprehensive review of all certification orders from the trial courts and Tenth 
Circuit reveal best practices for such orders? 
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Tenth Circuit involvement in certification 
The brief look at the practices of the Tenth Circuit in certification of questions to Utah 
has suggested many areas for future study. 
Which judges on the Tenth Circuit have been the most active in certification? 
Does the Tenth Circuit deny all motions for certification in all its cases or just in those 
involving Utah? 
How does the Tenth Circuit rate of sua sponte certification to the Utah Supreme Court 
compare to the Tenth Circuit rate of sua sponte certification to other courts? 
In nine of the cases in which questions were certified sua sponte by the Tenth Circuit to 
the Utah Supreme Court, the answer resulted in reversal of the district court’s opinion. In 
four instances, the Supreme Court’s answer did not change the ruling below. How was 
the Tenth Circuit so well able to target cases for certification which affected the trial court 
result? 
Study of inter-institutional dynamics of certification 
If certification procedures originate in the legislature are they more or less used than 
procedures originating in the courts? 
How is acceptance of certified questions affected by other relationships of state courts 
and federal counterparts? 
How does certification compare with the EU Preliminary Ruling Process?  
Other Topics 
Study of certification practices in other states would yield helpful comparative 
information. 
Review of opinions written on the subject of certification by Judge Guido Calabresi of 
the Second Circuit, an advocate of certification, would provide guidance from a judge 
who is possibly the most published on the subject.  
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Appendix—Uniform Acts 
Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act 1967  
§ 1. [Power to Answer]. 
The [Supreme Court] may answer questions of law certified to it by the Supreme Court of the United States, a Court 
of Appeals of the United States, a United States District Court, the United States Court of International Trade, the 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, the United States Claims Court, the United States Court of Military Appeals, 
the United States Tax Court, [or the highest appellate court or the intermediate appellate court of any other state], 
when requested by the certifying court if there are involved in any proceeding before it questions of law of this state 
which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying 
court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the [Supreme Court] [and the intermediate appellate courts] 
of this state. 
§ 2. [Method of Invoking]. 
This [Act] [Rule] may be invoked by an order of any of the courts referred to in section 1 upon the court’s own motion 
or upon the motion of any party to the cause. 
§ 3. [Contents of Certification Order]. 
A certification order shall set forth 
(1) the questions of law to be answered; and 
(2) a statement of all facts relevant to the questions certified and showing fully the nature of the controversy in which 
the questions arose. 
§ 4. [Preparation of Certification Order]. 
The certification order shall be prepared by the certifying court, signed by the judge presiding at the hearing, and 
forwarded to the [Supreme Court] by the clerk of the certifying court under its official seal. The [Supreme Court] may 
require the original or copies of all or of any portion of the record before the certifying court to be filed with the 
certification order, if, in the opinion of the [Supreme Court], the record or portion thereof may be necessary in 
answering the questions. 
§ 5. [Costs of Certification]. 
Fees and costs shall be the same as in [civil appeals] docketed before the [Supreme Court] and shall be equally divided 
between the parties unless otherwise ordered by the certifying court in its order of certification. 
§ 6. [Briefs and Argument]. 
Proceedings in the [Supreme Court] shall be those provided in [local rules or statutes governing briefs and arguments]. 
§ 7. [Opinion]. 
The written opinion of the [Supreme Court] stating the law governing the questions certified shall be sent by the clerk 
under the seal of the Supreme Court to the certifying court and to the parties. 
§ 8. [Power to Certify]. 
The [Supreme Court] [or the intermediate appellate courts] of this state, on [its] [their] own motion or the motion of 
any party, may order certification of questions of law to the highest court of any state when it appears to the certifying 
court that there are involved in any proceeding before the court questions of law of the receiving state which may be 
determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and it appears to the certifying court that there are no 
controlling precedents in the decisions of the highest court or intermediate appellate courts of the receiving state.] 
§ 9. [Procedure on Certifying]. 
The procedures for certification from this state to the receiving state shall be those provided in the laws of the receiving 
state.] 
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§ 10. [Severability]. 
If any provision of this [Act] [Rule] or the application thereof to any person, court, or circumstance is held invalid, 
the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the [Act] [Rule] which can be given effect without 
the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this [Act] [Rule] are severable  
§ 11. [Construction]. 
This [Act] [Rule] shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states 
which enact it. 
§ 12. [Short Title]. 
This [Act] [Rule] may be cited as the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law [Act] [Rule]. 
§ 13. [Time of Taking Effect]. 
This [Act] [Rule] shall take effect __________. 
 
Uniform Certification of Questions of Law [Act] [Rule] (1995)  
§ 1. Definitions[s]. 
In this [Act] [Rule]: 
(1) “State means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any 
territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 
[(2) “Tribe” means a tribe, band, or village of native Americans which is recognized by federal law or formally 
acknowledged by a State.] 
§ 2. Power to Certify. 
The [Supreme Court] [or an intermediate appellate court] of this State, on the motion of a party to pending litigation 
or its own motion, may certify a question of law to the highest court of another State [or of a tribe] [or of Canada, a 
Canadian province or territory, Mexico, or a Mexican state] if: 
(1) the pending litigation involves a question to be decided under the law of the other jurisdiction; 
(2) the answer to the question may be determinative of an issue in the pending litigation; and 
(3) the question is one for which an answer is not provided by a controlling appellate decision, constitutional 
provision, or statute of the other jurisdiction. 
§ 3. Power to Answer. 
The [Supreme Court] of this State may answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the United States or by 
[an appellate] [the highest] court of another State [or of a tribe] [or of Canada, a Canadian province or territory, 
Mexico, or a Mexican state], if the answer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying 
court and there is no controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision, or statute of this State. 
§ 4. Power to Reformulate Question. 
The [Supreme Court] of this State may reformulate a question of law certified to it. 
§ 5. Certification Order; Record. 
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The court certifying a question of law to the [Supreme Court] of this State shall issue a certification order and forward 
it to the [Supreme Court] of this State. Before responding to a certified question, the [Supreme Court] of this State 
may require the certifying court to deliver all or part of its record to the [Supreme Court] of this State. 
§ 6. Contents of Certification Order. 
 (a) A certification order must contain: 
(1) the question of law to be answered; 
(2) the facts relevant to the question, showing fully the nature of the controversy out of which the question arose; 
(3) a statement acknowledging that the [Supreme Court] of this State, acting as the receiving court, may reformulate 
the question; and 
(4) the names and addresses of counsel of record and parties appearing without counsel. 
(b) If the parties cannot agree upon a statement of facts, the certifying court shall determine the relevant facts and state 
them as a part of its certification order. 
§ 7. Notice; Response. 
The [Supreme Court] of this State, acting as a receiving court, shall notify the certifying court of acceptance or 
rejection of the question and, in accordance with notions of comity and fairness, respond to an accepted certified 
question as soon as practicable. 
§ 8. Procedures. 
After the [Supreme Court] of this State has accepted a certified question, proceedings are governed by [the rules and 
statutes governing briefs, arguments, and other appellate procedures]. Procedures for certification from this State to a 
receiving court are those provided in the rules and statutes of the receiving forum. 
§ 9. Opinion. 
The [Supreme Court] of this State shall state in a written opinion the law answering the certified question and send a 
copy of the opinion to the certifying court, counsel of record, and parties appearing without counsel. 
§ 10. Cost of Certification. 
Fees and costs are the same as in [civil appeals] docketed before the [Supreme Court] of this State and must be equally 
divided between the parties unless otherwise ordered by the certifying court. 
§ 11. Severability. 
If any provision of this [Act] [Rule] or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does 
not affect other provisions or applications of this [Act] [Rule] which can be given effect without the invalid provision 
or application, and to this end the provisions of this [Act] [Rule] are severable. 
§ 12. Uniformity of Application and Construction. 
This [Act] [Rule] shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform law with respect to 
the subject of the [Act] [Rule] among States [enacting] [adopting] it. 
§ 13. Short Title. 
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This [Act] [Rule] may be cited as the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law [Act] [Rule] (1995). 
§ 14. Effective Date. 
This [Act] [Rule] takes effect on __________. 
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Appendix—List of All Cases Considering Certification 
 All Cer�ﬁca�on Cases - sorted by trial court judge Dist. Ct.  
 Case name Case number Judge Cert? Cir.  DB ID 
 United States v Stubbs C 76 67 A. Anderson No 43 
 Stoker v. Salt Lake Cty. 2:90-cv-248-BSJ A. Anderson Y 67 
 In re Hendry 2:14-bk-27398-KA Anderson Y 156 
 In re Kiley 2:15-bk-27838-KA Anderson Y 157 
 Pace v. Swerdlow 2:06-cv-00027-DB Benson Y 111 
 CR England v Swi� 2:14-cv-00781 DB Benson Y 153 
 Compressor Pump v. Allis-Chalmers 2:89-cv-00451-DB Benson No 134 
 Land v. EG&G Defense Materials 2:04-cv-00479-DB Benson No 40 
 Kennard v. Leavit 2:01-cv-00171-DB Benson Y 123 
 Carson v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. 2:09-cv-00663-DB Benson No 130 
 Clark v. United States 2:98-cv-00304-DB Benson Y 133 
 Egbert et al v. Nissan North America et  2:04-cv-00551-DN Benson Y 142 
 Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ  2:08-cv-00772-DB Benson No Y 72 
 Iverson v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.  1:06-cv-00113-DB Benson Y 109 
 Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cloud Nine  1:05-cv-00088-DB Benson No Y 151 
 Richardson v. Navistar Int’l Transp. 2:95-cv-00752-DB Benson No Y 100 
 Smith v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Aﬀairs  2:12-cv-00968-DB Benson Y 59 
 Thayer v. Washington Cty. Sch. Dist. 2:09-cv-00565-DB Benson Y 32 
 In re W. Side Prop. Assocs. 97-20887 Boulden Y 107 
 SEC v. Merrill Scot, Ltd. 2:02-cv-00039-TC Campbell No 53 
 Society of Lloyd's v. Bennet 2:02-cv-00204-TC Campbell No 62 
 Shipley v. Forest Labs. 1:06-cv-00048-TC Campbell No 58 
 Bower v. Temple Mountain Energy  2:09-cv-01141-TC Campbell No 124 
 Whiteman v. Friel 2:05-cv-00424−TC Campbell No 49 
 Hale v. Fingerhut Co., Inc. 2:95-cv-00660-TC Campbell No 89 
 Utah Life & Disability v. Teacher Ins. 2:00-cv-00530-TS Campbell No 45 
 Pay Less Drug Stores v. Tender II, Ltd. 2:95-cv-00179-TC Campbell No 110 
 W. States Contrac�ng v. Spilsbury 2:10-cv-01141-TC Campbell No 16 
 Morgan v. McCoter 2:99-cv-00073-TC Campbell No 149 
 United Pac. Ins. Co v. Knudsen Constr. 2:97-cv-00235-TC Campbell No 44 
 Adams v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co.  2:92-cv-00516-TC Campbell No 22 
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 Burkholz v. Joyce 2:96-cv-00252-TC Campbell Y 127 
 Endow v. Utah Transit Auth. 1:13-cv-00108-TC Campbell Y 143 
 Gardner v. Galetka 2:95-cv-00846-TC Campbell Y 73 
 Miller v. United States 1:02-cv-00037-TC Campbell Y 85 
 Spackman v. Bd. Ed. Box Elder Cty. 1:98-cv-00120-TC Campbell Y 64 
 Ammons v. La-Z-Boy, Inc. 1:04-cv-00067-TC Campbell Y 27 
 Gibbs v. Unum Life Ins. Co. 2:00-cv-00549-PGC Cassell Y 77 
 Machan v. Unum Life Ins. Co. 2:00-cv-00904-PGC Cassell Y 56 
 Robert J. DeBry & Assocs. v. Quest Dex 1:03-cv-00099-PGC Cassell No Y 138 
 TruGreen Cos. v. Biton 1:06-cv-00024-BSJ Cassell Y 36 
 Black v United States C 138-66 Christensen No 14 
 In re Kunz 2:02-bk-40422-GEC Clark Y 154 
 In re Rockwell 2:02-bk-42013-WTT Thurman Y 154 
 Mitchell v. Roberts 2:16-cv-00843-EJF Furse Y 147 
 Katerman v. Salt Lake Cty. 2:13-cv-01122-EJF Furse Y 122 
 Baker v. D&RG 2:94-cv-00017-JTG Greene No 30 
 Bills v. Utah Farm Bur. Ins. Co. 2:91-cv-00193-JTG Greene No 119 
 Jorgensen v. Larsen 2:88-cv-00761-JTG Greene No 121 
 Young v. Delta Airlines 2:99-cv-00859-JTG Greene No 18 
 Albright v. Granite Bd. of Ed. 2:90-cv-00639-JTG Greene No 23 
 Gines v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. 2:89-cv-00543-JTG Greene Y 78 
 Grundbergl v. Upjohn Co. 2:89-cv-00274-JTG Greene Y 79 
 Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc. 2:88-cv-00708-JTG Greene Y 90 
 Hirpa v. IHC Hosp., Inc. 1:90-cv-00086-JTG Greene No Y 92 
 Peterson v. Browning 1:87-cv-00121-JTG Greene Y 105 
 Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins 2:88-cv-00410-JTG Greene Y 66 
 Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. 2:87-cv-00330-JTG Greene Y 70 
 United W. Bank v. Moyes 2:08-cv-00218-BSJ Jenkins No 51 
 McCourt v. Semken 2:87-cv-01052-BSJ Jenkins Y 83 
 MacArthur v. San Juan Cty. 2:00-cv-00584-BSJ Jenkins No 55 
 Wright v. Deland 2:90-cv-00829-BSJ Jenkins No 19 
 Strawberry Water v. United States 2:01-cv-00295-BSJ Jenkins No 69 
 Jensen v. NSLC 1:93-cv-00134-BSJ Jenkins No 115 
 MacArthur v. San Juan Cty. 2:00-cv-00584-BSJ Jenkins No 139 
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 Cyprus Plateau Mining v. Commonwealth 2:96-cv-00401-BSJ Jenkins No 136 
 Copier v. Smith & Wesson 2:95-cv-00723-BSJ Jenkins No 135 
 Cincinna� Ins. Co. v. AMSCO Windows 2:10-cv-00542-BSJ Jenkins No 132 
 Century Indem. v. Hanover Ins. 2:97-cv-00925-BSJ Jenkins No 131 
 Fox v. MCI Commc’ns Corp. 2:93-cv-00042-BSJ Jenkins Y 71 
 Gladwell v. Reinhart 2:06-cv-00325-BSJ Jenkins No Y 106 
 Mecham v. Frazier 1:04-cv-00033-CW Jenkins No Y 146 
 Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. 2:89-cv-00979-DB Jenkins Y 63 
 Rose v. Utah State Bar 2:10-cv-1001-WPJ Johnson No 96 
 Johnson v. Life Inv’rs Ins.  2:96-cv-00283-DAK Kimball No 117 
 Rawlings v. Gilt Edge Flour Mills 1:07-cv-00031-DAK Kimball No 102 
 Am. Nat. Prop. & Cas. V. McNeely 1:16-cv-00007-DAK Kimball No 25 
 Westport Ins. v. Ong 1:07-cv-00010-DAK Kimball Y 50 
 Utah Div. Forestry v United States 2:97-cv-00927-DAK Kimball No 46 
 Snyder v. Cache Cty. 1:98-cv-00151-DAK Kimball No 61 
 Evans v. State of Utah 2:14-cv-00055-DAK Kimball No 145 
 Schubert v. Genzyme 2:12-cv-00587-DAK Kimball No 38 
 Burns v. Astrue 2:09-cv-00926-DAK Kimball Y 128 
 Carranza v. Mountainlands Health Clinic 2:07-cv-00291-DAK Kimball Y 129 
 Garza v. Burnet 1:06-cv-00134-DAK Kimball No Y 75 
 Gladwell v. Reinhart 2:08-cv-00562-DAK Kimball No Y 103 
 Whitney v. Div. of Juvenile Jus�ce Servs. 2:09-cv-00030-DAK Kimball N Y 5 
 In re Simmons 2:13-bk-33821-RKM Mosier Y 155 
 Hahn v. Reyes 2:16−cv−00666−DN Nuﬀer No 80 
 First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Nw. Title Ins. 2:15-cv-00229-DN Nuﬀer No 26 
 Utah Republican Party v. Herbert 2:16-cv-00038-DN Nuﬀer Y 47 
 Spurlino v. Holcim 2:14-cv-00461-JNP Parrish No 65 
 Burningham v Wright Med. Grp. 2:17-cv-00092-JNP Parrish 159 
 Loveridge v. Pruden�al Ins. Co. of Am. 2:16-cv-00377-JNP Parrish No 54 
 Dircks v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. 2:14-cv-00118-JNP Parrish Y 140 
 Flores v. Uniﬁed Police Dep’t  2:16-cv-00224-JNP Parrish Y 60 
 GeoMetWatch v. Hall 1:14-cv-00060-JNP Parrish Y 76 
 HealthBanc Int’l v. Synergy Worldwide 2:16-cv-00135-JNP Parrish Y 91 
 Lancer Ins. Co. v. Lake Shore Motor 2:14-cv-00785-JNP Parrish Y 21 
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 Zimmerman v. Univ. of Utah 2:13-cv-01131-JNP Parrish Y 17 
 Equitable Life Ins. v. Research Park  2:87-cv-00866-DS Sam No 144 
 Davis Cty. Constr. v. Davis Cty. 1:89-cv-00054-DS Sam No 137 
 Bragg v. Buck 1:94-cv-00127-DS Sam No 126 
 Litleﬁeld v. Mobil Expl. 2:94-cv-01078-DS Sam No 52 
 Harline v. Gladwell 1:90-cv-00117-DS Sam No 95 
 Jeppson v. Thoman 2:94-cv-00519-DS Sam No 116 
 Scot v. Hammock 2:89-cv-00267-TC Sam Y 39 
 United States v. Badger 2:10-cv-00935-DB Shelby No 42 
 Roberts v. C.R. England 2:12-cv-00302-RJS Shelby 97 
 Allen v. Bamboo HR 2:16-cv-00905-RJS Shelby No 24 
 Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 1:11-cv-00104-RJS Shelby Y 101 
 Jensen v. State of Utah 2:05-cv-00739-TS Stewart No 12 
 Johnson v. Riddle 2:98-cv-00599-TS Stewart Y 99 
 Hogan v. Utah Telecomms. 1:11-cv-00064-TS Stewart No 93 
 Edwards v. Utah Bd. of Pardons 2:01-cv-00834-TS Stewart No 141 
 Novell v. Handleman 2:01-cv-00173-TS Stewart Y 112 
 Haik v. Salt Lake Cty. Bd. of Health 2:13-cv-01051-TS Stewart No 88 
 Anderson v. Toomey 2:07-cv-00673-TS Stewart No 29 
 Boyd v. Jones et al. 2:00-cv-00472-TS Stewart No 125 
 Haik v. Salt Lake City Corp. 2:12-cv-00997-TS Stewart No 87 
 McArthur v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. 2:09-cv-00416-TS Stewart No Y 82 
 1.800. Vending v. Wyland 1:14-cv-00121-CW Waddoups No 20 
 Stone v. Third Dist. Court 2:12-cv-00390-CW Waddoups No 68 
 Powderham v. Synergy Worldwide 2:08-cv-00548-CW Waddoups No 104 
 Krehbiel v. Travelers Ins. Co. 2:08-cv-00110-CW Waddoups No 118 
 Olseth v. Salt Lake City Corp. 2:02-cv-01122-CW Waddoups No Y 152 
 Tabor v. Metal Ware Corp. 2:99-cv-00503-CW Waddoups No Y 31 
 Waddoups v Noorda 1:11-cv-00133-CW Waddoups Y 15 
 Garﬁeld Cty. v. United States 2:11-cv-01045-CW Waddoups Y 74 
 Self v. Teleperformance Grp. USA 2:08-cv-00395-PMW Warner No 57 
 Nat’l Indem. & Guar. v. U.S. Sports 2:07-cv-00996-TS Wells Y 37 
 Anaconda Minerals v. Stoller  2:87-cv-00118-DKW Winder No 28 
 Worthen v. Kennecot Corp. C 84 0468 Winder No 48 
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 Haights Creek Irriga. Co. v. United Tech. 1:91-cv-00042-DKW Winder Y 86 
 Holden v NL Indus., Inc. C-79-0391 Winder No 94 
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Appendix—Questions Certified to the Utah Supreme Court 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc. 900512 830 P.2d 236 (Utah 1992) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc. 2:88-cv-00708-JTG Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 (1) whether a person not actually threatened with bodily harm who incorrectly but  
 reasonably believes that he or she is actually threatened with bodily harm has a claim  
 for negligent inﬂic�on of emo�onal distress that sa�sﬁes the “threat of harm”  
 requirement of sec�on 313 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), as adopted by  
 this court in Johnson v. Rogers; 
 (2) whether a person who witnesses others receiving bodily harm and fears for his or  
 her own safety, although that person does not comprehend the source of the harm and  
 therefore does not fear harm from that par�cular source, has a claim for negligent  
 inﬂic�on of emo�onal distress that sa�sﬁes the “fear for one's own safety”  
 requirement of sec�on 313 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), as adopted by  
 this court in Johnson v. Rogers;  
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
In re W. Side Prop. Assocs. 981425 13 P.3d 168 (Utah 2000) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 In re W. Side Prop. Assocs. 97-20887 Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 1. Does Salt Lake County's assessment of property tax on a building omited from West  
 Side Property Associates' tax assessment no�ces for 1992 through 1996, when other  
 buildings and the land were assessed, cons�tute an escaped property assessment as  
 deﬁned by Utah Code Ann. § 59–2–102(8)(a)(i).1 
 2. If Salt Lake County's assessment is a valid escaped property assessment, upon what  
 date was the tax incurred. 
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 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Garﬁeld Cty. v. United States  20150335 2017 WL 3187505 (Utah 2017) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Garﬁeld County (1) et al. v. United  2:11-cv-01045-CW Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 Are Utah Code § 78B–2–201(1) and its predecessor statutes of limita�ons or statutes of  
 repose? 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Garza v. Burnet 20120180 321 P.3d 1104 (Utah 2013) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Garza v. Burnet 1:06-cv-00134-DAK Dist. Ct. Cert.? No Y 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y 
 Under Tenth Circuit decisions at the �me Gerardo Thomas Garza ﬁled his complaint,  
 approximately two years remained in limita�ons period. A Supreme Court decision soon 
  a�er ﬁling, however, overturned those decisions and rendered his complaint  
 approximately ten months late. Under Utah law, does an intervening change in  
 controlling circuit law merit equitable tolling under these circumstances? 
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=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
GeoMetWatch v. Hall 20170264-SC 
 Federal Trial Court 
 GeoMetWatch v. Hall 1:14-cv-00060-JNP Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 1. Are the Utah State University Research Founda�on and the Utah State University  
 Advanced Weather Systems Founda�on en�tled to immunity under the Governmental  
 Immunity Act of Utah (“Immunity Act” or the “Act”) as a “public corpora�on” and/or an  
 “instrumentality of the state?” 
 2. Utah Code sec�ons 63G-7-501 and -502 vest “exclusive, original jurisdic�on over any  
 ac�on brought under” the Immunity Act in “the district courts” and venue “in the county  
 in which the claim arose or in Salt Lake County.” Do these provisions reﬂect an intent by  
 the State of Utah to limit the Immunity Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity to suits  
 brought in Utah district courts? 
 3. If ques�on 2 is answered in the aﬃrma�ve, does the Oﬃce of the Atorney General  
 for the State of Utah or any li�gant have authority under Utah law to waive the  
 jurisdic�onal and venue provisions enacted by the Utah Legislature in the Immunity Act? 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Gibbs v. Unum Life Ins. Co. 20030277-SC 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Gibbs v. Unum Life Insurance  2:00-cv-00549-PGC Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 1. In a ﬁrst party insurance situa�on, may an insured recover consequen�al 
 damages, other than atorney's fees, for breach of the express terms of an insurance  
 contract? If so, what are the consequen�al damages that are recoverable for breach of  
 the express terms of an insurance contract and how are they dis�nguished from the  
 consequen�al damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair  
 dealing that are recoverable under Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801  
 (Utah 1985)? 
 2. Did Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-26-30 I, en�tled "Timely Payment of Claims," allow 
 a private cause of ac�on by the insured against his or her insurer for viola�on of the  
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 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Gines v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. 910516 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Gines v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. 2:89-cv-00543-JTG Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 Not available 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Grundberg v. Upjohn Co. 900573 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Grundberg v. Upjohn Co. 2:89-cv-00274-JTG Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 Whether Utah adopts the “unavoidably unsafe products” excep�on to strict products  
 liability as set forth in comment k to sec�on 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts  
 (1965) (“comment k”). 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
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=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
 Federal Trial Court 
 McCourt v. Semken, et al 2:87-cv-01052-BSJ Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 No digital documents available. 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ  20120158 289 P.3d 502 (Utah 2012) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Fundamentalist Church of Jesus  2:08–cv–00772-DB Dist. Ct. Cert.? No Y 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y 
 Under Utah preclusion law, is the Utah Supreme Court's discre�onary review of a  
 pe��on for extraordinary writ and subsequent dismissal on laches grounds a decision  
 “on the merits” when it is accompanied by a writen opinion, such that later  
 adjudica�on of the same claim is barred? 
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=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Haights Creek Irriga. v. United Tech 1:91-cv-00042-DKW Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 Not available 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Fox v. MCI Commc’ns Corp. 950280 931 P.2d 857 (Utah 1997) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Fox v. MCI Commc’ns Corp. 2:93-cv-00042-BSJ Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 Does the termina�on of a private sector employee in retalia�on for the good faith  
 repor�ng to company management of the alleged viola�on by one or more co-workers of 
  computer fraud and embezzlement laws, implicate “a clear and substan�al public  
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
HealthBanc Int’l v. Synergy Worldwide 20170591-SC 
 Federal Trial Court 
 HealthBanc Int’l v. Synergy Worldwide 2:16-cv-00135-JNP Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 Does Utah’s economic loss rule apply to a fraudulent inducement claim? 
 Tenth Circuit 
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 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Hirpa v. IHC Hosps., Inc. 960180 948 P.2d 785 (Utah 1997) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Hirpa v. IHC Hosps., Inc. 1:90-cv-00086-JTG Dist. Ct. Cert.? No Y 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y 
 (1) Do the provisions of the Utah Good Samaritan Statute, par�cularly Utah Code Ann. §  
 58–12–23, apply to grant a licensed physician immunity when that physician provides  
 emergency care at an emergency occurring in a hospital which has employed the  
 responding physician as its medical director? 
 (2) If sec�on 58–12–23 does apply in the circumstances appearing here, does the sec�on 
  violate the Utah Cons�tu�on? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Holden v. N L Indus., Inc. 17159 629 P.2d 428 (Utah 1981) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Holden v NL Indus., Inc. C-79-0391 Dist. Ct. Cert.? No Y 
 Whether the exclusive remedy provision of Utah's Workmen's Compensa�on Act, s 35-1- 
 60, bars plain�ﬀs' claims against defendant-employer, or whether, as an excep�on to  
 that rule, plain�ﬀs can collect (1) for the tort of fraud, which caused his death, or (2) for  
 ac�ons, conduct and rela�onships atributable to defendant's status as manufacturer  
 and supplier independent of its status as an employer, the so-called “dual capacity  
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
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=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Johnson v. Riddle 2:98-cv-00599-TS Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 Is Plain�ﬀ’s Utah Consumer Sales Prac�ces Act (“UCSPA”) claim against 
 Defendants, who are atorneys, barred by the judicial proceedings privilege when 
 the claim is based upon collec�on ac�vi�es such as no�ces, phone calls, and 
 documents made pursuant to a collec�on lawsuit? 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Richardson v. Navistar Int’l Transp. 990253 8 P.3d 263 (Utah 2000) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Richardson v. Navistar Int’l Transp. 2:95-cv-00752-DB Dist. Ct. Cert.? No Y 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y 
 Under Utah law, may plain�ﬀs who have entered into a judicially approved setlement  
 with mul�ple defendants a�er a trial in which a jury allocated 100% of the fault among  
 the par�es pursuant to the Utah compara�ve fault scheme, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37  
 to -43, maintain a subsequent tort ac�on for the same injuries, arising out of the same  
 transac�on or occurrence, against addi�onal known defendants who were not par�es to 
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=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 20130940 359 P.3d 614 (Utah 2015) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 1:11-cv-00104-RJS Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 Is the right of self-defense a substan�al public policy excep�on to 
 the at-will employment doctrine, which provides the basis for a 
 wrongful discharge ac�on? 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
In re Reinhart 20091087 267 P.3d 895 (Utah 2011) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Gladwell v. Reinhart 2:08-cv-00562-DAK Dist. Ct. Cert.? No Y 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y 
 Can a Keogh plan be “described in” sec�on 401(a) of the IRC despite failing to fulﬁll that 
  sec�on's requirements for qualiﬁca�on, thereby en�tling debtor to exempt the plan  
 from his bankruptcy estate property? 
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=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Peterson v. Browning 900401 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Peterson v. Browning 1:87-cv-00121-JTG Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 Does an ac�on for termina�on of employment based upon the public policy excep�on  
 to the employment-at-will doctrine for viola�on of or refusal to violate federal, other  
 state, or Utah law sound in tort or contract? 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
In re Reinhart 20110257 291 P.3d 228 (Utah 2012) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Gladwell v. Reinhart 2:06-cv-00325-BSJ Dist. Ct. Cert.? No Y 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y 
 1. Does Utah Code Ann. § 70C–7–103 create an exemp�on in bankruptcy, or does it only  
 limit a judgment creditor's garnishment remedy outside bankruptcy? 
 2. If § 70C–7–103 does create an exemp�on in bankruptcy, do pre-pe��on wages such as  
 those claimed by the debtor in this case qualify as “disposable earnings” under the  
 statute? 
 3. If § 70C–7–103 does create an exemp�on in bankruptcy, and the debtor's pre-pe��on  
 wages qualify as “disposable earnings” under the statute, do the debts in this case  
104 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Burningham v Wright Med. Grp. 2:17-cv-00092-JNP Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y 
 1. Under Utah law, does the unavoidably unsafe excep�on to strict products liability in  
 design defect claims recognized in Comment k to Sec�on 402A of the Restatement  
 (Second) of Torts apply to implanted medical devices? 
 2. If the answer to Ques�on 1 is in the aﬃrma�ve, does the excep�on apply  
 categorically to all implanted medical devices, or does the excep�on apply only to some 
  devices on a case-by-case basis? 
 3. If the excep�on applies on a case-by-case basis, what is the proper analysis to  
 determine whether the excep�on applies? 
 4. If the answer to Ques�on 1 is in the aﬃrma�ve, does the excep�on require a showing 
  that such devices were cleared for market through the FDAs premarket approval process 
  as opposed to the § 510(k) clearance process? 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Utah Republican Party v. Cox 20160077 373 P.3d 1286 (Utah 2016) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Utah Republican Party v. Herbert 2:16-cv-00038-DN Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 In interpre�ng Utah Code § 20A-9-101(12)(d), § 20A-9-406(3) and § 20A-9-406(4), does Utah  
 law require that a QPP permit its members to seek its nomina�on by  “either” or "both"  
 of the methods set forth in § 20A-9-407 and § 20A-9-408, or may a QPP preclude a  member 
  from seeking the party’s nomina�on by gathering signatures under § 20A-9-408? 
 The statutes that may be at issue include:  Utah Code § 20A-9-101(12)(d), Utah Code §  
 20A-9-406(3), Utah Code § 20A-9-406(4) and Utah Code § 20A-9-401. 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
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=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Tabor v. Metal Ware Corp. 20060504 168 P.3d 814 (Utah 2007) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Tabor v. Metal Ware Corp. 2:99-cv-00503-CW Dist. Ct. Cert.? No Y 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y 
 1. Does Utah law recognize an excep�on to the general rule of successor nonliability  
 under the circumstances of this case? 
 2. Does Utah law impose on successor corpora�ons a post-sale duty to independently  
 warn customers of defects in products manufactured and sold by the predecessor  
 corpora�on? If so, what factors should determine whether a successor has discharged  
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Thayer v. Washington Cty. Sch. Dist. 20100648 285 P.3d 1142 (Utah 2012) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Thayer v. Washington Cty. Sch. Dist. 2:09-cv-00565-DB Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 Because the disposi�on of the state immunity claim turns on important and unsetled  
 ques�ons of Utah law, I cer�fy the following legal ques�on to the Utah Supreme Court:  
 Considering the facts discussed above, did the conduct of the school district oﬃcials  
 and those ac�ng on the school district’s behalf cons�tute the issuance of a “permit,  
 license, cer�ﬁcate, approval, order, or similar authoriza�on” under Utah Code Ann.  
 §63G-7-301(5)(c) such that the state actors are en�tled to immunity from liability  
 pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act? 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
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=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
TruGreen Cos., LLC v. Mower Bros. 20070451 199 P.3d 929 (Utah 2008) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 TruGreen Cos. v. Biton 1:06-cv-00024-BSJ Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 1. Whether under Utah law a former employer is en�tled to an award of lost proﬁts  
 damages, or instead an award of res�tu�on or unjust enrichment damages, where a  
 former employee has breached contractual non-compe��on, non-disclosure, and  
 employee nonsolicita�on provisions? 
 2. Whether Utah law recognizes an unjust enrichment measure of damages for tor�ous  
 interference with a compe�tor’s contractual and economic rela�ons? 
 3. Whether “actual damages” under Utah Code Ann. § 13-5a-103(1)(b)(i), the Utah 
 Unfair Compe��on Act, means the plain�ﬀ’s lost proﬁts or an award of damages  
 deﬁned by the defendant’s revenues? 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
U.S. Fid. & Guar. v. U.S. Sports Specialty 20090657 270 P.3d 464 (Utah 2012) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Nat’l Indem. v. U.S. Sports Specialty 2:07-cv-00996-TS Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 1. Does an insurer have a right to reimbursement or res�tu�on against an insured? 
 2. If an insurer does have a right to reimbursement or res�tu�on against an insured are  
 there any prerequisites to receiving such a right? 
 3. And ﬁnally, if such a right exists, does an insurer’s payment in excess of a policy’s  
 limit impact any such right. 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
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=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Whitney v. Div. Juvenile Jus�ce Servs. 20100983 274 P.3d 906 (Utah 2012) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Whitney v. Div. Juvenile Jus�ce Servs. 2:09-cv-00030-DAK Dist. Ct. Cert.? N Y 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y 
 Is a juvenile delinquent placed in a community-based proctor home incarcerated in a  
 place of legal conﬁnement, such that Utah has not waived its state sovereign immunity  
 for injuries arising out of, in connec�on with, or resul�ng from his placement, pursuant  
 to the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah, Utah Code § 63G–7–301(5)(j)? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Waddoups v Noorda 20120310 321 P.3d 1108 (Utah 2013) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Waddoups v Noorda 1:11-cv-00133-CW Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 Does sec�on § 78B-3-425 of the Utah Code clarify exis�ng law and therefore retroac�vely  
 apply to bar negligent creden�aling claims ﬁled prior to its enactment? 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
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=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Zimmerman v. Univ. of Utah 20160572-SC 2018 WL 523483 (Utah 2018) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Zimmerman v. Univ. of Utah 2:13-cv-01131-JNP Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 1. Is the Free Speech Clause of the Utah Cons�tu�on self-execu�ng? 
 2. If ques�on 1 is answered in the aﬃrma�ve, what are the elements of a claim brought 
  under the clause? 
 3. Does an employee who receives no�ce that his or her employment will be terminated 
  eﬀec�ve on a future date suﬀer an adverse employment ac�on for purposes of the Utah 
  Protec�on of Public Employees Act when he or she receives the no�ce, when the  
 employment is actually terminated, or both? 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Lancer Ins. Co. v. Lake Shore Motor  20160244 391 P.3d 218 (Utah 2017) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Lancer Ins. Co. v. Lake Shore Motor  2:14-cv-00785-JNP Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 1. Does Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(1)(a)(v) impose liability on an insured 
 driver for damages to third par�es resul�ng from the driver’s unforeseeable 
 loss of consciousness while driving, thereby abroga�ng the common law 
 principle that liability for personal injury may not be imposed absent fault or 
 negligence? 
 2. If ques�on 1 is answered in the aﬃrma�ve, is the driver’s liability limited to 
 the limits of the applicable insurance policy or the applicable minimum 
 statutory limit? 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
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=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Gardner v. Galetka 20051029 151 P.3d 968 (Utah 2007) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Gardner v. Galetka 2:95-cv-00846-TC Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 If Gardner had presented the ineﬀec�ve assistance claim at issue in Gardner v. Galetka, 
  2004 UT 42, 94 P.3d 263 in State court in a successive pe��on in 1990, would the pe��on  
 have been procedurally barred? 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Scot v Hammock 910112 870 P.2d 947 (Utah 1994) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Scot v. Hammock 2:89-cv-00267-TC Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 Not available. 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
110 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Miller v United States 20030054 104 P.3d 1202 (Utah 2005) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Miller v. United States 1:02-cv-00037-TC Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 Whether a federal government employee who ordinarily would be immune from suit in  
 cases of strict liability, may be liable under Utah's Dramshop Act if the Plain�ﬀs  
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Westport Ins. v. Ong 1:07-cv-00010-DAK Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 I. Under Utah law, can a liability insurance company seek reimbursement of defense  
 costs from its insured in the absence of a policy provision permi�ng such  
 reimbursement? 
 2. If the answer to Ques�on No. I is yes, on what state law theory is the cause of 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
111 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Machan v. Unum Life Ins. Co. 20030789 116 P.3d 342 (Utah 2005) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Machan v. Unum Life Ins. Co. 2:00-cv-00904-PGC Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 1. In a ﬁrst party insurance situa�on, may an insured recover consequen�al 
 damages, other than atorney's fees, for breach of the express terms of an insurance  
 contract? If so, what are the consequen�al damages that are recoverable for breach of  
 the express terms of an insurance contract and how arc they dis�nguished from the  
 consequen�al damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair  
 dealing that are recoverable under Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801  
 (Utah 1985)? 
 2. Did Utah Code Ann.§ 3 lA-26-301, en�tled 'Timely Payment of Claims," allow 
 a private cause of ac�on by the insured against his or her insurer for viola�on of the  
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Smith v. United States No. 20131030 356 P.3d 1249 (Utah 2015) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Smith v. U.S. Dep’t Veterans Aﬀairs  2:12-cv-00968-DB Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 1. Does the limita�on on a plain�ﬀs recovery of noneconomic damages in Utah Code  
 Ann. § 78B-3-410 apply to claims alleging wrongful death caused by medical  
 malprac�ce? 
 2. If the answer to Ques�on No.1 is in the aﬃrma�ve, is Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3 410  
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
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=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Flores v. Uniﬁed Police Dep’t 20170268-SC 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Flores v. Uniﬁed Police Dep’t 2:16-cv-00224-JNP Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 Utah Code sec�ons 63G-7-501 and -502 vest “exclusive, original jurisdic�on over any  
 ac�on brought under” the Immunity Act in “the district courts” and venue “in the county  
 in which the claim arose or in Salt Lake County.” Do these provisions reﬂect an intent by  
 the State of Utah to limit the Immunity Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity to suits  
 brought in Utah district courts? 
 2. If ques�on 1 is answered in the aﬃrma�ve, does the Uniﬁed Police Department of  
 Greater Salt Lake have authority under Utah law to waive the jurisdic�onal and venue  
 provisions enacted by the Utah Legislature in the Immunity Act? 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Savings  920015 857 P.2d 935 (Utah 1993) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Soter's Inc., v. Deseret Fed. Savings 2:89-cv-00979-DB Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 Materials are not available. 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
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=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Spackman v. Bd. Ed. Box Elder Cty. 990553 16 P.3d 533 (Utah 2000) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Spackman v. Bd. Ed. Box Elder Cty. 1:98-cv-00120-TC Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 Whether the Free and Equal Public Educa�on Clause of the Utah Cons�tu�on (Art. X, § 1)  
 and/or the Due Process Clause of the Utah Cons�tu�on (Art. I, §7) are self-execu�ng  
 cons�tu�onal provisions that may be directly enforced without implemen�ng  
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins No. 981732 996 P.2d 531 (Utah 2000) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins 2:88-cv-00410-JTG Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 (1) whether, under Utah law, the negligent acts of a plain�ﬀ in causing or contribu�ng  
 to the situa�on that the plain�ﬀ hired a professional to resolve can be the basis for  
 compara�ve or contributory negligence defense; and (2) how a plain�ﬀs negligent acts  
 in causing or contribu�ng to the situa�on that the plain�ﬀ hired a professional to  
 resolve can be considered in determining causa�on and damages. 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
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=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Stoker v. Salt Lake Cty. 2:90-cv-00248-BSJ Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 Not available. 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah No. 910482 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah 2:87-cv-00330-JTG Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 Unknown - documents not available 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
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=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Touchard v. La-Z-Boy, Inc. No. 20050361 148 P.3d 945 (Utah 2006) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Ammons v. La-Z-Boy, Inc. 1:04-cv-00067-TC Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 Whether the exercise of rights under the Utah Workers' Compensa�on Act, Utah Code  
 Ann. §34A-2-101, et. seq., ("UWCA") implicates "a clear and substan�al public policy" of  
 the State of Utah that would provide a basis for a claim of wrongful termina�on in  
 viola�on of public policy; and if so, 
  
 Whether this cause of ac�on applies in the following circumstances: (a) where the  
 employee has not ﬁled for beneﬁts under the UWCA but is retaliated against for  
 opposing an employer's treatment of other injured employees who are en�tled to ﬁle  
 for beneﬁts under the UWCA; (b) the employee is not ﬁred but resigns under  
 circumstances that cons�tute a "construc�ve discharge"; and ( c) the employee who has  
 ﬁled for beneﬁts under the UWCA is neither ﬁred nor construc�vely discharged, but  
 experiences other discriminatory treatment or harassment from an employer because  
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
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=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Katerman v. Salt Lake Cty. 0170324-SC 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Katerman v. Salt Lake Cty. 2:13-cv-01122-EJF Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 1. Does Utah’s Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code sec�ons 63G-7-101 through -904,  
 apply to dog bite claims against governmental en��es and their employees brought  
 pursuant to Utah Code sec�on 18-1-1, “Liability of Owners-Scienter-Dogs Used in Law  
 Enforcement”? 
  
 2. Utah Code sec�on 63G-7-202(3)(a) provides that “an ac�on under this chapter [Utah’s  
 Governmental Immunity Act] against a governmental en�ty for an injury caused by an act 
  or omission that occurs during the performance of an employee’s du�es, within the  
 scope of employment, or under color of authority is a plain�ﬀ’s exclusive remedy.” Is the 
  “exclusive remedy” provision of Utah Code sec�on 63G-7-202(3)(a) preempted or limited  
 by Utah Code sec�on 18-1-1, “Liability of Owners-Scienter-Dogs Used in Law  
 Enforcement”? 
  
 3. Utah Code sec�on 63G-7-101(2) provides that “[t]he scope of the waivers and  
 reten�ons of immunity found in this comprehensive chapter: (a) applies to all func�ons  
 of government, no mater how labeled; and (b) governs all claims against governmental  
 en��es or against their employees or agents rising out of the performance of the  
 employee’s du�es, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority.” Does  
 Utah Code sec�on 63G-7-101(2) apply to dog bite claims against governmental en��es  
 and employees brought pursuant to Utah Code sec�on 18-1-1, “Liability of Owners- 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
117 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Clark v. Pangan 981694 998 P.2d 268 (Utah 2000) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Clark v. United States 2:98-cv-00304-DB Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 "As a mater of Utah state law is it possible for the inten�onal tort of batery to be  
 within the scope of a person's employment, and if it is possible for batery to be within  
 the scope of one's employment, what test is to be employed to determine whether the  
 bater was within the scope of employment." 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Mecham v. Frazier No. 20070730. 193 P.3d 630 (Utah 2008) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Mecham v. Frazier 1:04-cv-00033-CW Dist. Ct. Cert.? No Y 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y 
 1. Does the Utah Governmental Immunity Act confer to state oﬃcers an 
 immunity from suit (immediately appealable) or merely an immunity from 
 liability (not immediately appealable)? 
 2. Does the Utah Governmental Immunity Act require that a No�ce of 
 Claim against state oﬃcials in their individual capacity expressly aver 
 “fraud” or “malice”? 
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=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Mitchell v. Roberts 20170447-SC 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Mitchell v. Roberts 2:16-cv-00843-EJF Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 1. Can the Utah Legislature expressly revive �me-barred claims through a 
 statute? 
 2. Speciﬁcally, does the language of Utah Code sec�on 78B–2–308(7), 
 expressly reviving claims for child sexual abuse that were barred by the 
 previously applicable statute of limita�ons as of July 1, 2016, make unnecessary the  
 analysis of whether the change enlarges or eliminates 
 vested rights? 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Carranza v. United States 20090409 267 P.3d 912 (Utah 2011) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Carranza v. Mountainlands Health 2:07-cv-00291-DAK Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 "Does Utah's wrongful death statute allow an ac�on for the wrongful death of an  
 unborn child?" 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
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=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Burns v. Astrue 20100435 289 P.3d 551 (Utah 2012) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Burns v. Astrue 2:09-cv-00926-DAK Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 "Is a signed agreement to donate preserved sperm to the donor's wife in the event of  
 his death suﬃcient to cons�tute 'consent[] in a record' to being the 'parent' of a child  
 conceived by ar�ﬁcial means a�er the donor's death under Utah intestacy law, Utah  
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Egbert v. Nissan N. Am., Inc. 20060433-SC 167 P.3d 1058 (Utah 2007) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Egbert v. Nissan N. Am., Inc. 2:04-cv-00551-DN Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 First Cer�ﬁca�on (docket no. 277): 
 1. In a product liability case where a manufacturer's product complies with applicable  
 government safety standards, should the jury be instructed that a presump�on of non- 
 defec�veness has arisen under Utah Code Ann. 78-15-6(3)? If so, should the instruc�on  
 require clear and convincing evidence of a defect to rebut the presump�on, or is proof  
 by a preponderance of the evidence suﬃcient for rebutal? 
 2. Does Utah recognize the "enhanced injury" theory of liability outlined in 16(a) of the  
 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability? 
  
 Second cer�ﬁca�on (docket no. 330, ﬁled 10/1/2008): 
 1. Is Utah Code Ann. 78-15-6(3) cons�tu�onal? 
 2. Does Utah recognize Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability 16 (b)-(d)? 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
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=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Robert J. DeBry & Assocs. v. Quest Dex 20050299 144 P.3d 1079 (Utah 2006) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Robert J. DeBry & Assocs. v. Quest Dex 1:03-cv-00099-PGC Dist. Ct. Cert.? No Y 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y 
 "Whether Defendants violated Utah Code Ann. 13-11a-3(1)(b), (d), or (t) when they  
 published in their 2003-2004 Ogden -area telephone directory a table of numerical  
 preﬁxes associated with a 'local calling area' and adver�sements by third par�es that  
 include a market expansion line telephone number without any physical business  
 address; and if so, whether Defendants are exempt from liability under Utah Code Ann.  
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Dircks v. Travelers Indem. Co.  20160065-SC 2017 WL 4675471 (Utah 2017) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Dircks v. Travelers Indem. Co. 2:14-cv-00118-JNP Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 "Does Utah Code Ann. 31A-22-305.3 require that all vehicles covered under the liability  
 provisions of a motor vehicle insurance policy also be covered under the underinsured  
 motorist provisions of that policy with equal coverage limits, unless a named insured  
 signs an acknowledgment form mee�ng the requirements of the statute?" 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
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=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Kennard v. Leavit 2:01-cv-00171-DB Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 1. Does Utah Code Ann. § 24–1–15(2)(a)(iii) of the Utah Property Protec�on Act authorize a 
  state court judge to approve a law enforcement oﬃcer's transfer of property in  
 obedience to a federal forfeiture order, because disobeying the federal order would  
 place the oﬃcer in jeopardy of being found in contempt and thus “unduly burden” the  
 oﬃcer for purposes of that provision? For purposes of this ques�on, “federal forfeiture  
 order” includes a federal court order, federal warrant for arrest in rem, federal agency  
 administra�ve order, or seizure order obtained by a federal agency. 
 2. Alterna�vely, does Utah Code Ann. § 24–1–15(2)(a) even require a seizing agency or  
 prosecu�ng atorney to pe��on a state court to authorize such a transfer when the  
 seizing agency or prosecu�ng atorney is already under a federal forfeiture order? For  
 purposes of this ques�on, “federal forfeiture order” includes a federal court order,  
 federal warrant for arrest in rem, federal agency administra�ve order, or seizure order  
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Burkholz v. Joyce 970252 972 P.2d 1235 (Utah 1998) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Burkholz v. Joyce 2:96-cv-00252-TC Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 "Whether the excep�onal circumstances version of the discovery rule tolls the  
 applicable statute of limita�ons, where, during the limita�ons period, the plain�ﬀ's  
 knowledge of the opera�ve facts underlying his cause of ac�on is interrupted by a  
 period of psychological repression during which plain�ﬀ is unaware of such facts." 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
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=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co v. Unigard Ins. Co. 20090340. 268 P.3d 180 (Utah 2012) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cloud Nine 1:05-cv-00088-DB Dist. Ct. Cert.? No Y 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y 
 Should the defense costs in the EdiZone case be allocated between Ohio Casualty and  
 Unigard under the “equal shares” method set forth in the “other insurance clause” of  
 Ohio Casualty's policy, or, in the alterna�ve, because the policies were issued for  
 successive periods, should those defense costs be allocated using the �me-on-risk  
 method described in Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127, 140  
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Iverson v. State Farm Mut. Ins. 20081016 256 P.3d 222 (Utah 2011) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Iverson v. State Farm Mut. Ins.  1:06-cv-00113-DB Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 How should Utah Code Ann. 31A-22-305(9)(b) and 31A-22-305(9)(h) [now codiﬁed as Utah  
 Code 31A-22-305.3] be interpreted and applied to the undisputed background facts of  
 this case? 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
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=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
In re Simmons 20140514-SC 73 
 Federal Trial Court 
 In re Simmons 2:13-bk-33821-RKM Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 Is an individual en�tled to a homestead exemp�on under UCA 78B-5-503(2) in  
 "Property," as deﬁned in UCA 78-5-503(1)(d), that is �tled in the name of a self-setled  
 revocable trust created by the individual? 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Endow v. Utah Transit Auth. 20140024-SC 2015 WL 4394047 (Utah 2015) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Endow v. Utah Transit Auth. 1:13-cv-00108-TC Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 "Does the Utah An�discrimina�on Act, Utah Code Ann. 34A-5-101 et seq., provide for  
 individual liability?" 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
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=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Pace v. Swerdlow 2:06-cv-00027-DB Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 To what extent, if any, does Utah law provide witness immunity for retained expert  
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Novell v. Handleman 2:01-cv-00173-TS Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 Does the Utah version of the UCC govern transac�ons involving the 
 "licensing" of so�ware products (when so�ware is "sold" on computer disks, but the  
 developer retains the intellectual property rights)? 
  
 Does the Utah version of the UCC apply to distribu�on agreements? 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
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=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
In re Kiley 20170472-SC 
 Federal Trial Court 
 In re Kiley 2:15-bk-27838-KA Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 1. What is the nature and scope of a party's interest in marital property as of the ﬁling  
 of a divorce complaint -- contrasted with the nature and scope of such interest upon the  
 entry of a divorce decree alloca�ng such marital property? Stated diﬀerently, upon the  
 ﬁling for divorce, is a spouse's interest in marital property merely con�ngent,  
 unliquidated, and inchoate un�l the entry of a divorce decree crea�ng a vested right to  
 receive a speciﬁc sum of money or a speciﬁc marital asset? 
 2. Is an individual en�tled to an exemp�on under Utah Code Ann. 78B-5-505(1)(a)(xv) in  
 money or other assets payable to that individual as an alternate payee under a QDRO?  
 Stated more simply, is the Debtor en�tled under Utah law to exempt the Re�rement  
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
In re Hendry 20170484-SC 
 Federal Trial Court 
 In re Hendry 2:14-bk-27398-KA Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 What is the nature and scope of a party's interest in marital property as of the ﬁling of a 
  divorce complaint -- contrasted with the nature and scope of such interest upon the  
 entry of a divorce decree alloca�ng such marital property? Stated diﬀerently, upon the  
 ﬁling for divorce, is a spouse's interest in marital property merely con�ngent,  
 unliquidated, and inchoate un�l the entry of a divorce decree crea�ng a vested right to  
 receive a speciﬁc sum of money or a speciﬁc marital asset? 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
126 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
Olseth v. Larson 20051180 158 P.3d 532 (Utah 2007) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 Olseth v. Salt Lake City Corp. 2:02-cv-01122-CW Dist. Ct. Cert.? No Y 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y 
 “Is the statute of limita�ons tolled under Utah Code Ann. § 78–12–35 when a person  
 against whom a claim has accrued has le� the state of Utah and has no agent within  
 the state of Utah upon whom service of process can be made instead, but the person is  
 amenable to service pursuant to Utah's long-arm statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78–27–24?” 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
In re Kunz & In re Rockwell 20030502 99 P.3d 793 (Utah 2004) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 In re Kunz & In re Rockwell 2:02-bk-40422-GEC Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 Do funds transferred directly from on exempt account, as described in Utah Code Ann.  
 78-23-5(1)(a)(x), to another exempt account within one year before a debtor ﬁles  
 bankruptcy cons�tute "amounts contributed" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. 78- 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
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=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
 20170561-SC 
 Federal Trial Court 
 CR England v Swi� Transp. 2:14-cv-00781-DB Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y Y 
 1. Does the tort of inten�onal interference with contract require proof of “improper  
 means”? 
 2. If so, what cons�tutes “improper means” in the context of tor�ous interference with  
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? 
 
=========================================================== 
Utah Supreme Court 
McArthur v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. No. 20100847 274 P.3d 981 (Utah 2012) 
 Federal Trial Court 
 McArthur v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. 2:09-cv-00416-TS Dist. Ct. Cert.? No Y 
 Tenth Circuit 
 Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y 
 A. Whether an exhaus�on clause, which excludes underinsured motorist 
 coverage contained in an automobile insurance policy absent a 
 condi�on precedent, is generally unenforceable in the State of Utah as 
 contrary to the State’s public policy, to wit: 
 THERE IS NO COVERAGE UNTIL: 
 1. THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY OF ALL BODILY INJURY 
 LIABILITY BONDS AND POLICIES THAT APPLY 
 HAVE BEEN USED UP BY PAYMENT OF 
 JUDGMENTS OR SETTLEMENTS TO OTHER 
 PERSONS; OR  
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 2. SUCH LIMITS OF LIABILITY OR REMAINING PART 
 OF THEM HAVE BEEN OFFERED TO THE INSURED. 
  
 B. Provided that the aforemen�oned exhaus�on clause is not generally 
 unenforceable in the State of Utah as contrary to the State’s public 
 policy, whether the enforceability of such clause is con�ngent upon the 
 insurer establishing actual prejudice to its economic interest. 
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Appendix—Methods of Gathering Utah Cases Related to Certification 
We attempted to gather every Utah case involving certification and log the cases into a 
Microsoft Access database. Contact the author to obtain a copy of the database file. 
Explanation of Case Document Locations: 
Cases actually certified from one court to another will result in documents in two courts, 
the certifying court and the Utah Supreme Court. The procedural history of the case will 
affect the number of relevant case documents and their location. 
If a case in the federal district court grants certification, there will be a federal district 
court case and a Utah Supreme Court case. The case may be appealed to the Tenth Circuit 
and the appeal may or may not involve certification. All appeals were listed. If the appeal 
involves certification, that was noted. One case originating in district court certified two 
questions. Some cases have multiple appeals. 
Some cases in the district court deny certification. They have no corresponding case in 
the Utah Supreme Court but may have been appealed to the Tenth Circuit. All appeals 
were listed. If the appeal involves certification, that was noted. 
Cases certified from the Tenth Circuit always have an origination in the Utah federal 
District Court and a corresponding case in the Utah Supreme Court. These cases are 
interesting because they demonstrate a decision by the Utah federal District Court not to 
certify which is thought to be in error by the Tenth Circuit. That error is not usually called 
out in the appellate opinion. In some instances, these cases are remanded after the 
certification and may be appealed a second time. We did/did not find any interlocutory 
appeals/writs mandating certification. 
Utah Federal Trial Courts: 
To gather Utah federal district court cases, we searched the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Utah through the electronic filing system CM/ECF using the events Order UT 
Supreme Court [cv, misc] and Order on Motion for Certification of Issue to State 
Supreme Court [cv, order]. We also searched written opinions for the word “certification” 
which yielded some cases and many false positives, because many things are certified in 
the district court. A CM/ECF search excludes many older cases because CM/ECF was not 
implemented in Utah until May 1 2005. However, some dockets and orders before that 
date were imported into CM/ECF.508 
                                                 
508 The District of Utah provides electronic access to case information on civil cases filed with the Court since July 
1989, and criminal cases filed with the court since November 1992. Exceptions include cases that have been sealed 
by order of a judge and social security cases. This system permits users to search for a case by entering a party name 
or case number. Documents began to be scanned to TIF format, and available electronically on a limited basis in 
November 1998. By the year 2000, most documents were being either scanned to PDF or converted electronically to 
PDF text format, and available through WebPACER. http://www.utd.uscourts.gov/cmecf-general-information (last 
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We also searched CM/ECF docket text only (not case filed documents) for the phrase 
“Utah Supreme Court” which also yielded many false positives, but gathered more cases. 
(This reveals that the correct CM/ECF events are not always used for certification 
orders.) Because this was not a search for CM/ECF filing events, which only began to be 
used May 1, 2005, but a search for docket entries, many of which were imported into 
CM/ECF, this method of search in CM/ECF went back much further in time, finding 
cases as early as 1989.  
Similar searches were made in the Utah Bankruptcy Court. However, the method used 
did not locate cases in which motions to certify were denied. 
Utah Supreme Court: 
To locate cases from the Utah Supreme Court, we searched in Westlaw for cases with the 
Key Number 170B-3105-3108. There are 37 Utah Cases under this Key Number. 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals: 
To locate cases from the Tenth Circuit, we searched in Westlaw for cases with the Key 
Number 170B-3105-3108. We culled the cases from Utah from that group. 
 
                                                 
visited June 15, 2017). The District went live on CM/ECF with full electronic filing May 1, 2005. “District of Utah 
is Live on CM/ECF, May 1, 2005. http://utd-cmecf.blogspot.com/2005/05/ (last visited June 15, 2017). 
